On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: > Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise > contests), that option should be the winner. > > Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith > Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterion, because if there is an > undefeated option, the Smith set consists solely of that option. > > Do you have a problem with these criteria in NON-Supermajority > elections?
I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand enough about what's meant by "pairwise contests" to agree with the Condorcet criterion. > In a Supermajority situation, the big question becomes: What does a > "supermajority" mean in a multi-option election? In a single-option > election, it's easy: More "yeas" than "nays" by a supermajority. I > can even see that extended to an Approval voting system: an option > -can- win by a N:M supermajority if the ratio of "Approved" votes to > "Not approved" votes is at least N:M. This leads to another possible > criterion: > > Supermajority Criterion: If any option requires a N:M supermajority, > then if more than M/N of the ballots disapprove of the option, then it > should not win. > > Does that sound reasonable? Please keep in mind that I haven't defined > what "approved" and "disapproved" means on a preferential ballot. Exactly. Those definition would have to be nailed down before it would be reasonable to agree or disagree on this. > How about this Supermajority Election proceedure: > > 1) Find a winner using some method that meets both the Smith and > Condorcet Criteria (exact method still under debate). Heh.. this procedure is already debatable. > 2) If the winner has a supermajority requirement, compare the winner > with the "status quo" option. If it defeats the status quo by the > supermajority requirement, then it wins, otherwise "default" wins. I dislike this, immensely. What if you have more than one flavor of "status quo" you're voting for? Later, -- Raul