On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 9:56 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> > On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen <rexall...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except
>>> >> by fiat declaration that it does).
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > Rex,
>>> > I am interested in your reasoning against mechanism. Assume there is
>>> were
>>> > an] mechanical brain composed of mechanical neurons, that contained
>>> the same
>>> > information as a human brain, and processed it in the same way.
>>>
>>> I started out as a functionalist/**computationalist/mechanist but
>>> abandoned it - mainly because I don't think that "representation" will
>>> do all that you're asking it to do.
>>>
>>> For example, with mechanical or biological brains - while it seems
>>> entirely reasonable to me that the contents of my conscious experience
>>> can be represented by quarks and electrons arranged in particular
>>> ways, and that by changing the structure of this arrangement over time
>>> in the right way one could also represent how the contents of my
>>> experience changes over time.
>>>
>>> However, there is nothing in my conception of quarks or electrons (in
>>> particle or wave form) nor in my conception of arrangements and
>>> representation that would lead me to predict beforehand that such
>>> arrangements would give rise to anything like experiences of pain or
>>> anger or what it's like to see red.
>>>
>>
>> I think that's a failure of imagination. From what I know about quarks
>> and electrons I can infer that they will form atoms and in certain
>> circumstances on the surface of the Earth they will form molecules and some
>> of these can be molecules that replicate and evolution will produce complex
>> reproducing organisms these will evolve ways of interacting
>>
>
> It's not a failure of imagination, it's recognition of magical thinking.
>
>
>> with the environment which we will call 'seeing red' and 'feeling pain'
>> and some of them will be social and evolve language and symbolism and will
>> experience emotions like anger.
>>
>
> Not even remotely possible. How does a way of interacting with the
> environment come to have an experience of any kind, let alone something
> totally unprecedented and explainable like 'red' or 'pain'. It is like
> saying that if you begin counting to infinity at some point the number is
> bound to turn purple. This is a failure of skeptical imagination. I can see
> exactly the assumption you are making, and understand exactly why you are
> making it, but can you see that it does not automatically follow that a
> machine which functions without experience should develop experiential
> dimensions as magical emergent properties?
>
>
>>
>> The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information.
>>> What matters is not the bits, nor even the arrangements of bits per
>>> se, but rather what is represented by the bits.
>>>
>>> "Information" is just a catch-all term for "what is being
>>> represented". But, as you say, the same information can be
>>> represented in *many* different ways, and by many different
>>> bit-patterns.
>>>
>>> And, of course, any set of bits can be interpreted as representing any
>>> information. You just need the right "one-time pad" to XOR with the
>>> bits, and viola! The magic is all in the interpretation. None of it
>>> is in the bits. And interpretation requires an interpreter.
>>>
>>> SO...given that the bits are merely representations, it seems silly to
>>> me to say that just because you have the bits, you *also* have the
>>> thing they represent.
>>>
>>> Just because you have the bits that represent my conscious experience,
>>> doesn't mean that you have my conscious experience. Just because you
>>> manipulate the bits in a way as to represent "me seeing a pink
>>> elephant" doesn't mean that you've actually caused me, or any version
>>> of me, to experience seeing a pink elephant.
>>>
>>> All you've really done is had the experience of tweaking some bits and
>>> then had the experience of thinking to yourself: "hee hee hee, I just
>>> caused Rex to see a pink elephant..."
>>>
>>> Even if you have used some physical system (like a computer) that can
>>> be interpreted as executing an algorithm that manipulates bits that
>>> can be interpreted as representing me reacting to seeing a pink
>>> elephant ("Boy does he look surprised!"), this interpretation all
>>> happens within your conscious experience and has nothing to do with my
>>> conscious experience.
>>>
>>> Thinking that the "bit representation" captures my conscious
>>> experience is like thinking that a photograph captures my soul.
>>>
>>
>> That's right. The meaning, the what is represented, is given by
>> interaction (including speech) with the environment (including others). So
>> only a computer with the ability to interact can seem intelligent and
>> therefore conscious and only one that interacts intelligently with people
>> (a robot) can have human-like intelligence that we can infer from behavior.
>>
>
> It's not. The data of an mp3 file is interacted with in the same way by a
> computer whether it is formatted as something we can see or hear, but the
> computer has no experience of either one. Blindsight also shows that qualia
> is not an inevitable result of interaction.
>
> I agree with what Max said (two years ago!):
>
>
> "Information requires interpretation. The magic isn't in the bits.
> The magic is in the interpreter."
>
Max's post was 23 hours ago. It is Rex Allen's post from two years ago
that you and Brent are quoting and responding to.
Note that I too agree with that bit about the interpreter of information
being needed for information to have any objective meaning.
Jason
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