Hi Aaron,
On 2014-01-02 16:10, Aaron Zauner wrote:
Hi Kurt,
On 02 Jan 2014, at 21:51, Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be> wrote:
On Thu, Jan 02, 2014 at 09:33:24PM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:
I *think* they want to prefer CAMELLIA to AES, judging by the
published ciphersuite.
But the construction must be wrong because it returns AES first.
If the intent is to
prefer Camellia, then I am most interesting in the rationale.
Thanks for reporting this!
Yes. The intent was to prefer Camellia where possible. First off we
wanted to have more diversity. Second not everybody
is running a sandybridge (or newer) processor. Camellia has better
performance for non-intel processors with about the
same security.
I would argue that our documents target server configurations, where
AES-NI is now a standard.
What’s the take on the ChaCha20/Poly1305 proposal by the Mozilla Sec.
Team by the way?
There are 5 security teams at Mozilla, so Mozilla Sec Team is a very
large group.
I think we all want a new stream cipher in TLS to replace RC4. But
that's going
to take years, and won't help the millions of people who don't replace
their software
that often.
From an Operations Security point of view, the question is: how do we
provide the
best security possible, with the cards we currently have in our hands,
and without
discarding anybody. ChaCha20/Poly1305 isn't gonna help with that in the
short term.
- Julien
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