-Caveat Lector-

http://cryptome.org/sv-spy-game.htm

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/14/magazine/14TECHNO.html

The New York Times Magazine
April 14, 2002

Silicon Valley's Spy Game
The post-boom high-tech industry has found a new backer -- the Office of
Homeland Security. The mission is to help the government track its citizens
the way Amazon tracks its customers.

By JEFFREY ROSEN

Jeffrey Rosen is an associate professor at George Washington University Law
School and the legal affairs editor of The New Republic. His last article
for The Times Magazine was about the growth of surveillance.

Gilman Louie is one of the most successful computer-game developers of all
time. ''I'm your classic entrepreneur,'' he told me recently. ''I started my
first business with my fraternity brothers at San Francisco State.'' Louie,
an amateur fighter pilot, had his first big success in 1987 with a game
called Falcon, which allowed players to simulate the flight of an F-16.
Falcon sold millions of copies, not only to teenage boys but also to pilots
in the United States Air Force, who found it so realistic that it helped
them learn to fly real fighter jets. Louie's biggest success came in 1988,
when he imported from the Soviet Union an unexpectedly addictive game called
Tetris, which became the best-selling computer game ever. ''Between Nintendo
sales and PC sales, 70 or 80 million copies of that game sold,'' Louie says.
''We even found out that Hillary Clinton loved playing Tetris on the Game
Boy.''

Lots of companies were impressed by Louie's success, including Hasbro, which
put him in charge of creating its games Web site. And then in 1998, Louie
was recruited by an even more powerful employer: the Central Intelligence
Agency. ''The C.I.A. actually thought that my computer-game background was a
valuable asset,'' Louie recalls. ''I look at the world as one big system --
one big game.''

The C.I.A. had just founded an unusual venture-capital firm called In-Q-Tel,
and the agency wanted Louie to be the C.E.O. ''The 'Q' stands for the 'Q'
factor -- it's named after the character in James Bond,'' says Louie.
In-Q-Tel was the brainchild of George Tenet, the C.I.A. director, who
believed that by investing $30 million a year in Internet startups in
Silicon Valley, the C.I.A. could encourage the development of cutting-edge
technologies that might be useful for national intelligence. Louie's
marching orders were to provide venture capital for data-mining technologies
that would allow the C.I.A. to monitor and profile potential terrorists as
closely and carefully as Amazon monitors and profiles potential customers.

The valley has long indulged its own antiestablishment mythology --
rebellious, libertarian hackers in their parents' garages, bucking the
system by inventing world-changing, personally empowering technologies --
and Louie was worried that persuading programmers to collaborate with the
C.I.A. would be ''borderline ludicrous.'' Despite his doubts, Louie agreed
to open one In-Q-Tel office in Menlo Park, Calif., and another near
Washington. He quickly discovered that far from recoiling at the idea of
working with the C.I.A., Internet entrepreneurs flocked to his door. The
chance to play with the government's cool toys trumped their fears of Big
Brother.

After the dot-com crash, Silicon Valley, desperate for venture capital,
began to depend more and more on the federal government. Then came Sept. 11,
and the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security. In-Q-Tel now finds
itself just one of several deep-pocketed federally financed investors that
are eager to back technological solutions to our new security challenges.
The Bush administration is asking Congress for $38 billion for homeland
security, and much of this money will be parceled out among competing
federal agencies -- including the Defense Department and the F.B.I. -- which
can then use the money either to invest directly in security technologies or
to follow In-Q-Tel's model of providing venture capital to young companies
in the private sector. Like the C.I.A., the Office of Homeland Security has
concluded that the same technologies that were useful before Sept. 11 for
tracking, profiling and targeting potential customers can be turned today on
potential terrorists. In the wake of the bursting of the tech bubble and in
the thick of the war on terrorism, Silicon Valley is reinventing itself as
the new headquarters for the military-technological complex.

As always, the entrepreneurs are following the money. In January, this led
them to Las Vegas for the Consumer Electronics Show, the largest trade show
of futuristic gadgets in North America. After Sept.11, the conference
organizers decided to sponsor a special exhibition hall at the Riviera Hotel
for technologies that are especially well suited to homeland defense. That
old familiar gold-rush feeling was in the air at the Riviera: one speaker
estimated that federal spending on security technologies would grow by 30
percent a year, rising to $62 billion by 2006. (''God bless America'' read
the PowerPoint slide, over an image of firefighters raising the flag.) In
the buzzing exhibition hall, participants admired a hologram of the Statue
of Liberty, as well as a man in a gigantic thumbprint costume, who had been
hired by a company called DigitalPersona to advertise its
fingerprint-recognition device.

After displaying their wares, the technologists flocked to an In-Q-Tel
reception near the exhibition hall, trolling for federal investors from the
C.I.A., F.B.I. and Defense Department. ''All we served was pot-stickers and
7-Up,'' Louie recalls, ''but people didn't want to leave.''

In Las Vegas, several companies predicted that profiling techniques that are
now used to detect credit-card fraud could soon be used to detect potential
terrorists. A few weeks later, this prediction turned out to be a reality,
when The Washington Post reported that the federal aviation authorities and
two technology companies called Accenture and HNC Software are planning to
test at airports a profiling system designed to analyze each passenger's
living arrangements, travel and real-estate history, along with a great deal
of demographic, financial and other personal information. Using data-mining
and predictive software, the government then plans to assign each passenger
a ''threat index'' based on his or her resemblance to a terrorist profile.
Passengers with high threat indexes will be flagged as medium or high risks
and will be taken aside for special searches and questioning.

Our system ''will check your associates,'' Brett Ogilvie of Accenture told
Business Week. ''It will ask if you have made international phone calls to
Afghanistan, taken flying lessons or purchased 1,000 pounds of fertilizer.''
The only problem: in order for the system to obtain answers to those
questions, the nation's privacy laws will need to be relaxed. Federal laws
currently restrict the personally identifiable information that the
government can demand from credit-card and phone companies except as part of
a specific investigation.

When I called Brett Ogilvie to ask what data Accenture proposes to analyze,
his spokeswoman, Stacey Jones, said that she couldn't reveal that
information: it's a trade secret. ''Anyone who is interested in beating the
system can, once we start divulging what the systems are,'' she explained. I
said that I wasn't interested in the specific profiling factors; I only
wanted to know whether Accenture proposed to include information in its
database that the government isn't now permitted to examine. But Jones stuck
to her script: ''National security and client confidentiality prohibits us
from divulging what the factors are.''

Accenture's profiling scheme is open to question not only because it would
almost certainly violate the privacy rights of airline passengers, but also
because it seems unlikely to work. Investigators will tell you that people
who commit credit-card fraud often fit a consistent profile -- using the
stolen card to buy gas at self-service stations, for example, and then using
it to buy clothes. By contrast, terrorists don't fit a consistent profile:
you're looking for a needle in a haystack, but the color and the shape of
the needle keep changing. Mohamed Atta might have been kept out of the
country if immigration officials had been aware that there was a warrant for
his arrest in Broward County, Florida. But Accenture's profiling system is
not designed to check passengers against a watch list of suspected criminals
or terrorists. Instead it is designed to compare the purchasing activities
and personal behavior of millions of passengers with those exhibited in the
past by a tiny group of terrorists -- to create a predictive profile of
likely hijackers.

Lawrence Lessig, who teaches law at Stanford and is the nation's leading
authority on the law and architecture of cyberspace, argues that the
Accenture system is unworkable. ''I can understand these massive data
systems to deal with things like stealing from the government or not paying
your taxes -- systematic repetitive large-scale deviations from the law,''
he says. ''The problem I really have with the terrorism stuff is, do we have
any good reason to believe we could ever predict this type of behavior?''
Because the sample of known terrorists is so small, Lessig says, the
profiles are bound to be inaccurate.

The entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley are undaunted by questions about whether
it makes sense to profile terrorists the way they profile e-business
consumers; they haven't been so enthusiastic about a race to innovate since
the height of the dot-com bubble. In the glory days of the late 90's,
Silicon Valley was consumed by the search for the ''killer app,'' the
software application that was just so cool and effective that everyone had
to buy it. After Sept. 11, the consensus in the valley is that the
national-security ''killer app'' will allow government agencies to access
and share information about Americans that is currently stored in different
databases -- from your chat-room gossip to your shopping history to your
parking tickets, and perhaps even the payment history for your child-support
checks.

''Today, every federal intelligence and law-enforcement agency and all
manner of state and local bodies maintain their own separate databases on
suspected criminals,'' Larry Ellison, the founder and C.E.O. of Oracle
Corporation , wrote in The Wall Street Journal last October. ''Do we need
more databases? No, just the opposite. The biggest problem today is that we
have too many. The single thing we could do to make life tougher for
terrorists would be to ensure that all the information in myriad government
databases was integrated into a single national file.'' Oracle, in fact, is
the world's largest database manufacturer, and Ellison offered to donate the
software for a single national database free of charge to the United States
government. (The company, Ellison added, would charge for upgrades and
maintenance.)

Oracle's office in Reston, Va., is near the headquarters of the C.I.A.,
which is appropriate enough: when Larry Ellison founded the company 25 years
ago, his first client was the C.I.A., to whom he sold a program called
Oracle, the world's first ''relational'' database. At that time, information
in computer databases was stored in unrelated files: a company like Ford,
for example, could keep one file of its employees and another file of its
departments, but it had no easy way of relating the two files. Ellison saw
the commercial potential of the relational database and began marketing it
in 1979. By the height of the dot-com boom in 2000, Ellison's net worth had
soared to $80 billion, making him (briefly) the richest person in the world.

When I visited Oracle in January, the security guard in the lobby gave me a
high-tech ID badge that could track where I was in the building at all
times. I was ushered upstairs to a bright conference room where seven people
were sitting around a huge oval table. One of them, David Carey, turned out
to be the former No. 3 man at the C.I.A.; he had just retired as executive
director after 32 years with the agency. Carey joined Oracle to head its new
Information Assurance Center, which was founded in November to design
homeland-security and disaster-recovery solutions and market them to the
federal government.

Like his colleagues, Carey was in an expansive mood. He said that the United
States government accounted for 23 percent of Oracle's multibillion-dollar
licensing revenue last year and that he expected the federal side of the
business to improve after Sept. 11. ''How do you say this without sounding
callous?'' he asked. ''In some ways, Sept. 11 made business a bit easier.
Previous to Sept. 11, you pretty much had to hype the threat and the
problem.'' Carey said that last summer, leaders in the public and private
sector wouldn't sit still for a briefing. Then his face brightened. ''Now
they clamor for it!'' After Sept. 11, Carey and Ellison held a series of
top-level meetings in Washington about the use of Oracle technology for
homeland security. ''In November, Larry had a serious discussion with Vice
President Cheney, and I met with Ridge, Ashcroft and Mueller,'' Carey says,
referring to the director of the Office of Homeland Security, the attorney
general and the director of the F.B.I.

I asked to see an example of Oracle's new homeland-security technology, and
I was ushered into a demonstration hall outside the conference room that
looked like something out of the last ''Star Wars'' movie. ''I'll give you
an overview of 'Leaders,''' said Brian Jones, then the head of Oracle's
health-care consulting unit. ''It stands for Lightweight Epidemiology
Advanced Detection and Emergency Response System.'' By collecting
health-care information from hospital emergency rooms across the country,
Leaders is designed to monitor outbreaks of suspicious diseases and provide
early warnings for biological attacks.

At 9:20 a.m. on Sept. 11, Jones had received a phone call from the Centers
for Disease Control in Atlanta, which feared that the attack on the twin
towers might be followed by a bioterrorism attack. Working for 10 straight
hours, Jones put into his computer the address of every hospital in New York
State, to detect unusual disease outbreaks, like smallpox. ''Every hospital
was capable of submitting data to a repository,'' he explained. ''The
Centers for Disease Control's experts could sit back in Atlanta and pull up
a map just like I'm showing you here.'' Jones punched a key and a digital
map of New York City appeared on the screen. Using a combination of 7,500
digital photographs and architectural plans of more than 6,000 miles of
underground pipes, Oracle has created a detailed map of every building,
sewer and water line and curb in the city. By the evening of Sept. 11, Jones
was ready to monitor every emergency-room bed in the state.

Oracle is now working with the federal government to apply the same
surveillance system to hospitals throughout the country. The system would
allow hospitals to report incidents of suspicious diseases like anthrax,
smallpox and Ebola to a central database. The program can then send out
e-mail or voice-mail alerts to law-enforcement officials if it detects
suspicious patterns of diseases anywhere in the country. Steve Cooperman,
Oracle's new director of homeland security, said, ''We're going to build a
bioterrorism shield, so eventually everyone is going to have to
participate -- every hospital, every clinic, every lab.''

The prospect of every hospital in America reporting your medical condition
to a central Oracle database might cause some patients alarm. (Oracle
insists that the information can be stored in ways that can't be linked to
individual patients.) The same potential for invasions of privacy is raised
by Larry Ellison's proposal to centralize all of the separate criminal
databases run by federal and state authorities into a single national
database. After we filed back into the conference room, David Carey
explained that Oracle is already discussing with various federal agencies
methods of sharing information that are currently restricted by law.

''We think of it as a triangle,'' said Tim Hoechst, a senior vice president
for technology at Oracle, holding up a Dorito. ''At one corner is privacy,
at one corner is assurance of security -- how safe is the data -- and at
another corner is usability. It's all a matter of trade-offs. What we focus
on is making the Dorito here, and putting you in any corner that you feel
comfortable with. On Sept. 12, most Americans would say, Privacy out the
window; go catch the folks. So we would have moved it all the way to
usability. But maybe day to day, we move it a little bit more toward
security.''

As the databases are consolidated, I asked, who should decide the proper
balance between privacy and access? How do you avoid a situation in which
someone could be kept off a plane because he had skipped jury duty or had an
overdue parking ticket? A hush fell over the room, and people looked
awkwardly at their sandwiches.

Finally Hoechst spoke up. ''You'll notice that we all became suspiciously
quiet when we started talking about policy questions,'' he said. ''At
Oracle, we leave that to our customers to decide. We become a little stymied
when we start talking about the 'should wes' and the 'whys' and the 'hows,'
because it's not our expertise.''

The Tom Lehrer song about the Nazi rocket scientist who defected to America
popped into my head: ''Once ze rockets are up, who cares where they come
down?/That's not my department,' says Wernher von Braun.''

''I expect that if you ask Larry Ellison the question he'd give you a much
better answer,'' one of Hoechst's associates chimed in. Hoechst agreed. ''My
experience with him is that he knows an extraordinary amount about a lot of
things. Every time I think I know something, he knows much more. He's read
more books on it.''

So I set off for Silicon Valley to meet Larry Ellison. The Oracle campus
near the San Francisco airport is known as the Emerald City, for its
artificial lakes and silo-shaped towers of glass and silver. Ellison's
private palace, however, is a $30 million mansion in nearby Atherton,
modeled on the Katsura Imperial Villa in Kyoto. I was checked in there by
two bodyguards with dark shirts and dark tans and escorted into the house to
wait. The living room was large and airy, with lots of blond wood and shoji
screens. It overlooked a beautiful Japanese garden, where ducks swam and
waterfalls shimmered.

Ellison appeared a few minutes later from behind one of the screens, wearing
a pressed charcoal suit over a black turtleneck. He appeared fit and tanned,
with piercing hazel eyes and a trimmed beard slightly flecked with gray. He
suggested that we talk in the garden, but the loud whine of a neighbor's
mulcher made this impossible. (In Silicon Valley, even $30 million doesn't
buy you quiet.) Defeated by the noise, we retreated to the dining room, with
its high-backed black lacquer chairs and black lacquer table.

Ellison is not a shy or enigmatic billionaire. He is entertainingly
indiscreet -- he answered every question with a torrent of confident
opinions. ''The Oracle database is used to keep track of basically
everything,'' he said. ''The information about your banks, your checking
balance, your savings balance is stored in an Oracle database. Your airline
reservation is stored in an Oracle database. What books you bought on Amazon
is stored in an Oracle database. Your profile on Yahoo is stored in an
Oracle database.'' Much of the information in these separate commercial
databases is also centralized in large databases maintained by credit-card
companies like TRW to detect fraud and to decide whether customers should
get credit at the mall.

When it comes to government data, by contrast, there are hundreds of
separate, disconnected databases. ''The huge problem is the fragmented
data,'' he said. ''We knew Mohamed Atta was wanted. It's just that we didn't
check the right database when he came into the country.'' Ellison wants to
consolidate the hundreds of separate state and federal databases into a
single Oracle database, using the centralized credit-card databases as a
model. ''We already have this large centralized database to keep track of
where you work, how much you earn, where your kids go to school, were you
late on your last mortgage payment, when's the last time you got a raise,''
he said. ''Well, my God, there are hundreds of places we have to look to see
if you're a security risk.'' He dismissed the risks of privacy violations:
''I really don't understand. Central databases already exist. Privacy is
already gone.''

As Ellison spoke, it occurred to me that he was proposing to reconstruct
America's national security strategy along the lines of Oracle's business
model. When Oracle moved its business to the Internet in 1995, Ellison
complained that its customer information was scattered across hundreds of
separate databases, which meant that the German office couldn't share
information about customers with the French office. By consolidating 130
separate databases into a single database on the Internet, Ellison said,
Oracle saved a billion dollars a year and found it easier to track, monitor
and discriminate among its customers. This was what Ellison now wanted to do
for America.

I asked if there would be any controls on access to the database. For
example, would Ellison want people to be kept off a plane because they were
late on their alimony payments?

''Oh, no, I don't think we would keep anyone off on alimony payments,''
Ellison said. ''But if the system designed to catch terrorists also catches
mere bank robbers and deadbeat dads, that's O.K. I think that's a good
thing. I don't think it's a bad thing.''

There are, at the moment, legal restrictions prohibiting the sharing of data
by government agencies. The most important restriction was passed in 1974,
to prevent President Nixon from ordering dragnet surveillance of Vietnam
protesters and searching for their youthful marijuana arrests. I asked
Ellison whether these legal restrictions should be relaxed. ''Oh,
absolutely,'' he said. ''I mean absolutely. The prohibitions are absurd.
It's this fear of an all-too-powerful government rising up and snatching
away our liberties.'' Since Sept. 11, Ellison argued, those qualms no longer
make any sense: ''It's our lives that are at risk, not our liberties,'' he
said.

Ellison proposes to link the central government database to a system of
digital identification cards that would be optional for citizens but
mandatory for aliens. He wants each card holder to provide a thumbprint or
iris scan that would be stored in the central database. I recalled that
Lawrence Lessig of Stanford Law School had explained to me that a national
fingerprint database was probably the most invasive of all possible designs
for an identification system, because it would allow the government to dust
for fingerprints in a nightclub or a protest scene and identify everyone who
was there. I asked Ellison why the government couldn't minimize these
privacy concerns by storing the fingerprint on the ID card.

Ellison dismissed the suggestion. ''Everyone's got this amorphous idea that
the government will somehow misuse this,'' he said, ''but no one has given
me a substantive example of what will happen that's bad.''

I tried again. What about the centralized storage of health information, as
Oracle was proposing to do with the Leaders system. Would Ellison want
government officials to have access to personally identifiable genetic
information?

''I feel like Alice has fallen through the looking glass,'' Ellison said.
His voice rose; he was starting to get a little testy. ''Does this other
database bother you here? We can't touch that database because I won't be
able to use my credit card. Like, I won't be able to go to the mall!'' He
took on the voice of Sean Penn's stoner from ''Fast Times at Ridgemont
High.'' ''Like, that's really disturbing. Like, don't mess with my mall
experience. O.K., so people have to die over here without this, but that's
not going to affect my experience going to the mall.'' He exhaled, and in
his regular billionaire voice asked, ''I mean, what the hell is going on?''

Ellison said he was late for an appointment at Intel  and started to make
motions to leave. I tried one more question. Were there no differences
between Oracle and the United States government, I asked, that should make
us hesitate before centralizing all of our national databases using Oracle
as a model?

''From the information-science standpoint, there's no difference at all,''
he replied. ''These central databases are cheaper and better and they solve
all these problems. We can manage credit risks that way. We should be
managing security risks in exactly the same way.''

It's not surprising, of course, that Larry Ellison sincerely believes that
what's good for Oracle is good for America. But there are, in fact,
differences between an e-business and the American government, differences
that perhaps should make us hesitate before reconstructing America along the
business model of the Oracle Corporation.

''Depending on how these technologies are designed, they can respect
traditional values of liberty or not,'' says Lawrence Lessig, ''and whether
they do depends on the values that drive the designers and the institutions
we build to check the design.'' Although Lessig's path-breaking book ''Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace'' argues that it's possible to design
technologies that protect privacy and security at the same time, he has
become pessimistic that Silicon Valley, left to its own devices, will get
the balance right. ''The reality is that all the market power is going to be
on the side of delivering the security, and there's no strong claim on the
other side for delivering the privacy,'' he says. ''There's no court that
will stand up and push the demand for heightened review for privacy, and
there's no politician. And then you have Larry Ellison types riding in with
the glow of the market. He's like a rich version of a North Korean
dictator.''

Here, then, is the Catch-22 of the integrated databases that are being
constructed in the wake of Sept. 11: the technologists want the politicians
to decide the balance between privacy and security, but because the
technology is so complicated and unfamiliar, very few politicians seem up to
the task.

I visited Maria Cantwell, the newly elected senator from the state of
Washington and perhaps the most technologically savvy member of the Senate.
(She complains that Congressional rules prohibit her from taking her
BlackBerry wireless communicator onto the Senate floor but allow her to use
a spittoon.) Cantwell learned about the importance of Internet privacy as an
executive for RealNetworks , which markets one of the most popular Internet
music players. In 1999, RealNetworks got into trouble when privacy advocates
noticed that the player could send information to RealNetworks about the
music each user downloaded. RealNetworks had the capability to match this
data with a Globally Unique Identifier, or GUID, that exposed the user's
identity. Although RealNetworks insisted that it had never, in fact, matched
the music data with the GUID, the company was eager to avoid a
public-relations disaster, and so it quickly disabled the GUID. The
experience helped turn Cantwell into a crusader for privacy, but her time in
the Senate has made her more pessimistic that her colleagues in Congress
have the understanding or inclination to regulate technology in a meaningful
way.

''What I don't think people realize is that we are just at the tip of the
iceberg,'' she told me. ''I think they're trying to be prescriptive on some
very basic things, not understanding the world that's yet to come. I try to
explain some of the new technology to my colleagues'' -- by which she means
her fellow senators. ''You're going to be able to be driving and say, 'Hey,
take me to the nearest Starbucks ,' and they all think that's great. And
then I say, but it also might be stored in a database that may also be able
to track where you were at 2 o'clock in the morning.''

Cantwell worries that her Senate colleagues are so swept up in the search
for a technological solution to our security problems that regulating access
to the databases isn't on their agenda. ''I mean, databases can become a
threat in themselves if you don't think through the right safeguards,'' she
said. ''People are getting enamored with the power of the technology and not
thinking through the privacy issues and how they might apply.''

In the face of Congressional indifference and judicial passivity, it has
fallen to the technologists to sort out the appropriate balance between
liberty and security. But this is a challenge that the technologists are ill
equipped -- by culture and temperament -- to meet.

The gonzo entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley like to think of themselves as
antigovernment libertarians; the business nostrums of the precrash era
assumed that the Internet would lead inevitably to the end of hierarchy and
centralized authority and the flourishing of individual creativity.

When the e-business technologies of tracking, classifying, profiling and
monitoring were used to identify the preferences of American consumers and
to mirror back to each of us a market-segmented version of ourselves,
Silicon Valley could argue that it was serving the cause of freedom and
individual choice. But when the same software applications are used by the
government to track, classify, profile and monitor American citizens, they
become not technologies of liberty but technologies of state surveillance
and discrimination. They threaten the ability of Americans to define their
identity in the future free from government predictions based on their
behavior in the past. Far from leading inevitably to the end of centralized
authority, the age of the Internet turns out to include powerful economic
and political forces that are determined to centralize as much information
about individuals as possible.

The technology for integrated databases already exists, waiting to be
activated by the flip of a switch. In the wake of Sept. 11, few politicians
or judges seem willing to keep the forces of centralization in check. And no
one should count on the technologists to police themselves.

I had one last question for Larry Ellison. ''In 20 years, do you think the
global database is going to exist, and will it be run by Oracle?'' I asked.

''I do think it will exist, and I think it is going to be an Oracle
database,'' he replied. ''And we're going to track everything.''

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