And even after opening those ports it's entirely possible you'd experience a
greater number of dropped UDP new mail notifications with that connection
method than you would with VPN (at least that's been my experience).

Chris
-- 
Chris Scharff
Senior Sales Engineer
MessageOne
If you can't measure, you can't manage! 


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pfefferkorn, Pete (PFEFFEPE) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
> Sent: Friday, October 19, 2001 9:11 AM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> Well I believe I'm finally starting to understand.  Even if 
> we opened up the ports as described in FAQ 3.24 and assigned 
> static ports on the Exchange server for the DS and IS, it 
> would also be necessary to open the UDP ports 1024-65535 up 
> for clients to get notified of new mail.
> 
> Don't get me wrong.  I'm still leaning toward requiring the 
> VPN client, but I need to insure I have all the information 
> for the networking/security group.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephen Mynhier [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Friday, October 19, 2001 2:06 AM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> You can set some of the ports as static (IS, DS, MTA, etc.,) 
> but you cannot assign a static port to UDP Push Notification. 
>  If ports>1024 are blocked, your Outlook clients might be 
> able to send and receive mail just fine, but the blocked Push 
> will prevent the view from refreshing.  This results in the 
> APPEARANCE that mail is not coming in until you change 
> folders, mail not leaving the outbox, etc.,  
> 
> Stephen
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pfefferkorn, Pete (PFEFFEPE) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 2:24 PM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> Maybe I didn't understand the post.  I believe you can 
> especially if your behind a firewall.  Refer to Q148732.
> 
> XADM: Setting TCP/IP Port Numbers for Internet Firewalls [Q148732]
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephen Mynhier [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 3:16 PM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> You cannot make that static.  That range that you listed is 
> for the UDP Push Notification from the Exchange server to the 
> client.  It is a randomly selected (by the client) UDP port 
> above 1024.  The Exchange server uses this to send the new 
> mail notification (refresh command) to the client.
> 
> Stephen
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pfefferkorn, Pete (PFEFFEPE) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 1:46 PM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> Went through TechNet and couldn't find any reference to the 
> actual range. Found the articles on how to make it static, 
> but no range.  Also posted that question on the list asking 
> about the range and I don't recall anyone stating what it 
> was.  The MS tech I talked to had to place me on hold 3 times 
> to get the answer. -----Original Message-----
> From: Don Ely [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 12:56 PM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> You could have searched the MSKB and figured that out.  
> There's plenty of documentation out there...
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pfefferkorn, Pete (PFEFFEPE) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 10:00 AM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> Just a note to everyone.  We called Microsoft and inquired 
> what the range for the two random ports were that Exchange 
> allocates to the client once it connects to a socket.  
> According to Microsoft the range is from 1,024 to 64,000.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Don Ely [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 10:16 AM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> No security consultant I know is going to open holes in the 
> network from the DMZ to the Internal network.  Being 
> proficient in both Exchange and Security, I feel sorry for 
> your clients if you suggest the model you propose below to them.
> 
> I think you ought to study up on security some more...
> 
> If you open holes from the DMZ to the internal LAN, why in 
> the hell do you have a DMZ.  You've made the DMZ virtually 
> pointless.  Or did your teacher or book you read say 
> something different.  If it were a book that told you to 
> configure things this way, please send me the ISBN number, I 
> really wanna read that book.  Apparently, I've been taking 
> the wrong approach for years now.
> 
> I happen to know of a company who has the same model you 
> describe.  After I showed them the security issues, they were 
> desiring a change for the better immediately.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Frank Knobbe [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
> Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2001 5:47 PM
> To: Exchange Discussions
> Subject: RE: Firewall and Exchange Ports.
> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ed Crowley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2001 9:55 PM
> > 
> > Don't bother.  Use a proxy server and publish OWA.  Or 
> require SSL and
> > open port 443.  Or implement a VPN.  I still think putting 
> an Exchange 
> > front-end server in a DMZ is kind of silly.  Not as silly with 
> > Exchange 2000 as with
> > Exchange 5.5, but silly nonetheless.
> 
> Ed, 
> 
> I don't find this silly at all. Let me try to clarify:
> 
> Scenario A:
> 
> You have an Internet connection coming to a firewall. Behind 
> the firewall in your internal network you have an Exchange 
> server. You also have a web server (maybe on the same box, 
> maybe different box). You allow HTTPS traffic through the 
> firewall to the web server in the LAN.
> 
> Scenario B:
> 
> You have an Internet connection coming to a firewall. Behind 
> the firewall in your internal network you have an Exchange 
> server. In a DMZ segment (which can be a third network card 
> in the firewall, or a segment between two
> firewalls) you have a web server. HTTPS traffic is allowed to 
> the web server, and required ports (say, RPC, NetBIOS, 
> InfoStore, Directory) are allowed from the web server through 
> the firewall to the Exchange server.
> 
> 
> Scenario A has following disadvantages:
> If your web server gets compromised, the hacker is in your 
> internal network. You have no means of further restricting 
> access (besides shutting the server down). Intrusion 
> Detection is almost impossible on the SSL session (unless you 
> terminate SSL on a proxy and go clear text from there). So a 
> compromise can easily go undetected, and the intruder can 
> probe your network and advance access. The primary intrusion 
> containment is all of your internal network.
> 
> In Scenario B you have following advantages:
> If your web server gets compromised, the hacker can access 
> everything in the DMZ. He will have to discover the address 
> of the Exchange server (which can be made hard through proper 
> host hardening). Once he has that he can attack the Exchange 
> server, but using Exchange as another stepping stone to gain 
> access to the rest of your network can again be very hard. 
> All those 'hard' items will buy you time. In addition, 
> Intrusion Detection in the DMZ can quickly alert you if it 
> sees 'strange' traffic coming from the web server (say FTP 
> connections, port scans, etc). The primary intrusion 
> containment is only the DMZ.
> 
> We can even go a step further. Using a host or network based 
> IDS system, you can potentially reconfigure the firewall in 
> an automated fashion to disallow any access from/to the web 
> server in the DMZ. Now even the allowed ports are closed, the 
> attacker has no way into your network.
> 
> 
> Scenario B buys you time and has far greater potential of 
> protecting your internal network.
> 
> Now, I'm primarily a security consultant, and less of an 
> Exchange consultant, so I may look at this differently than 
> the average Exchange Admin and mail list member. Reading 
> comments like 'placing OWA into the internal network can 
> secure your DMZ' and 'OWA in the DMZ opens you more up than 
> OWA in your internal network' just make me scream since from 
> a security perspective, they are completely wrong.
> 
> If anyone wants to seriously discuss this further in a 
> professional manner, please email me offline as I'm not going 
> to enter a silly discussion with armchair security 'experts' 
> on the list.
> 
> Best regards,
> Frank
> 
> 
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