Hi, > A much better approach is to install a TPM-generated key in the TPM’s > NVRAM, with a policy that only allows the key to be used once a trusted > operating system has booted. That can be used as a trust anchor even > without support from buggy UEFI firmware.
Side note: measuring kernel + initrd happens using UEFI firmware services. (once the kernel is up'n'running it will use its own tpm drivers instead of depending on the firmware services). > Furthermore, measured boot allows tying e.g. LUKS keys to a > combination of the actual OS booted and a passphrase needed to unlock > the TPM. This allows the TPM’s protection against brute-force attacks > to be used. You also want protect the initrd against modifications to make sure an attacker can't sniff your passphrase. Unified kernels help here too because the initrd for a given kernel has a fixed and known hash. take care, Gerd _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to devel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org Do not reply to spam, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure/new_issue
