On Tue, May 23, 2023, 4:14 PM Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 2:27 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 1:15 PM Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 11:08 AM Dylan Distasio <interz...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> And yes, I'm arguing that a true simulation (let's say for the sake of >>>> a thought experiment we were able to replicate every neural connection of a >>>> human being in code, including the connectomes, and neurotransmitters, >>>> along with a simulated nerve that was connected to a button on the desk we >>>> could press which would simulate the signal sent when a biological pain >>>> receptor is triggered) would feel pain that is just as real as the pain you >>>> and I feel as biological organisms. >>>> >>> >>> This follows from the physicalist no-zombies-possible stance. But it >>> still runs into the hard problem, basically. How does stuff give rise to >>> experience. >>> >>> >> I would say stuff doesn't give rise to conscious experience. Conscious >> experience is the logically necessary and required state of knowledge that >> is present in any consciousness-necessitating behaviors. If you design a >> simple robot with a camera and robot arm that is able to reliably catch a >> ball thrown in its general direction, then something in that system *must* >> contain knowledge of the ball's relative position and trajectory. It simply >> isn't logically possible to have a system that behaves in all situations as >> if it knows where the ball is, without knowing where the ball is. >> Consciousness is simply the state of being with knowledge. >> >> Con- "Latin for with" >> -Scious- "Latin for knowledge" >> -ness "English suffix meaning the state of being X" >> >> Consciousness -> The state of being with knowledge. >> >> There is an infinite variety of potential states and levels of knowledge, >> and this contributes to much of the confusion, but boiled down to the >> simplest essence of what is or isn't conscious, it is all about knowledge >> states. Knowledge states require activity/reactivity to the presence of >> information, and counterfactual behaviors (if/then, greater than less than, >> discriminations and comparisons that lead to different downstream >> consequences in a system's behavior). At least, this is my theory of >> consciousness. >> >> Jason >> > > This still runs into the valence problem though. Why does some "knowledge" > correspond with a positive *feeling* and other knowledge with a negative > feeling? > That is a great question. Though I'm not sure it's fundamentally insoluble within model where every conscious state is a particular state of knowledge. I would propose that having positive and negative experiences, i.e. pain or pleasure, requires knowledge states with a certain minium degree of sophistication. For example, knowing: Pain being associated with knowledge states such as: "I don't like this, this is bad, I'm in pain, I want to change my situation." Pleasure being associated with knowledge states such as: "This is good for me, I could use more of this, I don't want this to end.' Such knowledge states require a degree of reflexive awareness, to have a notion of a self where some outcomes may be either positive or negative to that self, and perhaps some notion of time or a sufficient agency to be able to change one's situation. Sone have argued that plants can't feel pain because there's little they can do to change their situation (though I'm agnostic on this). I'm not talking about the functional accounts of positive and negative > experiences. I'm talking about phenomenology. The functional aspect of it > is not irrelevant, but to focus *only* on that is to sweep the feeling > under the rug. So many dialogs on this topic basically terminate here, > where it's just a clash of belief about the relative importance of > consciousness and phenomenology as the mediator of all experience and > knowledge. > You raise important questions which no complete theory of consciousness should ignore. I think one reason things break down here is because there's such incredible complexity behind and underlying the states of consciousness we humans perceive and no easy way to communicate all the salient properties of those experiences. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiyaxumARPQ42bZty5ZhrLbFQuSHe_cNXvjUxd_gniFfg%40mail.gmail.com.
