UMR 8590 - IHPST - Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et
des Techniques
13, rue du Four - 75006 PARIS
*Séminaire d'épistémologie des modèles*
organisé par Franck Varenne (franck.vare...@univ-rouen.fr
<mailto:franck.vare...@univ-rouen.fr>) & Vincent Ardourel
(vincent.ardou...@gmail.com <mailto:vincent.ardou...@gmail.com>)
Bonjour à toutes et tous,
La troisième séance du séminaire d’épistémologie des modèles de l'IHPST
aura lieu le^** *mardi 22 janvier* à *15h00* (IHPST - Salle des
conférences). Nous aurons le plaisir d'accueillir *Pablo Lorenzano
*(Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina).**
*
*
*Titre et résumé de la conférence de Pablo Lorenzano:*
*
Explanations in Classical Genetics: A Model-theoretic Account*
The aim of this talk is to analyze the kind of explanations usually
given in Classical Genetics. Explanations in biology have intriguing
aspects to both biologists and philosophers. A summary of these aspects
are found in the introduction to the anthology /Explanation in Biology:
An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life
Sciences/ (Braillard & Malaterre 2015). We will outline four of the most
salient problems in the current debate. These problems are related to
(1) whether natural laws exist in biology, (2) whether causation plays a
specific explanatory role in biology, (3) whether other forms of
explanation – e.g., functional or teleological – are also needed, and
(4) whether the recent mechanistic type model of explanation that brings
together some form of law-like generalizations and of causation fulfill
all expectations. (p. 9) With our analysis of explanations in Classical
Genetics the last problem, which relates to the first two ones, will be
addressed straightforward. But instead of doing it with “the recent
mechanistic type model of explanation”, it will be done with a
model-theoretic, structuralist account of explanation. First,
explanations in Classical Genetics will be presented in the traditional
format of explanations as summarized by arguments. Later on, the nature
of these explanations will be discussed by using explanations in another
area of science, namely, Classical Mechanics. To clarify the situation,
and to carry out an analysis of explanations in Classical Genetics,
notions of the structuralist view of theories ‒ especially those of
theory-net, fundamental law (or guiding principle), specialization, and
special law ‒ will be applied to Classical Genetics. In this
application, Classical Genetics’ fundamental law/guiding principle will
be made explicit. Next, in order to make more transparent the
ontological commitments of Classical Genetics (some of which would play
a causal role), explanations will be presented in a model-theoretic,
structuralist format as ampliative embeddings into nomic patterns within
theory-nets. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of the
presented analysis, arguing in favor of the model-theoretic,
structuralist account of explanation “that brings together some form of
law-like generalizations and of causation”.
*References*
Balzer, W., Moulines, C.U. and J. Sneed (1987), /An Architectonic for
Science. The Structuralist Program/, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987.
Braillard, P.-A. and C. Malaterre (eds.) (2015), /Explanation in
Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the
Life Sciences/, Netherlands: Springer.
Bartelborth, T. (1996), “Scientific Explanation”, in Balzer, W. and C.U.
Moulines (eds.), /Structuralist Theory of Science. Focal Issues, New
Results/, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 23-43.
Carnap, R. (1950), “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”, /Revue
Internationale de Philosophie/ 4: 20-40.
Díez, J.A. (2014), “Scientific w-Explanation as Ampliative, Specialized
Embedding: A Neo-Hempelian Account”, /Erkenntnis/ 79(8): 1413-1443.
Díez, J.A. and P. Lorenzano (2015), “Are Natural Selection Explanatory
Models A Priori?”, /Biology & Philosophy/ 30(6): 787-809.
Forge, J. (2002), “Reflections on Structuralism and Scientific
Explanation”, /Synthese/ 130: 109-121.
Lorenzano, P. (2000), “Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of
Genetics”, in Balzer, W., Moulines, C.U. and J.D. Sneed (eds.),
/Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples/,
Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 251-284.
Lorenzano, P. (2005), “Comentarios a ‘Explicación teórica y compromisos
ontológicos: un modelo estructuralista’ de C.U. Moulines”, /Enrahonar:
//quaderns de filosofia/ 37: 55-59.
Lorenzano, P. (2007), “The Influence of Genetics on Philosophy of
Science: Classical Genetics and the Structuralist View of Theories”, in
Fagot-Largeault, A., Torres, J.M. and S. Rahman (eds.), /The Influence
of Genetics on Contemporary Thinking/, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 99-115.
Reutlinger, A. (2014), “The Generalizations of Biology: Historical and
Contingent?”, in M.I. Kaiser et al. (eds.), /Explanation in the Special
Sciences: The Case of Biology and History/, Dordrecht: Springer, pp.
131-153.
Woodward, J. (2001), “Law and Explanation in Biology: Invariance Is the
Kind of Stability That Matters”, /Philosophy of Science/ 68(1): 1-20.
Woodward, J. (2010), “Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and
the Choice of Levels of Explanation”, /Biology & Philosophy/ 25(3): 287-318.
Waters, K, (2007), “Causes that Make a Difference”, /Journal of
Philosophy/ CIV: 551-579
Vous retrouverez ces informations et la biographie de l'intervenant sur
la page du séminaire
<http://ihpst.cnrs.fr/activites/seminaires/seminaire-epistemod-03-pablo-lorenzano>.
Les prochaines séances du séminaire EpistéMod
<http://www.ihpst.cnrs.fr/activites/seminaires/seminaire-epistemod> se
tiendront les *mardis 12 mars, 2 avril et 21 mai 2019 de 15h à 17h.*
*Organisation : *
Pour des raisons de sécurité liées à la capacité d'accueil de la salle,
l'*inscription préalable au séminaire est fortement recommandée*.
Au plaisir de vous voir.
Cordialement,
Franck Varenne et Vincent Ardourel
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