Hijackers' Meticulous Strategy of Brains, Muscle and
Practice
Source: NY Times
Published: 11/04/01 Author: By DON VAN NATTA
Jr. and KATE ZERNIKE
American Airlines Flight 11 was in line for
takeoff from Logan
International Airport, the passengers already reminded to
turn off
personal electronic devices, when Mohamed Atta, in seat 8D in
business class, dialed his cellphone for the last time.
The call rang
aboard another sparsely occupied jetliner a bit farther
back on the same
tarmac, on a cellphone belonging to Marwan al-
Shehhi, in seat 6C on United
Airlines Flight 175.
The conversation between the two men, so close that
they called each
other cousin, lasted less than one minute — just long
enough,
investigators say, to signal that the plot was on.
That
simple communication was the culmination of months of meticulous
planning
and coordination that by 10 o'clock on the morning of Sept.
11 would become
the worst terrorist attack in history.
With all the suspects dead and no
evidence, as yet, of any
accomplices, investigators have been left to
recreate the
architecture and orchestration of the plot largely from the
recorded
minutiae of the hijackers' brief American lives: their cellphone
calls, credit card charges, Internet communications and automated
teller
machine withdrawals.
What has emerged, nearly two months into the
investigation, is a
picture in which the roles of the 19 hijackers are so
well defined as
to be almost corporate in their organization and
coordination.
Investigators now divide the 19 into three distinct
groups:
Mr. Atta, considered the mastermind, and three other leaders who
chose the dates for the attack and flew the planes; a support staff
of
three who helped with the logistics of renting apartments,
securing driver's
licenses and distributing cash to the teams that
would take the four planes;
and beneath them, 12 soldiers,
or "muscle," whose sole responsibility seems
to have been restraining
the flight attendants and passengers while the
leaders took over the
jets' controls.
The leaders had researched
their plans so well that they knew just
when each of the four cross-country
flights would reach its cruising
altitude — the moment, investigators say,
when the hijackers stormed
the cockpits to confront the pilots with box
cutters. The
coordination was so thorough that each of the four hijacking
teams
had its own bank account, and each team's A.T.M. cards used a single
PIN. The slightest misstep could trigger intense frustration: more
than
once last summer in Florida, when money transfers from abroad
had not
arrived on the expected dates, security cameras captured
several hijackers
glaring impatiently into A.T.M. screens.
The hijackers made a true
technophile's use of the Internet, online
chat rooms and e-mail. But when it
came to their most crucial
communications, they did what Al Qaeda's manual
on terrorist
operations instructs: they met in person. They chose as their
meeting
place the same locale where generations of American conventioneers
have met to exchange information about their crafts: Las Vegas, where
investigators now say they believe the most crucial planning in the
United States occurred.
But unlike traditional conventioneers who
cluster in casino hotels
that replicate the Pyramids or the New York City
skyline, the leaders
and their logistics men stayed at the seediest end of
the famous Las
Vegas Strip, next to the "Home of the $5 Lap Dance," at a
cheap motel
guaranteed not to have surveillance cameras. They stayed
briefly,
only as long as it took to exchange important information, and
apparently did not visit the casinos or any of the other purveyors of
easy vice in America's City of Sin.
Most of the 19 hijackers, perhaps
all of them, spent time in Osama
bin Laden's Afghan training camps,
investigators now say. Some of the
Sept. 11 soldiers appear to have met
there. And like Mr. Atta and the
other pilots, the muscle did not seem to
fit the profile of suicide
bombers as desperate and impoverished young men.
With the exception
of one, they were all Saudis, relatively well off and
well educated.
While the leaders seemed to be Islamic zealots, the muscle
did not,
indulging often in pornography and liquor.
There is still
much that investigators do not know. While they
contend, for instance, that
the plot cost nearly $500,000, they have
been able to trace only half of it
back to a suspected Al Qaeda
source. They know where the leaders met, but
not what information
they exchanged — among hundreds of e-mail messages
seized from
computers in Florida and Las Vegas, there is no "smoking gun" or
reference to the Sept. 11 attacks, a senior investigator said.
The
investigators say they are unsure how the soldiers were
recruited. And they
do not know how those men thought the story was
going to end — if they were
aware that they had signed on to
die. "This went totally by the book," one
senior government official
said. "It has all the earmarks of Al Qaeda. It
was well organized,
far from a half-baked operation. They had good
coordination,
excellent communication that is hard to track, and a good,
simple
plan. Somebody did their homework."
Following the
Manual
Investigators say their best theory is that Sept. 11 was a
franchise
operation, and the leaders hewed closely to the dictates of Al
Qaeda's terror manual.
The plot was first pieced together, they say,
at least two years ago,
in Hamburg, Germany, where three of the men who
would later be
leaders and pilots — Mr. Atta, Mr. Shehhi and Ziad Amir
Jarrah — were
part of a terrorist cell. Three other suspected members of
that cell
fled in early September and are being sought as
accomplices.
Senior law enforcement officials say the Hamburg plotters
received
the blessing — and, crucially, cash — from Al Qaeda, although
investigators say they do not know who in Osama bin Laden's
organization
approved the operation. Several officials say they
suspect it was Mr. bin
Laden himself, and investigators have also
said his top three associates
were involved in the planning. "They
met with somebody else who was calling
the shots" in Germany, one
official said. "But we don't know who that person
is.'`
Mr. Shehhi and Mr. Atta received visas to enter the United States
in
January 2000, and Mr. Jarrah arrived in June of that year. Another
pilot, Hani Hanjour, had been living in Southern California since
1996,
and two of the logistics men, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid
Almihdhar, had moved
to San Diego in 1999.
Investigators are not certain how the Hamburg and
California groups
came together, but evidence suggests it was through Al
Qaeda
channels. Investigators say they have linked Mr. Almihdhar to the
attack on the American destroyer Cole and perhaps to the 1998
bombings
of American Embassies in east Africa.
The money for the operation began
arriving at branches of the
SunTrust Bank and Century Bank in Florida, in
the summer of 2000. Mr.
Atta received slightly more than $100,000, Mr.
Shehhi just less than
that amount. About half of the $500,000 used to pay
for the
operation, senior Federal Bureau of Investigation officials say, was
wired by an important bin Laden operative, Mustafa Ahmad, from the
United Arab Emirates, and much of the rest from Germany. However, one
official said the authorities suspect the money trail began in
Pakistan.
Travel records show each of the men making several trips in
and out of the
United States in 2000 and early 2001 — to Spain,
Prague, Bangkok and Saudi
Arabia. Mr. Atta took seven international
trips; Mr. Shehhi took five. In
this country, they all had begun
taking flying lessons, in Phoenix, San
Diego and South Florida.
By spring 2001, the 12 men whom investigators
call the muscle had
begun to arrive from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government,
stung by
American reports that most of the hijackers received visas from
their
country, initially said that the hijackers used fake identities
stolen from innocent citizens. But the F.B.I. says that it has
confirmed
the identities of all 19 of the hijackers, and that 15 were
Saudis.
While the Saudi government has restricted the F.B.I. and
reporters
from interviewing the families of the men, the families of some of
the foot soldiers have told Arab newspapers that their sons left
within
the last 18 months, variously saying they were going to seek
religious
counseling, on pilgrimage or on jihad in Chechnya. An
investigator said
there was evidence that these men spent at least a
year in Al Qaeda training
camps.
The family of one, Mohand Alshehri, said he had studied at Imam
Muhammed Ibn Saud Islamic University in Abha, Saudi Arabia, for one
semester. The father of two others, Wail and Waleed Alshehri, said
they
had studied to become teachers. Another, Ahmed Alnami, had
studied law in
Abha. The man the F.B.I. identifies as the third
logistics man, Majed Moqed,
studied at King Saud University in
Riyadh, in the faculty of administration
and economics, according to
Arab newspapers.
Most hailed from poor
villages where fundamentalism thrives. But
their families appeared to be on
the upper rungs; their fathers were
religious leaders, school principals,
shopkeepers and businessmen.
None had visited the United States before,
and several appeared to
speak little or no English. Once they arrived, the
logistics men
helped them fade into American life.
Hani Hanjour
helped some rent an apartment in Paterson, N.J. Others
cycled through one
apartment in Delray Beach, Fla. Mr. Almihdhar
helped some obtain illegal
driver's licenses and photo ID's in
Virginia.
The leaders and
logistics men seemed to "buddy up" with their junior
partners. When Ahmed Al
Haznawi had an ulcerated leg, Mr. Jarrah took
him to Holy Cross Hospital in
Palm Beach County, Fla. At first, Mr.
Atta and Mr. Shehhi lived together in
Florida; Mr. Al-Shehhi then
moved in with Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan al-Qadi
Banihammad, and Mr.
Atta with Abdulaziz Alomari, the last hijacker to
arrive.
Most of the 19 obtained Social Security numbers, which allowed
them
to open bank accounts and obtain credit cards. They seemed, the
F.B.I. says, to remain self-contained, with little or no help from a
support network in the United States. Investigators suspect the help
came from money men in the United Arab Emirates and several important
lieutenants in Germany and Afghanistan.
Research and
Planning
Al Qaeda's manual, which prosecutors say was used in the
embassy
bombings, outlines three stages of any operation: research, planning
and execution.
"In order to discover any unexpected element
detrimental to the
operation," it says, "it is necessary, prior to execution
of the
operation, to rehearse it in a place similar to that of the real
operation."
So beginning in May, the leaders and logistics men began
taking trial
flights on cross-country routes, though they never took the
exact
flights that they would later hijack.
After each flight to the
West Coast, they flew to Las Vegas. And each
time, they flew first class —
as most of the 19 would on Sept. 11.
Although they traveled first class,
their accommodations were
distinctly low- rent, at an Econo Lodge on the
faded end of the Strip.
Although several of the hijackers are believed to
have had numerous
meetings in South Florida and Paterson, senior
investigators say they
are convinced that the most important American
planning occurred in
that dingy hotel room.
Investigators say they
can confirm only one overlapping visit to Las
Vegas, on Aug. 13 and 14,
although they say the picture may not be
complete. An Algerian who is
believed to have helped train the
pilots, Lotfi Raissi, drove from Phoenix
to Las Vegas at least once
last summer, and hijackers may have done the
same.
Mr. Alhazmi and Mr. Hanjour arrived together and appear to have
spent
most of their time together; Mr. Atta spent most of his time alone,
disappearing into the dark cavern of Cyberzone, an Internet cafe
where
young men slouch in front of a half-dozen brightly lighted
computer
terminals, surfing the Web.
Investigators are not sure why the plotters
chose Las Vegas. "Perhaps
they figured it would be easy to blend in," one
senior official said.
The men were most likely following the manual's
protocol: meet at a
place that offers good cover.
It is not unusual
for criminals to launder money in Las Vegas
casinos, but surveillance tapes
show no trace of the hijackers. Based
on that and on interviews, the F.B.I.
says it believes the hijackers
did not gamble. Nor have investigators found
any local terrorist
cells there.
There was one curious disruption in
their pattern, on the last trip
east from Las Vegas. For the flights in May,
June and July, the
hijackers booked nonstop, round-trip tickets. But on that
final
flight, they bought one-way tickets to different destinations, with
layovers, and they flew coach, not first class.
Investigators
speculate that with their test flights completed, the
hijackers now wanted
to save money. They may also have wanted to see
if they could buy one-way
tickets without attracting attention —
which is what they did over the next
two weeks as they purchased
tickets for Sept. 11.
Carrying Out the
Mission
Those return flights put the men in position to execute the
plot. Mr.
Hanjour and Mr. Alhazmi flew to Baltimore, where they would soon
join
their soldiers in nearby Laurel, Md. From there, on the morning of
Sept. 11, they would leave for Dulles International Airport and
American
Airlines Flight 77.
Mr. Atta flew from Las Vegas to Fort Lauderdale,
Fla., near where
much of the muscle was living.
Investigators see a
spike in the number of cellphone calls between
the 19 in those final weeks.
The hijackers bought plane tickets, each
team choosing almost exactly the
same seats on the planes. The
Florida group moved north to Boston; the New
Jersey group moved out
of the Paterson apartment. Three hijackers wired
money back to Mr.
Ahmad in the United Arab Emirates.
On Sept. 10,
Mr. Atta and his charge, Mr. Alomari, drove from Boston
to Portland, Me.
Why Portland? Again, it may have been protocol: the manual warns
against traveling in large groups and suggests boarding "at a
secondary
station" to deflect notice.
The next morning, they almost missed their
connecting flight at Logan
Airport in Boston, making it with minutes to
spare.
As the hijackers may have anticipated from test runs, the planes
hit
cruising altitude after about 40 minutes. The hijackers, who had
cared so little about learning to take off and land a plane, began
their
work.
Four of the five men on American Flight 77, the jet that plowed
into
the Pentagon, had helped with the logistics or are considered by
investigators to have been leaders. It is assumed that several of the
logistics people, including Mr. Almihdhar, also carried box cutters
and
served as muscle.
That plane, apparently flown by Mr. Hanjour, began to
jerk wildly in
the air. There may have been a struggle with the pilots, but
investigators say it was more likely a result of Mr. Hanjour's poor
skills — his flying school teachers would later say he had been a
sorry
student.
Based on one cellphone call from one of the planes, the F.B.I.
now
contends that the muscle began to herd passengers into the back of
the planes, and forced the pilots from the cockpit by telling them it
was a traditional hijacking, one where, if demands were met, the
passengers and crew would be released without harm.
As the planes
accelerated toward their targets, the muscle men, too,
may have believed the
same thing. This question remains the subject
of debate within the F.B.I.
Some investigators note that in
surveillance photographs taken at a Portland
A.T.M. the previous
night, Mr. Alomari appears to be grinning, an expression
more
befitting a petty thief about to go on a stealing spree.
One
F.B.I. official said the prayers found at the crash sites seemed
to exhort
the foot soldiers to be strong in prison — unlike the four-
page set of
instructions and prayers found in Mr. Atta's luggage,
which made it clear he
believed he was going to his eternal paradise.
Investigators in this
country and abroad note that this would be in
keeping with terrorist
patterns.
As Al Qaeda's manual instructs, "The operation members should
not all
be told about the operation until shortly before executing it, in
order to avoid leaking of its news."
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