On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:25 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 11:17, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 11:13 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 10:40 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2023 at 09:34, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 9:29 AM John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 5:14 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *> Given a long series of N spin measurements, MWI says that there >>>>>>>> is always one person who sees N spin-ups. Since this observation is >>>>>>>> certain, it has probability one. Whereas the Born probability of >>>>>>>> seeing N >>>>>>>> ups is 1/2^N. A clear contradiction.* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The probability that Bruce Kellett will see N spin-ups is indeed >>>>>>> one. However the probability that you will see N spin-ups is not. >>>>>>> As I mentioned before, for this sort of discussion the way the English >>>>>>> language handles personal pronouns needs to be modified. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It is not a question of whether you will see the N spin-ups, or >>>>>> whether it is just one copy of Bruce Kellett that will see this. The >>>>>> incompatibility arises from the fact that the series of N spin-ups >>>>>> necessarily exits in MWI, where it only has probability 1/2^N from the >>>>>> Born >>>>>> rule. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you lived in any sort of universe where you were duplicated, there >>>>> would be some probability that you would see different outcomes. >>>>> >>>> >>>> So what? The problem you have is that you have changed the rules of the >>>> theory -- from a theory about what exists, to a theory about what you will >>>> see. Since you will only ever see one outcome, one world, you have reduced >>>> it from a theory of many worlds to a theory of a single world -- the world >>>> you will see! >>>> >>> >>> Obviously the Born rule under MWI is about the probability of what >>> outcome you will see. >>> >> >> As I pointed out, if it is a theory about what you will see, then it is a >> single world theory, since you will only ever see just one world. Hence the >> incompatibility with Many worlds, which is a theory about what exists. >> > > If I pull a coloured ball out of a basket, there is a probability of what > ball I will see and a theory about what balls exist. > Not really comparable. The probability of what ball you get is distinct from the fact that the ball exists. MWI is not a theory about what you will see. Any theory about that is necessarily a single world theory since you only see one ball. MWI is a theory about what exists, and its claim is that many worlds all exist with probability one. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTaVGwaN%3D9Yr55UK9DTbo2E0AZDzuHxKLR5ZVnpR3fXPA%40mail.gmail.com.
