Jacques Mallah wrote
>>From: George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>It is at times like this that I hope that all our theories about >>multiuniverses are in fact correct. > > It doesn't matter, of course. First, the measure of James-like beings >(summing over time) is now known to be smaller than we thought it would be; >that's true no matter what. Sometimes you speak like if you *have* solved your "implementation problem". How could you know now? With the comp hyp., or just the QM hyp., (and this in a completely provable way taking just Everett memory machines in the non relativistic setting), you should not sum up on "time", but you must sum up on *all* consistent neighborhoods. (Time and space emerges on that eventually through comp). You really speak like a quantum Bohmian, discarding quasi-magically all computational histories but one. Decoherence explains only why those "worlds" get rather quickly inaccessible for most of *each* of us, (= "Is" with George Levy first person plural plenal, or noush?). Why do you put "many world" in your signature? The James Higgos of the "other worlds" are zombie or what? I'm not sure it is consolating or reassuring, but that's another point. How do you distinguish yourself from numerically indentical counterparts? >Secondly, the 'classical' universe is surely >large enough that there still exist similar beings, or at least, beings that >we would place equal utility on the existance of. >So, with or without the >MWI, the effect of this news on our utility functions should be about the >same. Sorry we were talking about James *own* utility functions and expectations, from James own first person "average" consistent point of view. The first person. The one you mention in your signature (btw): The one who knows no one else knows ... Bruno
