On 27 Jan 2014, at 16:33, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 27 Jan 2014, at 13:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 27 Jan 2014, at 03:44, LizR wrote:
On 27 January 2014 14:08, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/26/2014 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have provided the definition. Should I repeat?
God is the transcendental reality we bet on, and which is
supposed to be responsible for my or our existence.
Sounds like "physics" to me.
If physics is transcendental, a lot of people may be wasting their
time trying to find a TOE.
The physical TOE would be a very natural candidate for the general
TOE, if it was not dissolving consciousness and person when
tackling the mind body problem.
The fact that the most coherent and rational materialist tend to
eliminate consciousness is coherent with the UDA conclusion. We
cannot have both a primitive materials universe, and a mechanist
expanation of the mind.
I have suggested based on string theory that we can have a
primitive materialistic universe derived from
If it is "primitive", it cannot be "derived from".
i use "primitive" in the sense of "having to be assumed in the
theory", or "not derivable" (yet, accepted).
the effectively complete computations of a metaverse machine and at
the same time a mind and consciousness derived from an incomplete
universe machine. That is, mind/body comes from two different comp
machines, one infinite and the other finite. Richard
It is a bit fuzzy, but that sounds reasonable. Yet, string theory
comes from experimentation (if only because it is build on QM) which
is, in comp, a bit of a sort of treachery.
God is indeed treacherous, consisting of the programmer, the
metaverse comp(uter) machine and each universe comp machine
You are quick.
in my string cosmology. The metaverse spacetime overlaps each
universe spacetime; and each are at least mental multiverses if not
physical multiverses. However, physical particles are computed early
on by the effectively complete metaverse machine. Consciousness
stems from physical complexity exceeding the Lloyd bit limit
(10^120) of our universe,
"our universe"? That is what I want to explain and worse, what a
mechanist is obliged to explain.
It is not quite compatible with comp to associate consciousness to
"our universe".
That is comp compatible, but only if *that* is derived from
arithmetic. (And it would be weird and forbid to say "yes" to any comp
doctor, as in this case comp, though true, is definitely not
practical: we can't emulate in one skull the "physical complexity
exceeding the Lloyd bit limit (10^120) of our universe".
which allows an unfettered connection to the metaverse, a sort of
Platonia. [Perhaps]
I don't want to throw cold water on this, but if it is correct, and if
mechanism is correct, the "logical" modest point is that (to be TOE
complete and not put the person under the rug), you need to derive
this from any first order specification of any universal system
(machine, language, combinator, number, game, finite set theory, etc.)
You might have the correct theology, but with mechanism, you have to
derive it from any universal u, computing a universal function phi_u,
in the list of the phi_i.
Equivalently you have to prove, in your theory if you want, that your
theory solves the comp measure problem.
You might try to explain what is the effectively complete (I know only
sigma_1 set or sentence to be like that in some sense) metaverse
machine (it looks like the UD). And why particles are computed before
the dreams? I don't believe, nor made sense of "Consciousness stems
from physical complexity exceeding the Lloyd bit limit (10^120) of our
universe", but that does not mean that there is no interesting idea
there. The comp subst level might be low then, below Planck length.
Perhaps.
Bruno
Richard
This prevents the use of the G/G* separation to be exploited for
consciousness and qualia.
Bruno
Consciousness is the grain of dust in the picture of reality, which
will force us to come back to seriousness in the fundamental
questioning about the mind.
Bruno
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