Jack, What you mentioned ending the existence of a suffering copy can be positive. I am curious, would you consider ending any observer whose quality of life was less than the average weighted (by number of copies) quality of life of all observers everywhere? Consider this example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism#Average_v_total
Total utilitarianism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_utilitarianism> advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the total utility of its members. According to Derek Parfit<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derek_Parfit>, this type of utilitarianism falls victim to the Repugnant Conclusion<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repugnant_Conclusion>, whereby large numbers of people with very low but non-negative utility values can be seen as a better goal than a population of a less extreme size living in comfort. In other words, according to the theory, it is a moral good to breed more people on the world for as long as total happiness rises. [13] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism#cite_note-12> Average utilitarianism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Average_utilitarianism>, on the other hand, advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the average utility of that population. It avoids Parfit's repugnant conclusion, but causes other problems like the Mere Addition Paradox. For example, bringing a moderately happy person in a very happy world would be seen as an immoral act; aside from this, the theory implies that it would be a moral good to eliminate all people whose happiness is below average, as this would raise the average happiness[14]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism#cite_note-13>. This could however be circumvented by assigning a low utility score to dead people, and taking them into account in the average. I think applying one of these philosophies could shed some light on the inherent goodness or badness when it comes to ending a copy. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
