On 5/22/2012 4:22 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>
No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any particular as
primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is to violate the
very
notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend some time reading
Spinoza
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/> and Bertrand Russell's
discussions of
this. I did not invent this line of reasoning.
*Neutral monism*, in philosophy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy>, is the
metaphysical <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics> view that the mental and the
physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are
themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical nor mental.
I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is neither physical
nor mental.
If mathematical "objects" are not within the category of Mental then that is news to
philosophers...
even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such
special
status,
Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on
numbers, than on finite.
So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the
"everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to conceive anything
but
infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my defense I must state that what
I am
conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My
disease is
the inability to properly articulate a written description.
especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the
"reality" of the physical world?
Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt.
Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be
primitively
physical.
You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the "physical reality"
point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree physical reality is not
ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in between position.
We have to start at the physical reality that we individually experience, it is,
aside from our awareness, the most "real" thing we have to stand upon philosophically.
From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology. cosmogony and
epistemology. is there an alternative?
Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for what is
"Real",
This contradicts your neutral monism.
No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above.
Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as primitive, which is
not neutral...
No, I posit the physical and the mental as "real" in the sense that I am
experiencing them.
The physical world is a model. It's a very good model and I like it, but like any model
you can't *know* whether it's really real or not. Bruno's model explains some things the
physical model doesn't, but so far it doesn't seem to have the predictive power that the
physical model does.
Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas like Bruno's. I
guess that I need to draw some diagrams...
why the bias for integers?
Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type "finitely
describable".
This is true only after the possibility of determining differences is
stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a non-neutral
stance, to do so it a contradiction.
Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated on a turing
machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by an integer. I don't see a
contradiction.
I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a
finite machine.
It's instantiated by brains which are empirically finite. Penrose's argument from
Godelian incompleteness is fallacious.
This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail.
You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say "yes" to
the
doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A
code is
mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to
computer
science, which study the computable function, which can always be recasted
in term
of computable function from N to N.
And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or if
you
prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine
universality
notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.)
I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory of
computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from
non-quantity, even
to the point of the possibility of the act of making a distinction. When you
propose a primitive ground that assumes a prior distinction and negates the
prior
act that generated the result, you are demanding the belief in fiat acts.
This is
familiar to me from my childhood days of sitting in the pew of my father's
church.
It is an act of blind faith, not evidence based science. Please stop
pretending
otherwise.
"evidence based science" ??
Yes, like not rejecting the physical necessity involved in a computation. I reject
Platonism on these grounds; it is anti-empirical.
But it wouldn't be if it made some risky predictions which we found to be true.
Brent
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