On 14 Mar 2010, at 06:55, Brent Meeker wrote:
I could have said "associated" or "attributed" instead of
"attached". To say that a brain is conscious is a category error.
My brain is not conscious (no more than a rock). The person who has
that brain can be said to be conscious.
So how does a person "have" a brain? Why does a computation need one?
The basic computations does not need a brain or a computer, given that
they already exists in the elementary (first order logical) relation
between numbers.
Now, a universal number can make computation relatively to another
universal number, or relatively to an infinity of univesral numbers
(according to the point of view). This makes it possible to develop a
greater degree of relative autonomy, partial control, etc. with
respect to its probable local universal histories.
A person has an infinity of brains, all generated infinitely often by
the UD.
The same consciousness will be associated to that person in all
computational histories going through the relevant brain's
computational state.
Obviously you are supposing that the brain's computational state
does not entirely determine the its future states, e.g. different
computations (in fact infinitely many) "go thru" the same state.
But is this because of quantum indeterminancy or because of
different external interactions (e.g. perceptions) or both.
Comp indeterminacy, discovering that I belong to this or that type of
histories. The state of my brain does not make it possible to predict
if a meteor will strike the earth, etc.
Now the relative measure is put on the histories (not the finite
number of states), which makes a continuum of histories 2^aleph_0
in the limit space of histories. We have to take that limit space,
because the first person is unaware of the delays in the UD-time-
step.
So we're taking the limit over computations, not over perceived time?
Careful. This point is subtle. With comp, perceived (and thus first
person) time and space is "platonistically defined", in the third
person way, by a sum on an infinity of computations. (Re)read
(perhaps) uda step1-7.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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