Hi,

* Helmut Grohne <hel...@subdivi.de> [2023-08-10 06:43]:
When repacking, the upstream signature becomes useless and external
parties can no longer verify it at ease. Including that upstream
signature increases trust in the source shipped by Debian being
good.
I don't think that problem is very relevant in practise.

On the one hand, the vast majority of upstreams I have encountered
so far do not ship any signatures at all. Some upstreams do not even
have an immutable release archive; Github (for example) generates
TARs and ZIPs on the fly and changes the exact format from time to
time.

On the other hand, those upstream developers who care enough to go
the extra mile with a meaningful [1] cryptographic signature,
probably also pay more attention to the actual files they ship,
making it less likely to require repacks in the first place.


Cheers
Timo


[1] A signature is only meaningful if the signing key is kept
secure. If you upload a GPG private key to your favorite code
hoster and have it sign releases automatically, you have a very
convenient workflow that achieves nothing at all, because the
integrity of the release still depends on the integrity of the
hosting platform.

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