On 13 Jan 2014, at 21:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi,
Someone wrote, not sure if it was Terren or Bruno:
"... from their own 1-1 points of view, they are in the UD*, and
will follow the path with the greater measure. "
This looks like some form of a self-selection!?
OK. Like in the WM-duplication.
It essence, any observer having a 1p means that it will always exist
in the center of maximum likelihood for its existence.
It is continued by the most probable computations going through its
local current state. "current" is defined with the Dx = "xx" method,
like all indexicals in the comp theory.
Am I missing something here?
I don't think so.
Bruno
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 3:06 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 13 Jan 2014, at 17:53, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Bruno,
On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 11 Jan 2014, at 14:05, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Unfortunately I don't have enough familiarity with the math to
follow you here. It is something I'd like to become fluent in one
of these days but unfortunately I barely have enough time these
days to read this list.
OK. Good book are Mendelson, Boolos and Jeffrey (and Burgess), etc.
Unfortunately they asks for a lot ow work. Logic is the less known
branch of math. The beginning *seems* easy, but is not (unlike
computability theiory).
Thanks.
However one thing still nags me. I don't find it hard to imagine
that given enough computational power, we could simulate a universe
with alternative physics, that leads within the simulation to
intelligent, conscious life forms, eventually.
The simulated agent will be conscious in the 3-1 sense, but we will
have to "manipulate them infinitely" to fail them. Indeed they can
read and think like us, do the UD-Argument, and find the comp-
physics, and compare it with their artificial physics, and their
choice will be that either they are indeed in a normal simulation,
or that comp is false. But we will have ourself an infinite task to
fail them. If not they will soon or later find the discrepancies.
I don't see why... see below.
OK
So Glak appears in our simulation. And if we can simulate it, well,
it's already in the UD*, as well as the infinite computations going
through Glak's state.
Bur from their own 1-1 points of view, they are in the UD*, and
will follow the path with the greater measure.
They will not "stay" in the simulation. That will happen only in
our 3-1 view (or 1-3-1 views).
The only way I can resolve this with your reply is that I fear you
have to say conscious beings cannot exist in alternative physics
simulations, but I'd love to be wrong here.
They can, from our points of view, but they will find themselves in
the most common computations in the UD* which pass through their
states.
Those people stays in the simulation, only from our points of view,
and this asks infinite word from our part if we want them to stay
failed by our simulation. Their situation is similar with the
stochastically rare witness of a quantum suicide surviver. He
survived with probability 1, from their own view, but with
probability near 0 for their witness (in iterated quantum suicides).
If we are able to simulate a universe with alternate physics
I can make sense of that.
that gives rise to Glak (and there may be an infinity of different
such universes),
This means that your simulation of the alternate physics emulates
Glak at the right level, or below.
But Glak, from his "real" perspective belongs to *all* computations
in the UD* going through his state.
That is the real physics! And you cannot simulate it, a priori, as
it is given by an infinite sum on all computations.
then that simulation exists in the UD*.
That one, yes, but also all this others. And Glak's physics is
determined, below its own level, by all the simulations, not just
the one you do.
And of course, the UD* also contains an infinity of continuations
simulating that alternative physics,
and of course Glak.
By the first person consciousness invariance, Glak, from his
perspective, is confronted with the "real physics" below its subst
level. It is the same for all machines, unless someone fail them in
normal worlds (like us here). So, if the law of alternate physics
are different from the laws of the comp-physics, Glak will see that.
He might conclude that comp is false, or that he belongs to a normal
reality simulating an alternate physics.
So it's not clear to me that the measure of that alternative
physics would be so small as to make it obvious that the
alternative physics would be a "white rabbit world".
In this case, it is not a white rabbit world. Like in a video game,
you can decide to avoid white rabbits, and to have reasonable
alternate physical laws.
So Glak can be conscious in the alternative physics, but unless you
intervene to manipulate the mind of Glak, if he is Löbian enough
(which is a consequence of being self-referentially correct and
believing in arithmetic), he will know that he is in alternate
physics.
With comp physics is determined by the existence of the substitution
level and the math of what happens below. It is the result of the
indeterminacy below it. It is the same for all machines.
Ask if not clear, I have to go.
Bruno
Terren
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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