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CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENERAL RULE OF REASON TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF
LEGISLATIVE ACTS

TO GIVE due process of law a more effective scope as a criterion to measure
the validity of new legislative projects, the justices who were exponents of
conservative principles and laissez faire policies adopted the dicta of a few
authorities on Magna Carta and of several state justices that this phrase was
designed to prevent all governmental acts arbitrary in their nature and to
preserve the fundamental principles of a free republican government. The
application of a rule of reason or a rule of expediency as a primary standard
to evaluate the propriety of legislation was accomplished by making due
process of law an inhibition against arbitrary legislative or administrative
acts, against any interference with the fundamental rights of the individual,
and against social and economic legislation which was regarded unreasonable
or discriminatory.

1. Arbitrary Legislative and Administrative Acts are Void. Locke is credited
with suggesting the idea that exercising governmental powers in an arbitrary
manner is unconstitutional.[1] The suggestion of this idea, however, may be
traced to opinions rather common in ancient and mediaeval times. The claims
that certain clauses of Magna Carta were intended to check all forms of
arbitrary political authority,[2] had few supporters in England, as we have
seen, but was repudiated by all parties prior to the time that the American
colonies set up new governments.

Early in the nineteenth century the belief had been expressed in the United
States that the law of the land provision was intended to remove arbitrary
power from every branch of the government.[3] One justice declared that "the
framers of the constitution never dreamed of permitting the exercise of
arbitrary power in any department of government."[4] The suggestion that due
process of law was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government[5] and that the security of a citizen
against arbitrary legislation rested upon the broader and more solid ground
of natural rights, and was not wholly dependent on those negatives upon the
legislative power contained in the constitution,[6] gave an indication of
possible future interpretations of due process of law. But there were few
occasions to consider these comments or to apply them concretely[7] until a
similar doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
made a part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices
Bradley and Field were among the first to suggest the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to be an inhibition against arbitrary
legislative and administrative acts.[8] They pleaded for an extensive
application of the requirement of due process of law to all state acts, and
suggested that if such acts were "arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust," they
might be declared not to be in accord with due process of law.[9]

When judges insisted that "under our institutions, arbitrary power over
another's lawful pursuits is not vested in any man nor in any tribunal,"[10]
due process of law, applied in England only as a guard against executive
usurpation, was destined to become in the United States a bulwark against
arbitrary legislation.[11] This new standard for legislative acts was applied
when it was determined that the validity of statutes was not to be tested in
the federal courts unless "they are clearly inconsistent with some power
granted to the general government or with some right secured by that
instrument or unless they are purely arbitrary in their nature."[12]

The phrase "equal protection of the laws," though not in the Fifth Amendment
of the federal Constitution, and not, as a rule, in the state constitutions,
had been interpreted as a requirement for legislative and executive acts by
certain justices in state and federal courts prior to 1879.[13] It was used
without any clear indication as to the purpose of the phrase in the draft of
the Fourteenth Amendment which was finally adopted, and the courts were loath
to apply its vague content to concrete cases until there was a determined
effort on the part of certain justices to incorporate the natural rights
philosophy and the doctrine of equality of the Declaration of Independence
into the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to condemn acts which the judges
regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable.[14] The movement to declare void acts
judicially construed as arbitrary[15] found the equal protection clause a
supplement to what would otherwise have been construed as a requirement of
due process of law. That due process would ultimately have been interpreted
as involving the equal protection principle is shown by the fact that
statutes regarded as conferring undue favors, class privileges, or
discrimination are seldom attacked on the equal protection clause alone, but
also as a denial of due process of law.

Due process of law and equal protection of the laws, then, combined were
being construed with wide enough scope to prevent all legislative and
administrative acts which the justices regarded as arbitrary and, like
certain other implied limits on legislatures, the equal protection principle
was made an essential part of the concept of due process of law.[16] Hence
acts which were not general in their application to a particular class were
held not to be in accord with the due process and equal protection phrases of
the Fourteenth Amendment.[17]

"The due process clause requires," said Chief Justice Taft,



that every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and the benefit
of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds not
arbitrarily or capriciously but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial, so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.[18]

And Justice Holmes believes that state acts interfering with liberty should
be held valid unless "a rational and fair man" would admit that they
necessarily infringe "fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law."[19] But where is the rational and
fair man, what are the fundamental principles, and how are the traditions of
the people to be discovered? Since when has the sole custody of these
principles and traditions been assigned to the judges?

The way in which judges made limitations applicable to legislative action is
admirably shown in one of Cooley's dicta:



The bills of rights in the American constitutions forbid that parties shall
be deprived of property except by the law of the land; but if the prohibition
had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one man's property over to
another would nevertheless be void. If the act proceeded upon the assumption
that such other person was justly entitled to the estate, and therefore it
was transferred, it would be void, because judicial in its nature; and if it
proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void, as neither legislative
nor judicial but a mere arbitrary fiat.[20]

Those who defend the application of judicial standards for the justness or
fairness of legislative action claim that it is the only way that unjust
interference, not called for by the public needs, with private property and
personal liberty can be effectively prevented. But what are unjust
interferences with private property, and do these not depend upon changing
times and conditions which may be perceived by legislators as well as by
judges? And who shall determine what the public needs demand, the
representatives of the people or arbiters who have assumed the rôle of
umpires?[21]

2. Acts Contrary to Fundamental Rights are Void.[22] Among the ideas which
have supplemented other phases of the elastic term "due process of law," in
limiting legislative functions, is the doctrine that there are immutable
fundamental rights or principles which no governmental authorities may invade.

Notions of natural law and of fundamental natural rights, as we have noted,
were among the dominant notions of the leaders of the American Revolution and
of the framers of the first written constitutions in the United States.
Governments, it was believed, were instituted primarily to preserve these
rights. And it was taken for granted that legislative enactments which
contravened such rights were void, though ideas as to how to prevent such
legislative acts or to assure protection to the people against illegal
procedure under them were often indefinite. The assertion by the courts of
the right to review the constitutionality of legislative acts and to become
the special guardians of the written instruments containing assertions of
natural rights gave a new turn to the legal applications of the fundamental
rights philosophy.

It was in connection with the interpretation of the privileges and immunities
guaranteed to the citizens of the several states by the federal Constitution
that the doctrine of fundamental rights was early announced. Justice
Washington said:



"We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments." Though it was regarded as difficult to
enumerate these fundamental privileges a few were suggested, such as the
enjoyment of life and of liberty, the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject to such
restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good.[23]
"Standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws
of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of the Constitution of
the United States," Justice Story held invalid a state legislative act which
attempted to interfere with the vested property rights of a corporation.[24]
The rather common belief in fundamental rights also received his sanction
when he called attention to the "fundamental maxims of free government,"
which required that the rights of personal liberty and private property
should be held sacred.[25]

When the doctrines of the Federalists and of conservative thinkers generally
lost ground and were repudiated by all departments of the government,
including the judiciary, in favor of popular theories of political control,
little was heard for several decades of immutable fundamental rights in state
or federal courts.[26]

The doctrine was reaffirmed after the Civil War by Justice Chase[27] and then
by Justice Miller, who insisted that there are rights in every free
government beyond the control of the state and that there are limitations
which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments, "implied
reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not
exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name."[28]
All men, thought Justice Field, have certain inalienable rights; among these
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; in the pursuit of happiness
all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to everyone; and in
the protection of these rights are all equal before the law.[29]

The eighteenth-century notion of fundamental rights beyond the realm of
government interference and the concept of inalienable rights as formulated
in the Declaration of Independence which, it was thought, governments were
designed to protect, have now been incorporated by means of judicial
construction as essential elements of due process of law and as necessary
principles of the American system of government.[30]

Few lawyers or judges were as frank as Justice Harlan who was among those
applying natural law ideas, when he said: "the courts have rarely, if ever,
felt themselves so restrained by technical rules that they could not find
some remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by government or
by individual persons, that violated natural justice or were hostile to the
fundamental principles devised for the protection of the essential rights of
property."[31]

Justice Moody was similarly frank when he preferred to rest the decision
regarding exemption from self-incrimination on broader ground than the strict
language of the Constitution and raised the query, "Is it a fundamental
principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free
government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government? If
it is, and is of a nature that pertains to process of law, this court has
declared it to be essential to due process of law."[32]

Despite these apparent applications of principles of reason, or of natural
law and natural justice in the opinions of the justices and of the marked
change in the meaning of due process of law, the assertion is repeated
consistently that judges in the decision of cases have nothing to do with the
wisdom, justice, or expediency of legislative acts.[33]

3. Police Regulations must be Reasonable. The extensive limitations which
were inserted in the state constitutions and the implied limitations
developed by the courts placed many restrictions upon the authority of the
states and rendered it difficult to meet the public needs and requirements.
Hence the doctrine of the police power was conceived as a kind of
safety-valve through which the necessary authority for the protection of the
public order, public morals, and public health might be authorized despite
these restrictions.[34] But the exercise of such powers, it was eventually
held, was subject to the requirements of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws and the general necessity of reasonableness. American
courts, following the English practice, held that the by-laws of a municipal
corporation, unless expressly authorized by a legislative act, must be
reasonable, and must not be inconsistent with the general principles of the
common law, particularly those having relation to the liberty of the
individual or the rights of private property.[35] This meant that ordinances
might be held void which were deemed unfair, oppressive, or discriminatory.

State legislatures, also, in their efforts to regulate social and industrial
conditions were held subject to the requirement that "under the mere guise of
police regulations personal rights, and property rights cannot be arbitrarily
invaded, and the determination of the legislature is not final or conclusive."
[36] It was also held for the courts to decide whether a regulation had in
fact some relation to the public health, whether it was appropriate, and
adapted to the end aimed at.[37]

The federal justices, who first refused to interfere with the police powers
of the state under the due process provision, were prevailed upon to adopt
the dictum of the New York court,[38] that the power to regulate is not the
power to destroy,[39] and to render this dictum applicable to all types of
social legislation. A rule of reason test for police regulations extensive in
its scope was also formulated by Justice Peckham.[40]

A state law, therefore, might be held void when enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety if it had "no real or
substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law."[41]

The criteria by which the Supreme Court determines whether a state act is a
legitimate exercise of the police power are:



1. The object of the legislation must be permissible.

2. The means must have a substantial relation to the end.

3. Fundamental rights must not be infringed.

4. The effect of the enforcement of the law must not be arbitrary,
unreasonable, or oppressive.[42]

Thus it will be seen that the courts may adopt Locke's dictum and hold that
an act which appears to them unwise is not within the scope of legislative
action. Or they may conclude that the ways and means adopted by the
legislature are not appropriate to accomplish the object intended. If an act
meets these tests it may run afoul of the fundamental rights of the
individual and what are fundamental rights has never been determined.
Finally, it must meet the test of reasonableness, which is the most difficult
of all requirements, for who knows what will appear reasonable to the
judicial mind?[43] It is not surprising then for the conclusion to be
reached, after a thorough analysis of the attempts to apply the criterion of
due process of law to cases arising under the police power, that the opinions
of the Supreme Court "have confused rather than clarified the subject and
that from such attempts have come no rules, standards, or principles capable
of certain applications to concrete cases."[44]

The criteria upon which the court proceeds in such cases, it is observed, are
largely subjective and depend upon the personal, political, and economic
opinions of the justices. The terms "arbitrary," "unreasonable," and
"oppressive" are not defined in the written law and can be applied only "in
the light of the judges' own mental processes."[45] It is here that the
silence of the Constitution speaks in a voice tuned only to judicial ears.

The situation resulting from the application of the general language of the
Fourteenth Amendment to state legislation on social and industrial matters is
thus summarized by Mr. Nesbitt:



The difficulty with what I have chosen to call the categorical view of the
due process of law requirement as applied to legislation, dealing with social
and economic changes, is that it extols bare authority at the expense of
experience; that it results in the deductive application of general
principles to precise facts often without any accommodation to the particular
situation out of which the legislation has arisen; that it tends to limit the
content of the clauses to a fixed, unconditional meaning, precluding all
flexibility in their application; that it construes the due process of law
clauses not so much as broad guarantees of "relatively fundamental rights" as
the regulations of a code, as arbitrary abstract principles rather than
organic rules; and that it excludes consideration of public opinion as a fact
to be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of legislation,
thus making the opinion of the court as fixed by judicial experience the
measure of the limit of the legislative function. The standard of
reasonableness which it would apply is remote and traditional.[46]

There is involved in much of the reasoning of the judges in the cases under
the police power an assumption of inherent superiority of the wisdom and
judgments of justices over the judgments of members of the other departments
of government. The legislature, it is asserted, cannot invade the rights of
person or property, under the guise of a police regulation when it is not
such in fact. It is insisted also that it is the province of the judiciary to
determine when personal or property rights have been invaded and whether a
measure is appropriate for the desired object.[47] Constitutions do not
define police regulations which do or do not invade personal or property
rights nor do they give any indication as to the appropriate objects of such
regulations. Police power as a constitutional concept is a judge-made concept
arising from the assumption that legislatures are disposed to fritter away
constitutional inhibitions and that it is the duty of judges to prevent such
legislative depredations. The term "police power" was hit upon as a
convenient phrase for the courts to determine whether a legislative act which
interfered with private rights was reasonable enough to have judicial
approval.

What the whole matter amounts to, we are told, is: "There must be some sort
of reasonable balance between the degree of interference with private rights
and the public benefit which may be expected to flow from that interference."
[48] What is a "reasonable balance," and who is in the best position to
decide this question — a judge or a legislator — probably a judge if the
chief object is to preserve private rights, and a legislator if the public
interest and convenience is to be given superior weight?

4. Results of the Extension of the Meaning of Due Process of Law. With
judicial review of legislative enactments applied via due process of law to
the main lines of public regulation of business and economic conditions, it
was not long before the Fourteenth Amendment took its place as the foremost
feature of the federal Constitution, so far as the limitations on the powers
of the states are concerned. Whereas for the first twenty years after the
adoption of the amendment about one case per year on the average arose under
its provisions, it was not long before thirty or more cases were adjudicated
in the same period. In such important fields of state power as eminent
domain, taxation, public utility regulation, and the police power, state and
local acts had been attacked before the Supreme Court in more than six
hundred cases to the year 1910.[49]

To 1910 according to the table of Collins the following questions had been
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment:



Eminent domain .................. 27 cases

Taxation ........................... 144 "

Matters of procedure ........ 146 "

Police power .................... 302 "

Most of the cases which have arisen under this amendment have been decided
since 1896. From 1900 to 1913 there were four hundred and nine opinions or
about thirty one per year. Out of a total of more than six hundred cases only
twenty-eight dealt with the rights of the negro race for whose protection the
amendment was primarily enacted. More than half of the cases have come to the
court on appeals of public utility interests and other corporate
organizations asking protection from the acts of the legislatures and
administrative agencies of the states.[50] Though the amendment was enacted
primarily as a charter of liberty for the negro race it has been used to a
great extent by corporations, public and private, to resist the efforts
toward public regulation and to check the exercise of state authority through
eminent domain, taxation, and the police power.[51]

As a result of such a series of decisions, quasi-legislative in character,
the prohibitions involved in due process of law were held applicable to
substantive law as well as to legal procedure, to executive, administrative,
and judicial acts as well as to legislation, and to corporations as well as
to natural persons.[52] Writing in 1919, Judge Hough believed that "the
direct appeal of property to due process of law had for the most part
failed.... The indirect appeal through liberty is still going on.... But it
is dying, and the courts, when invoked today under the due-process clause,
are doing little more than easing the patient's later days."[53] That this
prediction is not being fulfilled is shown by the fact that since 1920 more
acts in the field of social and economic legislation have been invalidated
under the due process clause than were set aside from 1868 to 1920.[54]



Phrased in percentages this means that from 1868 to 1912 the Court held
against the legislature in a very little more than six per cent of the cases;
from 1913 to 1920 in a little more than seven per cent of the cases; while
since 1920 the Court has held against the legislature in twenty-eight per
cent of the cases. And if we go behind the decisions and look at the votes of
the individual judges in each case, we will find the same startling increase
in the number of opinions adverse to the validity of legislation under the
due process clauses. In the period up to 1921 the judicial vote was cast
approximately ninety per cent in favor of the various statutes considered,
and only ten per cent against. Since then, however, the favorable vote has
shrunk to about sixty-nine per cent and the adverse vote grown to thirty-one
per cent.[55]

Evidently the justices regard with increasing seriousness their assumed duty
to guide political action in a safe course so as to avoid the dangers of
economic or social radicalism.

5. Some Examples of Higher Law Concepts in Recent Supreme Court Decisions.
The doctrine of liberty of contract, an inalienable-right product, is now
construed as involved in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This doctrine
was applied in a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States by
holding invalid the Minimum Wage Act passed by Congress for the District of
Columbia.[56] Justice Sutherland, rendering the opinion of the court, held
that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the Fifth Amendment. Quoting with approval the
much criticized opinion of Justice Peckham in the case of Lochner v. New York,
[57] he concluded that the Act of Congress was



simply and exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to adult women — who are
legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men. It forbids two
parties having lawful capacity — under penalties as to the employer — to
freely contract with one another in respect of the price for which that one
shall render services to the other in a purely private employment where both
are willing, perhaps anxious, to agree.[58]

The standard for the guidance of the board under the act was regarded so
vague as to be impossible of practical application. It took into account the
necessities of only one party to the contract and it fixed an arbitrary wage
payment and thus interfered with economic laissez faire; altogether the act,
Justice Sutherland declared, was "clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary
exercise of power."[59]

Chief Justice Taft, dissenting, with whom concurred Justice Sanford, took
issue with the contention that there is, in many instances, a substantial
equality as between employer and employee. He admitted that the policy of a
compulsory minimum wage is one on which there is much dispute but he thought
it was "not the function of this court to hold congressional acts invalid
simply because they are passed to carry out economic views which the Court
believes to be unwise or unsound."[60] The principle of the limitation of
liberty of contract was recognized by the court in the regulation of wages
and labor conditions under the police power and it seemed difficult to
understand the difference between regulating the manner and time of payment
of wages or fixing maximum hours of labor and the fixing of a minimum wage.
[61]

In his opinion the Lochner Case was overruled and he expressed surprise at
the attempt of the majority justices to quote the case as a precedent. The
intimation that the controlling effect of earlier opinions had been weakened
by the Nineteenth Amendment was answered by the statement that this amendment
did not change the differences between men and women recognized by Congress
in the passage of this act.

Justice Holmes also dissented and observed that:



Notwithstanding the deference due to the prevailing judgment of the Court,
the power of Congress seems absolutely free from doubt. The end, to remove
conditions leading to ill health, immorality, and the deterioration of the
race, no one would deny to be within the scope of constitutional legislation.
The means are the means that have the approval of Congress, of many states,
and of those governments from which we have learned our greatest lessons.
When so many intelligent persons, who have studied the matter more than any
of us can, have thought that the means are effective and are worth the price,
it seems to me impossible to deny that the belief reasonably may be held by
reasonable men....

The earlier decisions upon the same words in the Fourteenth Amendment began
within our memory, and went no farther than an unpretentious assertion of the
liberty to follow the ordinary callings. Later that innocuous generality was
expanded into the dogma, liberty of contract. Contract is not specially
mentioned in the text that we have to construe. It is merely an example of
doing what you want to do, embodied in the word liberty. But pretty much all
law consists in forbidding men to do some things that they want to do, and
contract is no more exempt from law than other acts.[62]

The opinions of Justice Van Orsdel of the District of Columbia Court and
Justice Sutherland illustrate the attenuated methods of reasoning involved in
declaring void legislative acts under the phrase "due process of law."[63]
They likewise illustrate the process of judicial interpretation by which
implied limitations on legislative powers are extracted from the general
language of constitutions. It is the method of reasoning which first
discovered a doctrine of vested rights which might be preserved whether or
not constitutions gave such a protection, which found inherent limitations on
legislatures to protect property rights through the terms "public purpose"
and "public use," and which, lacking any express provision, fell back on the
spirit of the constitution or the general principles of free government to
condemn, as Justice Holmes suggests, what "a tribunal of lawyers does not
think about right."[64] Both justices assume certain fundamental principles
and then by what appears to them as "indubitable demonstration" they conclude
that the acts are arbitrary, unreasonable, and necessarily void — as contrary
to due process of law. Here is an application of the old natural rights and
natural law philosophy, combined with the mechanical concept of the functions
of the court. That there is no clear dividing line between arbitrary
restraint and reasonable regulation; that the determination of the dividing
line is largely one of policy on which the judgment of the legislature with
the full facts before it ought to be relatively sound, or can be readily
changed, if found unsound; and that a court is overstepping the bounds of its
legitimate authority to pass on the wisdom or folly of the economic policy of
wage legislation, did not make any difference to the justices imbued with the
doctrine of fundamental principles or of a modern Naturrecht.

Conceived in the spirit of individualism and laissez faire characteristic of
the pioneer conditions which prevailed in a large part of the country more
than a generation ago, the concept of liberty of contract as an absolute
right is ill suited to the industrial conditions now prevailing in many
American communities.[65] If there is any field in which the precept should
prevail that law is a progressive science, that rights are subject to
restrictions and limitations as the social interest may require, and that the
determination as to what restrictions are on the whole wise and salutary
belongs primarily to the legislature, it is the growing field of the
necessary regulations and adjustments in the wage contract. A minimum wage
law may or may not be wise from the economic or social viewpoint. But the
best way to determine its wisdom or unwisdom would appear to be to give it a
trial under terms and conditions laid down by a legislative body which could
change those conditions, if the act proved unwise after a fair trial. For the
court to prevent such experimentation, with the care, foresight, and
experience manifested in the enactment and administration of labor laws,
under an attenuated view of due process of law, protecting liberty and
property, is to place too heavy a burden upon the judiciary and to throttle
the avenue of advance for government to meet the growing needs of modern
economic and industrial society.

When the bakers resisted the enforcement of a Nebraska statute providing for
standard sizes for loaves of bread with an allowance for an excess over the
specified standards, as unnecessary, unreasonable, and arbitrary, the Supreme
Court held, Justice Butler rendering the opinion, that the state may not
"under the guise of protecting the public arbitrarily interfere with private
business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and
unnecessary restrictions upon them." The provisions of an act must have, he
demanded, a reasonable relation to the protection desired to be accomplished.
[66] Regarding the act as essentially unreasonable and arbitrary it was held
void as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Brandeis, dissenting, stated the problem of the application of the
rule of reason in such cases as follows:



With the wisdom of the legislation we have, of course, no concern. But, under
the due process clause as construed, we must determine whether the
prohibition of excess weights can reasonably be deemed necessary; whether the
prohibition can reasonably be deemed an appropriate means of preventing short
weights and incidental unfair practices; and whether compliance with the
limitation prescribed can reasonably be deemed practicable. The determination
of these questions involves an enquiry into facts. Unless we know the facts
on which the legislators may have acted, we cannot decide whether they were
(or whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.[67]

After an extensive summary of evidence showing the practical necessity of the
prohibition of excess weights as a means of preventing short weights, he
concluded:



The evidence contained in the record in this case is, however, ample to
sustain the validity of the statute. There is in the record some evidence in
conflict with it. The legislature and the lower courts have, doubtless,
considered that. But with this conflicting evidence we have no concern. It is
not our province to weigh evidence. Put at its highest, our function is to
determine, in the light of all facts which may enrich our knowledge and
enlarge our understanding, whether the measure, enacted in the exercise of an
unquestioned police power and of a character inherently unobjectionable,
transcends the bounds of reason. That is, whether the provision as applied is
so clearly arbitrary or capricious that legislators acting reasonably could
not have believed it to be necessary or appropriate for the public welfare.

To decide, as a fact, that the prohibition of excess weights "is not
necessary for the protection of the purchasers against imposition and fraud
by short weights"; that it "is not calculated to effectuate that purpose";
and that it "subjects bakers and sellers of bread" to heavy burdens, is, in
my opinion, an exercise of the powers of a super-legislature — not the
performance of the constitutional function of judicial review.[68]

Again the majority of the court, as in the Minimum Wage Case, refused to
accept the judgment of the legislature on the facts and then condemned the
policy determined by the legislative body to deal with the facts.

The vacillation and uncertainty involved in according a general power of
review over state acts to judges who are likely to be unfamiliar with the
local conditions which prompted the acts are shown in many recent cases.
There are cases in which the judges indicate a disposition to place the
burden of proof upon those who attack state statutes and to defer to the
judgment of state authorities, legislative and judicial.[69] When this
tendency was beginning to be considered as a rule of law,[70] the justices
again showed an inclination to resort primarily to their own judgments of
facts and local conditions. The refusal to give special consideration to
local conditions, is indicated in the New York Theater Ticket Case.[71]

The New York legislature passed a law to remedy notorious abuses in the
resale of theater tickets, because in its judgment the matter was of
sufficient public interest to warrant public regulation. But the Supreme
Court declared the law void on the ground that the act was an unwarranted
interference with a private business. "The mere declaration by the
legislature," said Justice Sutherland, "that a particular kind of property or
business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive upon the
question of the validity of the regulation. The matter is one which is always
open to judicial inquiry."[72]

Justice Holmes, who has expressed more frequently and insistently than any
other justice the view that the justices have substituted their views of
public policy for those of the legislature, said in a dissenting opinion,



I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express
prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and
that courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their
obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the
particular court may happen to entertain.... I am far from saying that I
think this particular law a wise and rational provision. That is not my
affair. But if the people of the State of New York speaking their authorized
voice say they want it, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United
States to prevent their having their will.[73]

Reasonable as this opinion may seem, the majority of the Supreme Court have
declared otherwise. Again, when Minnesota attempted to prohibit buyers of
dairy products from discriminating between localities, the majority of the
Supreme Court refused to accept the legislative determination of facts and
held the law invalid as an unwarranted interference with freedom of contract.
[74]

The way in which the Supreme Court makes law in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment is illustrated in the gradual inclusion of the first eight
amendments, which were held to apply only to federal law and procedure,[75]
as a part of the Fourteenth Amendment — and hence as limitations on state
laws and procedure. Subsequent to the Barron Case it was held frequently that
the provisions of the Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution were not
applicable to state action. This opinion was reaffirmed in recent decisions
when it was asserted that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states
any restriction about freedom of speech."[76] But three years later Justice
Sanford, upholding the validity of the New York Criminal Anarchy Law, said:



"We may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press — which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress — are among the
fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."[77]

Repeated efforts to secure protection from the federal courts in such matters
as state interferences with the right of suffrage, the right of assembly, the
right to bear arms, the right of impartial trial, the right against cruel and
unusual punishment, the right against compulsory self-incrimination[78] were
given little countenance prior to 1925. In 1925 it is assumed without
argument or discussion that the fundamental rights and liberties of the first
eight amendments are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me
persuasive," said Justice Brandeis,



it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the
federal Constitution from invasion by the states. The right of free speech,
the right to teach, and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental
rights.[79]

Justice Stone, speaking of the holding of the Supreme Court that the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law prohibits only such restraints upon interstate commerce as are
unreasonable, says: "Reasonableness is not a concept of definite and
unchanging content. Its meaning necessarily varies in the different fields of
the law, because it is used as a convenient summary of the dominant
considerations which control in the application of legal doctrines." And
recognizing the uncertainty of the test of reasonableness as a legal concept,
he continues:



Moreover, in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should
hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and
illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a
test as whether prices are reasonable — a determination which can be
satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organization
and a choice between rival philosophies.[80]

If such complete economic surveys had been made would a ten-hour bakeshop
law, or a minimum wage law as well as a number of other state and federal
acts have been declared void?

When the Fourteenth Amendment was construed to prohibit state legislative and
administrative acts which were deemed arbitrary, to prevent any interference
with fundamental rights, to require that all state and local police
regulations must be reasonable, and the justices determined that it was their
duty to examine the facts on which state legislative and administrative
policies were based as well as the ends to be accomplished by regulation, a
change in the American system of government was effected, the results of
which are only beginning to be realized. The change has its roots in the
political and legal thinking of earlier periods but few could have surmised
what a significant turn in political practice was to follow from a slow and
silent revolution in constitutional interpretation.[81]
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