Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 2/20/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > Stathis:'Would any device that can create a representation of the > world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be > conscious?' > > MP: Well that, in a nutshell, is how I understand it; with the > proviso that it is dynamic: that all representations of all salient > features and relationships are being updated sufficiently often to > deal with all salient changes in the environment and self. In the > natural world this occurs because all the creatures in the past > who/which failed significantly in this respect got eaten by > something that stalked its way in between the updates, or the > creature in effect did not pay enough attention to its environment > and in consequence lost out somehow in ever contributing to the > continuation of its specie's gene pool. > > Stathis [in another response to me in this thread]: 'You can't prove > that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.' > > MP: Well, that depends what you mean; > > 1. to what extent does it matter what I can prove anyway? > 2. exactly what or, rather, what range of sufficiently complex > systems are you referring to as 'machines'; > 3. what do you mean by 'conscious in the same way you are'?; > > I'm sure others can think of equally or more interesting questions > than these, but I can respond to these. > > 1. I am sure I couldn't prove whether or not a machine was > conscious, but it the 'machine' was, and it was smart enough > and interested enough IT could, by engaging us in conversation > about its experiences, what it felt like to be what/who it is, > and questioning us about what it is like to be us. > Furthermore, as Colin Hales has pointed out, if the machine > was doing real science it would be pretty much conclusive that > it was conscious. > 2. By the word machine I could refer to many of the biological > entities that are significantly less complex than humans. What > ever one says in this respect, someone somewhere is going to > disagree, but I think maybe insects and the like could be > quite reasonably be classed as sentient machines with near > Zombie status. > 3. If we accept a rough and ready type of physicalism, and > naturalism maybe the word I am looking for here, then it is > pretty much axiomatic that the consciousness of a > creature/machine will differ from mine in the same degree that > its body, instinctive behaviour, and environmental niche > differ from mine. I think this must be true of all sentient > entities. Some of the people I know are 'colour blind'; about > half the people I know are female; many of the people I know > exhibit quite substantial differences in temperament and > predispositions. I take it that these differences from me are > real and entail various real differences in the quality of > what it is like to be them [or rather their brain's updating > of the model of them in their worlds]. > > I am interested in birds [and here is meant the feathered > variety] and often speculate about why they are doing what they > do and what it may be like to be them. They have very small > heads compared to mine so their brains can update their models > of self in the world very much faster than mine can. This must > mean that their perceptions of time and changes are very > different. To them I must be a very slow and stupid seeming > terrestrial giant. Also many birds can see by means of ultra > violet light. This means that many things such as flowers and > other birds will look very different compared to what I see. > [Aside: I am psyching myself up slowly to start creating a > flight simulator program that flies birds rather than aircraft. > One of the challenges - by no mean the hardest though - will be > to represent UV reflectance in a meaningful way.] > > > 1. If it behaved as if it were conscious *and* it did this using the > same sort of hardware as I am using (i.e. a human brain) then I would > agree that almost certainly it is conscious. If the hardware were on a > different substrate but a direct analogue of a human brain and the > result was a functionally equivalent machine then I would be almost as > confident, but if the configuration were completely different I would > not be confident that it was conscious and I would bet that at least it > was differently conscious. As for scientific research, I never managed > to understand why Colin thought this was more than just a version of the > Turing test. > > 2. I don't consider biological machines to be fundamentally different to > other machines. > > 3. Sure, different entities with (at least) functionally different > brains will be differently conscious. But I like to use "conscious in > the way I am" in order to avoid having to explain or define > consciousness in general, or my consciousness in particular. I can > meaningfully talk about "seeing red" to a blind person who has no idea > what the experience is like: What wavelengths of light lead me to see > red? Can I still see red if my eyes are closed or my optic nerve > severed? What if I have a stroke in the visual cortex? What if certain > parts of my cortex are electrically stimulated? That is, I can go a very > long way with the definition "that experience which i have when a red > coloured object enters my visual field". > > Stathis [from the other posting again]: 'There is good reason to > believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can > be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and > chemistry is a well-understood field.' > > MP: Once again it depends what you mean. Does 'Third person > observable behaviour of the brain' include EEG recordings and the > output of MRI imaging? Or do you mean just the movements of muscles > which is the main indicator of brain activity? If the former then I > think that would be very hard, perhaps impossible; if the latter > however, that just might be achievable. > > > Huh? I think it would be a relatively trivial matter to emulate MRI and > EEG data, certainly compared to emulating behaviour as evidenced by > muscle activity (complex, intelligent behaviour such as doing science or > writing novels is after all just muscle activity, which is just chemical > reactions in the muscles triggered by chemical reactions in the brain). > > Stathis: 'I think it is very unlikely that something as elaborate as > consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary purpose > (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if > zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility.' > > MP: I agree with the first bit, but I do not agree with the last > bit. If you adopt what I call UMSITW [the Updating Model of Self In > The World], then anything which impinges on consciousness, has a > real effect on the brain. In effect the only feasible zombie like > persons you will meet will either be sleep walking or otherwise > deficient as a consequence of drug use or brain trauma. I think > Oliver Sachs's book The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat gives > many examples illustrating the point that all deficiencies in > consciousness correlate strictly with lesions in the sufferer's brain. > > > A human with an intact brain behaving like an awake human could not > really be a zombie unless you believe in magic. However, it is possible > to conceive of intelligently-behaving beings who do not have an internal > life because they lack the right sort of brains. I am not suggesting > that this is the case and there are reasons to think it is unlikely to > be the case, but it is not ruled out by any empirical observation. > > Stathis Papaioannou
The problem is that there doesn't seem to be any conceivable observation that could rule it out. So by Popper's rule it is a not a scientific proposition but rather a metaphysical one. This is another way of saying that there is no agreed upon way of assigning a truth or probability value to it. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
