Package: release.debian.org Severity: important Tags: bookworm X-Debbugs-Cc: w...@packages.debian.org Control: affects -1 + src:wpa User: release.debian....@packages.debian.org Usertags: pu tags: security
[ Reason ] CVE-2023-52160 security bug [ Impact ] security bug is present [ Tests ] Test suite run fine [ Checklist ] [ X] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog [X] I reviewed all changes and I approve them [ X] attach debdiff against the package in (old)stable [ X] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable [ Changes ] The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. [ Other info ] Buster is fixed so upgrade reintroduce the CVE Bastien
diff -Nru wpa-2.10/debian/changelog wpa-2.10/debian/changelog --- wpa-2.10/debian/changelog 2023-02-24 13:01:35.000000000 +0000 +++ wpa-2.10/debian/changelog 2024-04-30 22:45:18.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,19 @@ +wpa (2:2.10-12+deb12u1) bookworm; urgency=high + + * Non-maintainer upload on behalf of the Security Team. + * Fix CVE-2023-52160 (Closes: #1064061): + The implementation of PEAP in wpa_supplicant allows + authentication bypass. For a successful attack, + wpa_supplicant must be configured to not verify + the network's TLS certificate during Phase 1 + authentication, and an eap_peap_decrypt vulnerability + can then be abused to skip Phase 2 authentication. + The attack vector is sending an EAP-TLV Success packet + instead of starting Phase 2. This allows an adversary + to impersonate Enterprise Wi-Fi networks. + + -- Bastien Roucari??s <ro...@debian.org> Tue, 30 Apr 2024 22:45:18 +0000 + wpa (2:2.10-12) unstable; urgency=medium * Prevent hostapd units from being started if there???s diff -Nru wpa-2.10/debian/patches/0013-CVE-2023-52160-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentica.patch wpa-2.10/debian/patches/0013-CVE-2023-52160-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentica.patch --- wpa-2.10/debian/patches/0013-CVE-2023-52160-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentica.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ wpa-2.10/debian/patches/0013-CVE-2023-52160-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentica.patch 2024-04-30 22:42:02.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 +Subject: CVE-2023-52160 PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication + requirements + +The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 +authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated +during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP +specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front +is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than +the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when +unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed +devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the +user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. + +Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 +authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session +resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been +configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed +authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more +strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability +issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS +session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. + +Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 +configuration parameter option: +'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS +tunnel) behavior for PEAP: + * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication + * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate + (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was + not used (default) + * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> +origin: https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c +bug: https://www.top10vpn.com/research/wifi-vulnerabilities/ +bug-debian-security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-52160 +bug-debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1064061 +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 ++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 +++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 +++++++ + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +index 3238f74..047eec2 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { + * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + * 2 = require cryptobinding + * ++ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++ * not used (default) ++ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases ++ * + * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and + * uuid=Device_UUID + * +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +index 12e30df..6080697 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { + u8 cmk[20]; + int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) + * is enabled. */ ++ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; + }; + + +@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data, + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); + } + ++ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); ++ } + #ifdef EAP_TNC + if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { + data->soh = 2; +@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm) + data->force_peap_version = -1; + data->peap_outer_success = 2; + data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; + + if (config && config->phase1) + eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); +@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm, + } + + ++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, ++ struct eap_peap_data *data) ++{ ++ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || ++ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && ++ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && ++ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || ++ data->phase2_eap_started) && ++ !data->phase2_eap_success) ++ return false; ++ return true; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response + * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() +@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, + " - force failed Phase 2"); + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; + ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; ++ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); ++ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; ++ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; + } else { + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; + ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; +@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: + /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate + * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has + * been completed. */ +- if (data->phase2_eap_started && +- !data->phase2_eap_success) { ++ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " + "Success used to indicate success, " + "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " +@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) + { + struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; ++ + return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && +- data->phase2_success; ++ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; + } + + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm, + + sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); + ++ if (!phase2) ++ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || ++ params->client_cert_blob || ++ params->private_key || ++ params->private_key_blob; ++ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +index 9ac0012..3348634 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { + * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used + */ + int tls_v13; ++ ++ /** ++ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured ++ */ ++ bool client_cert_conf; + }; + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) + # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + # * 2 = require cryptobinding ++# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++# not used (default) ++# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or + # pbc=1. + # diff -Nru wpa-2.10/debian/patches/series wpa-2.10/debian/patches/series --- wpa-2.10/debian/patches/series 2023-02-24 13:01:35.000000000 +0000 +++ wpa-2.10/debian/patches/series 2024-04-30 22:42:02.000000000 +0000 @@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ upstream-fixes/0003-OpenSSL-Drop-security-level-to-0-with-OpenSSL-3.0-wh.patch allow-legacy-renegotiation.patch wpa_service_netdev.patch +0013-CVE-2023-52160-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentica.patch
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
