On Thursday, February 7, 2013 7:12:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 4:01 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> 
> wrote: 
>
> >> That's just because the simulation of a person isn't good enough. The 
> >> question is what if the simulation *is* good enough to completely fool 
> >> you. 
> > 
> > 
> > Fooling me is meaningless. "I think that you think therefore you are" 
> fails 
> > to account for the subjective thinker in the first place. If someone 
> kills 
> > you, but they then find a nifty way to use your cadaver as a 
> ventriloquist's 
> > dummy, does it matter if it fools someone into thinking that you are 
> still 
> > alive? 
>
> You have said that you can just "sense" the consciousness of other 
> minds but you have contradicted that, or at least admitted that the 
> "sensing" faculty can be fooled. 


An individual's sense can be fooled, but not necessarily fooled forever, 
and not everyone can be fooled. That doesn't mean that when we look at a 
beercan in the trash we can't tell that it doesn't literally feel crushed 
and abandoned.
 

> If you have no sure test for 
> consciousness that means you might see it where it isn't present or 
> miss it where it is present. So your friend might be unconscious 
> despite your feeling that he is, 


Of course. People have been buried alive because the undertaker was fooled.
 

> and your computer might be conscious 
> despite your feeling that it is not. 
>

Except my feeling is backed up with my knowledge of what it is - a human 
artifact designed to mimic certain mental functions. That knowledge should 
augment my personal intuition, as well as social and cultural 
reinforcements that indeed there is no reason to suspect that this map of 
mind is sentient territory.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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