Exact same issue for Globalsign, if you know the root you can find the certificate:
https://platform.censys.io/certificates/2CABEAFE37D06CA22ABA7391C0033D25982952C453647349763A3AB5AD6CCF69 But searching for it by SHA256, SPKI, etc yields nothing. - Wayne On Monday, July 20, 2026 at 7:07:27 AM UTC+1 Wayne wrote: > Okay something's odd with Censys. For the Digicert one checking elsewhere > I can find the root... > > > https://platform.censys.io/certificates/cb3ccbb76031e5e0138f8dd39a23f9de47ffc35e43c1144cea27d46a5ab1cb5f > > However searching for that by SPKI SHA256, or its own SHA256 fingerprint > yields no results for the root: > cert.parsed.subject_key_info.fingerprint_sha256: > "8bb593a93be1d0e8a822bb887c547890c3e706aad2dab76254f97fb36b82fc26" > > 34 results, however no self-signed > > cert.fingerprint_sha256: > "cb3ccbb76031e5e0138f8dd39a23f9de47ffc35e43c1144cea27d46a5ab1cb5f" > > 0 results > > I'm wondering if this was imported into Censys in an odd way to break it > appearing in searches. > > - Wayne > > On Monday, July 20, 2026 at 6:02:32 AM UTC+1 Wayne wrote: > >> Yup my bad had the notBefore >=2019-01-01 still active on the checks. >> Here is a revised list being more conservative on any self-signs: >> >> Layout: ID, Subject CN, Subject DN, SHA256s matching >> >> *1. AC Sector Público* >> C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC >> Sector Público >> 8265756dd5cd8a37ee61e40351288e4b16a89dd248c1ec4eba25aaf161abf498 >> >> >> *2. AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo* >> C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC >> Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo >> 9ce630b35f8ae2c6419e734ad9d2fa30476dd9e7394b1e93b27f83f776a024ea >> >> >> *3. DigiCert Global Root G2* >> >> C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 >> 6523c34f1e879add7603cb2048a898a5e2f0c6c4b512c0d22782b85d43ae3371 >> 79d57b15dfa65c2870eafe11b637765909cfe937b49c15ce7f194030cab395ad >> a0d609a7e3c434e878a9a1c1bd065b8dcf33aa7efee1b11bc75cce5e5a042080 >> caf8ad697f7bda712ab127a8ad8b83f74a91a0de1784a1b483fef9ac79b67513 >> >> >> *4. GlobalSign* >> >> OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign >> c84e1378b974a991acdcdd733421e3061e6fa21a0491c8902bafde3855e0063e >> dda8da736187d76f4f0ed5a5f667b54d99a98ae06091d0e3a01714e9221695ad >> >> >> *5. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1* >> >> C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1 >> 5a84c94054d340d650a29985ef97bb396352e215aed6c0b33ca7ffdd3bd5d2a2 >> >> >> *6. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1* >> >> C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1 >> bc8bbd7d279d2e5f070bcef6faf3aab1bef30da3eb2875424295ad147f2aef07 >> >> >> *7. USERTrust RSA Certification Authority* >> >> C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust >> RSA Certification Authority >> 68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665db61bbdb109e00f05ca9f74244ee5f5f52b >> >> - Wayne >> >> On Monday, July 20, 2026 at 4:45:35 AM UTC+1 Michael Stone wrote: >> >>> Hi Wayne, >>> >>> Good day. >>> >>> Regarding the certificates you mentioned, for CFCA: >>> >>> - sha256 >>> Fingerprint=6E:6E:B2:9F:5E:BA:91:0A:FF:D4:62:FC:92:1D:72:4E:52:68:05:EF:E9:08:AE:C4:5B:D4:09:B6:24:E1:4C:09 >>> this is a root certificate, it's not in violation with MRSP 5.3 >>> >>> - sha256 >>> Fingerprint=FA:A4:FA:0E:F7:05:6D:69:53:BB:DF:B3:64:61:E3:F7:CD:F3:33:52:AF:72:4F:D8:25:4B:18:4D:3E:2C:94:1F >>> this is a cross certificate signed by CFCA EV ROOT, and within the >>> 'exception' of MRSP 5.3. >>> >>> I've just checked BR, it seems not in violation with BR/MRSP. >>> >>> Let me know if you have any other concerns. >>> >>> On Monday, July 20, 2026 at 11:38:42 AM UTC+8 Matthew McPherrin wrote: >>> >>>> The following two entries from Let's Encrypt are not intermediate >>>> certificates: >>>> They are roots, pending inclusion. >>>> I haven't validated this to be true of every entry on the list, but it >>>> appears to me certainly the majority are either roots, or are cross-signed >>>> which have an explicit exemption in the policy. >>>> >>>> 18. Root YE - C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE >>>> e14ffcad5b0025731006caa43a121a22d8e9700f4fb9cf852f02a708aa5d5666 >>>> >>>> 19. Root YR - C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR >>>> e57b7e6f150c419102e8d5c055729ff967b9d1a829bf00cec89ca604ebf4a86f >>>> >>>> On Sunday, July 19, 2026 at 8:16:37 PM UTC-4 Wayne wrote: >>>> >>>>> I have been performing some unrelated research and had a read of the >>>>> Mozilla Root Store Policy. >>>>> >>>>> >5.3 Intermediate Certificates >>>>> >All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new >>>>> certificates and that directly or transitively chain to a CA certificate >>>>> included in Mozilla’s root store MUST be operated in accordance with this >>>>> policy. >>>>> > >>>>> >... >>>>> > >>>>> >Intermediate certificates created after January 1, 2019, with the >>>>> exception of cross-certificates that share a private key with a >>>>> corresponding root certificate: >>>>> >- MUST contain an EKU extension; >>>>> >- MUST NOT include the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId; and >>>>> >- MUST NOT include both the id-kp-serverAuth and >>>>> id-kp-emailProtection KeyPurposeIds in the same certificate. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks to Censys and the following query I've been about to check the >>>>> above. >>>>> (cert.validation.nss.is_valid=true and not cert.labels="revoked" and >>>>> (cert.labels = "intermediate" and not cert.labels="root")) and >>>>> cert.parsed.validity_period.not_before>='2019-01-01' and not >>>>> (cert.parsed.extensions.extended_key_usage.server_auth=false or >>>>> cert.parsed.extensions.extended_key_usage.server_auth=true) >>>>> >>>>> The following concerns all known intermediate certificates that chain >>>>> to the NSS store that lack an EKU extension. No corresponding root >>>>> certificate was found through checks. >>>>> >>>>> Layout: ID, Subject CN, Subject DN, SHA256s matching >>>>> >>>>> *1. AC Sector Público* >>>>> C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, >>>>> CN=AC Sector Público >>>>> 8265756dd5cd8a37ee61e40351288e4b16a89dd248c1ec4eba25aaf161abf498 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *2. AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo* >>>>> C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, >>>>> CN=AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo >>>>> 9ce630b35f8ae2c6419e734ad9d2fa30476dd9e7394b1e93b27f83f776a024ea >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *3. Amazon ECDSA 256 Root EU M1* >>>>> C=DE, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon ECDSA 256 Root EU M1 >>>>> 9ead32c9285fe68ba2c5b0fe427d149b103fdfa1d0958d77c3da0ff246e853d3 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *4. Amazon ECDSA 384 Root EU M1* >>>>> C=DE, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon ECDSA 384 Root EU M1 >>>>> 8e136ce0e77c848f2d2910abd4e3a764358bb1b7a4932202bc9b915732462d85 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *5. Amazon RSA 2048 Root EU M1* >>>>> C=DE, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 Root EU M1 >>>>> eaffac50c7e3e15a68f779a5e70ec2f5e9fc4a03ff69ab337b4d6c4510432395 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *6. Certum EC-384 CA* >>>>> C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, >>>>> CN=Certum EC-384 CA >>>>> b72450abf5047a8af63ec9d87e331484850b1849a2550a82a86db6b41ed38760 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *7. Certum Trusted Network CA 2* >>>>> C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, >>>>> CN=Certum Trusted Network CA 2 >>>>> 08e7eac998a62c4155cc4cbc5eda32f5b41a12c012f29ab3433bd366348149f0 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *8. Certum Trusted Root CA* >>>>> C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, >>>>> CN=Certum Trusted Root CA >>>>> fb13890c7ab14ff7b94b2714503e31123bfdd340fc4d979743166e0469b47a88 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *9. CFCA Global RSA ROOT G2* >>>>> C=CN, O=China Financial Certification Authority, CN=CFCA Global RSA >>>>> ROOT G2 >>>>> 6e6eb29f5eba910affd462fc921d724e526805efe908aec45bd409b624e14c09 >>>>> faa4fa0ef7056d6953bbdfb36461e3f7cdf33352af724fd8254b184d3e2c941f >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *10. DigiCert Assured ID Root G2* >>>>> C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID >>>>> Root G2 >>>>> d9ae5ed27c9c6485296c89a29d222f4ab2bc7eeca51ecc8d2d7a23fe9c1151da >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *11. DigiCert Global Root G2* >>>>> C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 >>>>> 6523c34f1e879add7603cb2048a898a5e2f0c6c4b512c0d22782b85d43ae3371 >>>>> 79d57b15dfa65c2870eafe11b637765909cfe937b49c15ce7f194030cab395ad >>>>> a0d609a7e3c434e878a9a1c1bd065b8dcf33aa7efee1b11bc75cce5e5a042080 >>>>> caf8ad697f7bda712ab127a8ad8b83f74a91a0de1784a1b483fef9ac79b67513 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *12. DigiCert Trusted Root G4* >>>>> C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Trusted Root G4 >>>>> 33846b545a49c9be4903c60e01713c1bd4e4ef31ea65cd95d69e62794f30b941 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *13. e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025* >>>>> C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., CN=e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025 >>>>> a01c4f8f68112fa9dac50b96809a791480168c8acb9e51c5482d8d3819688557 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *14. GlobalSign* >>>>> OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign >>>>> f349954e8fb6d44011bcb789d97d9a2cb2032bd5f0b598d1fb8a099f5848d523 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *15. GlobalSign* >>>>> OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign >>>>> c84e1378b974a991acdcdd733421e3061e6fa21a0491c8902bafde3855e0063e >>>>> dda8da736187d76f4f0ed5a5f667b54d99a98ae06091d0e3a01714e9221695ad >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *16. GTS Root R1* >>>>> C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R1 >>>>> 3ee0278df71fa3c125c4cd487f01d774694e6fc57e0cd94c24efd769133918e5 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *17. Microsoft TLS RSA Root G2* >>>>> C=US, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft TLS RSA Root G2 >>>>> 6a170583db584151e1c454eeca2a64cc5d8e484a5bd1156e720b4458654ee9e5 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *18. Root YE* >>>>> C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE >>>>> e14ffcad5b0025731006caa43a121a22d8e9700f4fb9cf852f02a708aa5d5666 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *19. Root YR* >>>>> C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR >>>>> e57b7e6f150c419102e8d5c055729ff967b9d1a829bf00cec89ca604ebf4a86f >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *20. SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC* >>>>> C=US, ST=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root >>>>> Certification Authority ECC >>>>> 60ef412eabe7c3fc6399eed1b633b777747515b29d721b963dd258bc498ab292 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *21. SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC* >>>>> C=US, ST=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root >>>>> Certification Authority ECC >>>>> 06b9722a699c57dff1869f430b479bb6eb49aae1184eac9c5325c1334a34ea4c >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *22. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1* >>>>> C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1 >>>>> bc8bbd7d279d2e5f070bcef6faf3aab1bef30da3eb2875424295ad147f2aef07 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *23. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1* >>>>> C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1 >>>>> 5a84c94054d340d650a29985ef97bb396352e215aed6c0b33ca7ffdd3bd5d2a2 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *24. TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 2* >>>>> C=TR, ST=Kocaeli, O=TUBITAK Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi, CN=TUBITAK >>>>> Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 2 >>>>> ec6431ba9fc13e405df80ade58a048136f789a03fdca4cf5daa4336ac522225b >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *25. USERTrust ECC Certification Authority* >>>>> C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, >>>>> CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority >>>>> a6cf64dbb4c8d5fd19ce48896068db03b533a8d1336c6256a87d00cbb3def3ea >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *26. USERTrust RSA Certification Authority* >>>>> C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, >>>>> CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority >>>>> 68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665db61bbdb109e00f05ca9f74244ee5f5f52b >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Whether directly or indirectly because of chaining these are currently >>>>> in violation of the Mozilla Root Store Policy. >>>>> >>>>> - Wayne >>>> >>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/f831a54f-dbad-4252-9649-ea4b968ff3b1n%40mozilla.org.
