On 11 Mar 2010, at 02:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Here's an interesting theory of consciousness in which counterfactuals would make a difference.
The fat that the counterfactuals makes a difference is the essence of comp and of the comp supervenience thesis. But that is the reason why neither the movie, nor the boolean graph *is* conscious. What is conscious is the person, and by comp, the person is an abstract immaterial being that you can locally associate it to the boolean graph/brain, (and even the movie, quasi conventionally, in the case you decide to project the last frame of the movie on the boolean graph, to trigger it relatively stable in your story). But the consciousness of that person is then related, if only in the relative way, to all computational histories going through it, from its point of view (more exactly from the 3-p views of his 1-p views).
http://ntp.neuroscience.wisc.edu/faculty/fac-art/tononiconsciousness.pdf
Quite consistent with AUDA, but I have often explained the consistency of "machine theology", auda, with Hobson theory of dreams and neurophysiological approaches. There is an implicit use of the galois connexion theories/model, or equation/surface, and that qualia is the shape of experience, is natural with the first person who lives at the intersection of belief and truth (Bp & p).
This is coherent for example with his analysis of the problem of "Mary" (correct with respect to its implicit comp):
Tononi wrote
Being and describing According to the IIT, a full description of the set of informational relationships generated by a complex at a given time should say all there is to say about the experience it is having at that time: nothing else needs to be added.17 Nevertheless, the IIT also implies that to be conscious—say to have a vivid experience of pure red— one needs to be a complex of high ; there is no other way. Obviously, although a full description can provide understanding of what experience is and how it can be generated, it cannot substitute for it: being is not describing. This point should be uncontroversial, but it is worth mentioning because of a well-known argument against a scientific explanation of consciousness, best exemplified by a thought experiment involving Mary, a neuroscientist in the 23rd century (Jack- son, 1986). Mary knows everything about the brain pro- cesses responsible for color vision, but has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room and has never seen any color.18 The argument goes that, despite her complete knowledge of color vision, Mary does not know what it is like to experience a color: it follows that there is some knowledge about conscious experience that cannot be de- duced from knowledge about brain processes. The argument loses its strength the moment one realizes that conscious- ness is a way of being rather than a way of knowing. According to the IIT, being implies “knowing” from the inside, in the sense of generating information about one’s previous state. Describing, instead, implies “knowing” from the outside.
But he makes a common mistakes by concluding:
This conclusion is in no way surprising: just consider that though we understand quite well how energy is generated by atomic fission, unless atomic fission occurs, no energy is generated—no amount of description will substitute.
Which is obviously incorrect. If you emulate the couple made of the genuine cortical integrated system + the atomic fission, there will be a conscious (and relatively correct) observation of energy generation. If you want he is correct from inside, but if his own (based on comp) theory is correct, there is view from outside of the couple <observer/ atomic-fission>. He is not aware of the comp first person (plural or not) indeterminacy.
From this, he miss the mind-body problem, but this does not change the interest for its proposal as a theory of human consciousness. It is even coherent with my suggestion that a brain is either two universal machines in front of each other, or two brains in front of each other (making a brain 2 or 4 or 8 or 16 or 32 ... universal machines).
At some point he need times, he says, but here the UD-times, or even the successor on natural numbers suits perfectly.
I have no problem with his notion of graded consciousness, being an experiencer of lucidity in sleeps, and amateur of altered states of consciousness, amnesia, etc. This does not change really the nature 0 or 1 of being conscious or not: the abstract third person being the fixed point of p <-> Bp. Löb's formula (B(BP->p-->Bp) makes such fixed point true and provable. (on the contrary; the first person lives at the intersection of p and Bp (p & Bp) and has no fixed point).
The p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & p & Dt, does not describe partial states of consciousness, but different state of consciousness (like observing, feeling, proving, knowing, etc.). the modalities corresponding to the point of views, and they take into account our intrinsic ignorance on which universal machine bears us, and on the fact that below or substitution level all Universal machine/number are playing at once, (by the uda step 2-7).
In mixing Tononi's term and mine: the first person is the integrator of information. In one of its note he seems to be aware that this defines a logic.
It is coherent also with the fact that a brain is a filter of possibilities With comp, or with non relativist Everett, it is always a filtration of ain infinity of histories/universal machines among infinities.
Tononi assume the identity thesis? Not necessarily? I think he is neutral. He beryas it only with Mary, if I can say. He does not address the consciousness/realties problem, and does not seems aware that elementary arithmetical truth contains or define high "psi" region, region of high information integration with respect to fluxes of possible histories in the universal dovetailing.
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that device. I f you have an idea, please elaborate. In my opinion this a priori integrate well in the comp consequences. Thanks for that interesting reference on a reasonable neurophysiological (and with a "high substitution level" comp) account of consciousness and qualia, probably consistent with auda, but not aware, like many, of the conceptual reversal that the basic assumption imposes.
Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
