On 27 July, 09:31, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > The UDA is a reasoning which shows that once we postulate an > "ontological" physical universal, it is impossible to recover the > first person from it
Do you mean to say that we can't recover the 1-person from a physical universe on the assumption that the mind is a 'computation' executed by elements of a physical brain, or that it can't be recovered *in any manner* on the assumption of 'physical ontology'? I've always assumed the former - which is the one attacked in your thought experiments; the latter would be a much stronger and more startling claim, to say the least. > > Nonetheless, the inescapable implication is that any alternative > > schema must from the outset explicitly and fearlessly address the same > > problem space or else run foul of the same intractable 0-1-3 person > > ontological and epistemological issues. > > This is tackled by the modality of self-reference. Yes, I should have said 'otherwise intractable' - meaning intractable for any schema that doesn't explicitly generate the dreamers and their many viewpoints as well as their dream contents. This is the problem space that must be confronted - as COMP does. My point is that any approach to the mind-body issues that doesn't tackle this must fail at the outset. Agreed? > > This has profound implications for virtually all current cosmological > > TOEs: i.e. a view from nowhere turns out to be nobody's view. As has > > been observed in other writings, our understanding remains profoundly > > obscured and distorted unless we restore the personal to the view from > > nowhere. Only then can we conceive why indeed there is somewhere > > rather than nowhere. > > OK. You will have to judge comp, in that respect, by yourself. I'm still trying! I must say that the more I think about your arguments in detail (some of the basic ones - like the teleportation examples - have direct counterparts in my own intuitive history) the more they exercise my intuitions in helpful directions. I feel that there is something intuitively necessary in this generative approach, and specifically in the way it seeks to resolve the 0-1-3-person conundrums that - even if it turns out to be unsupportable as a whole - would remain a core feature of any successor theory. David > On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: > > > > > > > Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and > > machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your > > helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of > > my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I > > hope this will be helpful for future discussion. > > > THE APHORISMS > > > We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind. > > > What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff: dreams. > > > Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to us > > - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't see > > itself). > > > So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but the > > intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some > > inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's great > > insight stands. > > > It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are > > non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions less > > 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence > > again, any such identification could only be via some singular > > correlative synthesis. > > > Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or > > 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if messy > > - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly > > dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside' are > > not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies. > > > By extension of our individual introspecting, a plurality of minds, > > and the 'external world' that includes brains, can be conceived as > > correlated in some way - to be elucidated - in a universal synthesis > > or context: that context being our mutual ontology. > > > Such a universal context, or in common terms 'what exists', cannot be > > fully known (i.e. can't be exhausted by description) although - or > > rather because - it constitutes what we are, and by extension what > > *everything* is. > > > Nonetheless we may seek a logic of dreaming so far as it goes, and > > this will indeed be as far as anything goes in the way of knowledge > > claims. > > > Mathematics may be deployed as a dream-logic: but mathematical > > physics, restricted to 'physical heuristics', prototypically gets > > stuck at the level of describing the content and behaviour of dreams, > > not their genesis. > > The UDA is a reasoning which shows that once we postulate an > "ontological" physical universal, it is impossible to recover the > first person from it. > > > > > To go further and deeper we need an explicit mathematical > > specification of dreamers and their dreams, and of generative > > mechanisms by which dreamers and their dream contents can be > > constructed. > > Once comp is assumed, and UDA understood, including step 8, we get an > explicit mathematical specification of the dreamers (which will be the > universal numbers---to be (re)explained later) and the explanation of > the appearance of the dreams: self-referential gluing (sigma_1) > arithmetical relations. > > > > > Such a schema will by its nature form an analysis of how we come to > > believe that we and our world are real, and in what terms: i.e. how we > > come to know a world in a present and personal manner. > > Except for the mystery of numbers, which has to remain intact > (mysterious). The first person arise from the difference of the logics > of the points of view. Each point of view is just a different modality > of the self reference. I recall (or anticipate): > > p > Bp > Bp & p > Bp & Dp > Bp & Dp & p > > With p any arithmetical sentences, Bp the arithmetical sentence of > Gödel (Beweisbar(Godel number of p)), etc. Note that "p" = 0-person. > Bp = 3 person, Bp & p = first person, Bp & Dp = "3-person matter", Bp > & Dp & p = first person matter. This makes 8 hypostases, due to the G/ > G* splitting. > > The first person view arise from the discrepancy between the logic of > Bp and Bp & p (mainly). > > > > > Consequently such a schema must subsume within its universe of > > discourse: being, knowing, perceiving, acting and intending - as the > > foundations of what it means to be real: i.e. it must be capable of > > invoking the Cheshire Cat *to the life*, not merely leave its grin > > hanging in the void. > > It is here that we may differ. All what needs to be subsumed is 0, and > successor axioms, together with addition and multiplication. Assuming > comp (which is a statement about RITSIAR, and in that sense you are > correct), everything (that is: every dreams and the way they glue > together) has to be derived from the way universal numbers reflects > each other. > > > > > Moving beyond bare analysis and description, any move to universalise > > and 'realise' the axioms of such a schema is to make a claim on > > ontological finality. It has not been completely clear (to me) > > whether COMP necessarily makes such a stipulation on realisation, in > > the sense of a claim that its axioms *literally are* what is present > > and personal (i.e. RITSIAR). > > Comp could be a little more than RITSIAR: it is the fact that RITSIAR > is preserved through a substitution of my parts done at some level. > Comp assumes "yes" for the question, will I *stay* as real as I am > here and now, once I say yes to the doctor and after he has proceeded. > > > > > However I'm coming to suspect that it does not in fact make such a > > claim, although it allows any one of us to take this as a personal > > leap of faith, specifically through the acid test of saying yes to the > > doctor. > > OK then. > > > > > COMP may turn out to be false in its specific predictions - i.e. > > empirical tests > > could rule out the possibility of our being finite machines; or > > perhaps we can never be sure one way or the other. > > > Nonetheless, the inescapable implication is that any alternative > > schema must from the outset explicitly and fearlessly address the same > > problem space or else run foul of the same intractable 0-1-3 person > > ontological and epistemological issues. > > This is tackled by the modality of self-reference. > > > > > This has profound implications for virtually all current cosmological > > TOEs: i.e. a view from nowhere turns out to be nobody's view. As has > > been observed in other writings, our understanding remains profoundly > > obscured and distorted unless we restore the personal to the view from > > nowhere. Only then can we conceive why indeed there is somewhere > > rather than nowhere. > > OK. You will have to judge comp, in that respect, by yourself. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---