A wifi MITM attacker can steal all the passwords you have saved on
http sites, by sending you to fake versions of each site and watching
what the browser fills into the form.

You're safe iff you initially saved the password from an https page,
or if the site now uses STS, or maybe if you're extremely careful to
never open any http pages while connected to untrusted networks.

I have some ideas for mitigating this risk.

1) If a site sends an STS header, and the user has any data (cookies,
passwords, etc) that are not https-only, immediately mark that data as
https-only. (This helps if a site uses STS, but the user's privacy
settings cause the password storage to outlive the STS storage.)

2) When clearing history, retain the STS bit if any other data
associated with the site is retained. For example, in the common case
of clearing all history other than passwords, retain the STS bits for
sites that have passwords stored. (This accomplishes roughly the same
thing as #1.)

3) If you have a password stored for http, and you log into the same
site using https, move the password to https-only. (This helps if a
site moves from http to https, but does not set STS.)

4) If an identical password is stored for both any http site and any
https site, stop autofilling it on the http site. Instead, provide a
way for users to instruct the browser to fill it in (e.g. an infobar).

5) If an identical password is stored for both any http site and any
https site, and it is not used on the http site for 16 months, expire
the http version. (This helps in cases where the hostname has changed,
e.g. from mail.google.com to www.google.com, and the security level
has also changed.)

6) When connected to an untrusted wireless network, don't fill in passwords.

7) When connected to an untrusted wireless network, refuse to make any
insecure connections. If the user really wants to open an insecure
search result, they can open it in a separate browsing session.

Which of these seem practical and worth implementing?
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