At 03\03\04 01:15 +0100 Tuesday, Markus Schulze wrote: ... >Here is a 3-candidate example showing IFPP fails MMC: > > 30 ABC > 30 BAC > 40 CAB >
(Three candidate: A and B lose since under the 1/3 quota.)
>In this example, a majority of the voters strictly prefers the >candidates A and B to the candidate C. Nevertheless, IFPP chooses >candidate C. >
So monotonicity is deleted and so you want the equal suffrage to be disregarded ?. Why not tell us what your define that principle to be ?.
> >By the way: I believe that the strong opinion of some participants >on the "boring margins/winning-votes debate" (Rob LeGrand) is mainly >a relic from those times when only very few Condorcet methods >(e.g. MinMax method, Copeland method) were known to this mailing >list and when all of these Condorcet methods had serious problems. >In those times, it was necessary to put much weight in the >majoritarian argumentation to be able to justify the proposed >Condorcet method against the attacks e.g. of the IRV supporters. > >However, the currently discussed Condorcet methods are so >sophisticated that it is not necessary anymore that the reader >agrees to a certain opinion of the "lesser-of-2-evils problem" >to see the beautifulness and the elegance e.g. of the Ranked Pairs >method or the beat path method. > -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr Schulze's view could have been this:
Direction reversals
(a) the candidate who was voted for, and
(b) the 2nd candidate who got the votes that should have gone
to the other.So far MMC seems to be wrong and undesirable and a rule that has absolutely no power at all to protect the rights of the voters.
What is the alternative?. Presumably a rules that is fairer but achieving similar. Mr Schulze has not searched for it. Mr Cretney started off very cautiously introducing MMC majority as a principle. Mr Schulze seems to have a new evil plan to criticise the IFPP method. But the facts are that a some dumb MMC rule was promoted and Shulze does not know what <<a surface of a region where a candidate wins>>, is, perhaps.
One of the reasons I deleted Lord Alexander's argument against IRV is that it considered votes on the 1st and 2nd preferences rather than changes in support. I didn't want to explain that using a template argument that is powerful and rapid at eradicating a Condorcet threat, is running inefficiently if directed against the Alternative Vote. The latter is basically very unfair it won't make winners out of persons with 0% of the vote, and to target it, the politician ought tailor the method. Also it is best to oppose all sorts of "it's obvious" type arguments from political heavyweights, e.g., since they are not based on facts/axioms and the other side might copy the technique and have unfair success.
MMC is so basically undesirable and it has the IQ of a fish.
Mr Cretney certainly was reluctant to promote the Naziistic MMC with its seeming complete incompatbility with the whole universe of requirements that equal suffrage may impose.
What are the "10%" and the "25%" checkboxes on the ballot papers for, Schulze ?. Those checkboxes permit a perfectly monotonic method to have candidate C lose
Craig Carey
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