Dear Colleagues,
Please find here the program of the second edition of the online conference The Metametaphysics of Social Ontology, which will take place on January 11 and 12, 2023. To register, please go here <https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeh8OS3JNF7xGwDnUYBw6N-WwBFmThtpfIUAvQhCyiF50WrsQ/viewform>. For more information, please click here <https://mmso.hypotheses.org/mmso23-conference-program>. Best regards, Raphaël Künstler -------------------------------- Chèr-e-s Collègues, Veuillez trouver ici le programme de la seconde édition du colloque The Metametaphysics of Social Ontology, qui aura lieu les 11 et 12 janvier prochain, en visioconférence. Pour vous y inscrire, merci de vous rendre ici <https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeh8OS3JNF7xGwDnUYBw6N-WwBFmThtpfIUAvQhCyiF50WrsQ/viewform>. Pour davantage de renseignements, c’est ici. <https://mmso.hypotheses.org/mmso23-conference-program> Bien cordialement, Raphaël Künstler ——————————————————— Raphaël Künstler Directeur de la collection "Métaphysique et Sciences", Hermann Professeur agrégé Université Toulouse II - Jean Jaurès Département de philosophie Bureau GS31 5 allée Antonio Machado 31058 Toulouse https://raphaelkunstler.com/ <https://raphaelkunstler.com/> https://raphaelkunstler.com/ <https://raphaelkunstler.com/>https://erraphis.univ-tlse2.fr/accueil-erraphis/equipe/kunstler-raphael <https://erraphis.univ-tlse2.fr/accueil-erraphis/equipe/kunstler-raphael> https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/metaphysique-philosophie-connaissance/Raphael-Kunstler.htm <https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/metaphysique-philosophie-connaissance/Raphael-Kunstler.htm> https://mmso.hypotheses.org/ <https://mmso.hypotheses.org/> https://sph.hypotheses.org/ <https://sph.hypotheses.org/> https://interpreter.hypotheses.org/ <https://interpreter.hypotheses.org/> Salle de réunion personnelle : https://univ-tlse2.zoom.us/j/2812219385 Wednesday, January 11 2 p.m. — Åsa Burman (Stockholm University) — Nonideal Social Ontology This talk starts from the observation that there are two different research frames within contemporary social ontology. It argues that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. I characterize ideal social ontology by developing the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology). The standard model is exemplified by the works of Margaret Gilbert, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela. This model thus synthesizes central assumptions from the three works that shaped the research field of ideal social ontology and shows their explicit and implicit assumptions about social reality. This standard model has a crucial implication: it has shaped what socia l ontologists understand the social phenomena to be analyzed to be—direct, transparent, and deontic social phenomena built on consensus. Consequently, this model offers only a partial view of the social world while claiming it is general. I then argue for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. My central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through (Burman 2023) <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/nonideal-social-ontology-9780197509579?q=burman%20ontology&lang=en&cc=us#>. 3 p.m. — Katharine Jenkins (University of Glasgow) — Ontology and Oppression: The Case of Gender Recognition This talk argues that the fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind can, in some cases, be wrongful in and of itself. It is commonly recognised that the social arrangements that bring human social kinds (kinds such as judge or wife) into being can be unjust or even oppressive, and that being made into a member of a human social kind can have unjust and oppressive consequences. I go further, however, arguing that we can and should subject human social kinds to direct normative assessment, and offering philosophical tools for doing so, chiefly an account of ‘ontic oppression’ (conceived of as a sub-type of ‘ontic injustice’ (Jenkins 2020). I then illustrate this approach by considering a case study, namely gender recognition, currently a site of bitter political disputes in the UK. I argue that attempts to improve the social and political situation of trans people should focus less on claims about what gender kinds are, and more on pragmati c considerations concerning (1) the consequences of different ways of arranging social practices of gender differentiation and (2) how morally and political acceptable (or unacceptable) these consequences are. 4 p.m. — Asya Passinsky (Central European University) — Social Construction and Meta-Ground The notion of social construction plays an important role in many areas of social philosophy, including the philosophy of gender, the philosophy of race, and social ontology. Yet there is no consensus in the literature on how this notion is to be understood. One promising proposal, which has been championed in recent years by Brian Epstein (2015, 2016), Aaron Griffith (2017, 2018), and Jonathan Schaffer (2017), is that social construction may be understood in terms of the notion of metaphysical grounding. However, a simple ground-theoretic analysis of social construction is subject to familiar counterexamples, and it is far from clear how to modify the analysis to avoid the counterexamples. I argue that some initially plausible strategies for dealing with the counterexamples fail. I then develop and defend a new strategy for dealing with the counterexamples—one which leads to a novel ground-theoretic account of social construction in terms of meta-ground. 5 p.m. — Brian Epstein (Tufts University) — TBA Thursday, January 12 2 p.m. — Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani (Jean Nicod Institute) — Social institutions and two types of underlying principles The aim of this talk is to introduce a distinction between two types of principles underlying institutional practices: principles which reveal the raison d’être of institutional practices, and principles which determine the obtaining and functioning of institutional entities. I will start by telling a story of levelling in order to make the distinction tangible: I will suggest that essential principles pertain to the relation between institutional practices –such as competitive games and marriage– and the underlying values and functions, in view of which they emerge. When these practices are institutionalized in one form or another –French marriage, chess, etc.– we pass through definitional principles, which pertain to the instantiation conditions of the practice in a particular form, against the background of its essential rules. I will then argue that although the truth of definitional principles is contingent on their being operative in a certain context, the tr uth of essential principles is independent of their operativeness and, a fortiori, independent of our representations and attitudes. After introducing the notion of essentially-social acts as those which require joint attitudes for their possibility, I will focus on communicative [speech] acts as a subset of essentially-social acts and argue that certain communicative acts like promising and commanding belong, as kinds, to the institutional realm even though they are not in need of definitional principles for their instantiation. 3 p.m. — Matti Sarkia (University of Helsinki) — Social ontology as theoretical modelling Theoretical modeling has been analyzed as a distinctive strategy of scientific investigation, which is based on the indirect investigation of the world by the mediation of a surrogate system, instead of studying the world directly, through empirical observation and experiment (Godfrey-Smith 2006; Weisberg 2007; 2013). Drawing on my earlier work (Sarkia 2021a; 2021b), I will argue that much (even if not all) research in social ontology may also be understood as theoretical modeling, where deliberately abstract and idealized surrogate systems are constructed for the study of the basic building blocks of the social world. Understanding social ontology as theoretical modeling makes it possible to better understand the types of standards of success that apply to it, and to identify new continuities between social ontology and the social sciences. 4 p.m. — Daniel Little (University of Michigan-Dearborn) — Can critical realists embrace ontological individualism? Most critical realists would probably insist that their philosophy of social science is flatly opposed to any form of individualism. Roy Bhaskar and many of his followers emphasize the reality of social structures, a view about the reality of social causal mechanisms, a fairly strong form of emergence, and a determined opposition to methodological individualism. However, it will be argued here that CR rejection of reductionist individualism is unwarranted when directed at the position of ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is not a reductionist doctrine, but rather a view about the constitution of the social world. It maintains that social entities, powers, and conditions are all constituted by the actions, thoughts, and mental frameworks of individual human beings, and nothing else. The social world is constituted by the socially situated individuals who make it up. This ontology does not question the undoubtable fact that individuals have social properties — beliefs, values, practices, habits, and relationships — that are integral to their consciousness and agency. But these properties themselves are the recursive effects of prior sets of socially constituted, socially situated individuals who have contributed to their formation as social actors. The paper will demonstrate that the critical realist positions taken by Bhaskar, Archer, and Lawson can be fully expressed without loss within the ontological framework of ontological individualism. This finding enhances the antecedent credibility of critical realism rather than diminishing it. 5 p.m. —Muhammad Ali Khalidi (City University of New York) — Social Ontology or Metaphysics of Social Science? Philosophers interested in the metaphysics of the social world sometimes appear to be pursuing two distinct projects. One project involves understanding the domain of individuals, groups, artifacts, and other entities that populate our ordinary human lives. The other project concerns the foundations of the social sciences, including the institutions, processes, and events that are studied in systematic inquiries in such disciplines as economics, sociology, and political science. No doubt there is some overlap in the entities and kinds that are under investigation, as well as in some of the methods used in undertaking the two investigations. But there are certainly some important differences of emphasis. For example, among the kinds dealt with in the first project are ones like university professors, sports teams, department meetings, friendly walks, and screwdrivers, which do not seem to feature in the second project. Meanwhile, the kinds investigated in the second proj ect are those like consumers, inflation, government, recession, industrialization, and revolution. Moreover, the methods of the first project tend to involve reflecting on and analyzing concepts that pertain to our everyday lives, and the results are answerable to commonly held beliefs or intuitions, whereas the methods of the second project require close attention to empirical work in the social sciences. Finally, the conclusions of the two inquiries may well turn out to diverge. For example, the first project might conclude that kinds have less determinate individuation conditions than the second project. How should we attempt to reconcile these two projects? Should the pursuit of “folk social ontology” be clearly distinguished from the “metaphysics of social science,” or should we try to merge the two enterprises, and if so how? -- https://www.vidal-rosset.net/mailing_list_educasupphilo.html
