Dear Jose Javier,
Thank you very much for your constructive response to my note. I respect your
view of Luhmann and his constructivism (?), which you have certainly correctly
summarized in a few words.
However, what the Lupasco theory of actuality and potentiality does is to offer
some ontological basis for both, grounded in physics and is hence in my opinion
hence worthy of some modicum of our attention. It is possible to talk about
reality without the pretty little diagrams and calculus of Spencer-Brown.
Luhmann talks about the "constant interplay" between actual and potential,
their ineinanderstehen, but there is no functional relation to the mundane
properties of real physical systems. As Loet showed at the time, Luhmannian
structures can be defined analytically, but that is not enough for me. And a
key point: why 'constant' interplay? Is there something wrong, or is it just
too real, to include discontinuities as equally important as continuities?
It should be clear that I completely disagree with the place given to Luhmann
in current thought. Luhmann perhaps deserves some historical credit for basing
his theory on information. However, I follow Christian Fuchs who said in 2006
that "The function of Luhmann's theory for society is that it is completely
useless".
Society does not "contain" human beings: society is a group of human beings
composed of individuals and the group and their contradictorial relations and
dynamics. Luhmann stated that the "ground of being" is at the same time
actuality and potentiality, but tells us nothing about their nature and rules
for their evolution. Meaning cannot be a unity of actualization and
potentialization (or re- and re-). In unity, the two lose their necessary
specificity and basis for change. Luhmann took human beings as agents out of
his system, and replaced them with abstractions. Fascist ideology is not far
away.
If people would spend 1/20 the time on Lupasco that they do on Pierce and
Luhmann, . . .
Best regards,
Joseph
----- Original Message -----
From: Jose Javier Blanco Rivero
To: Joseph Brenner
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 11:20 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism
Dear Joseph,
Luhmann's concept of meaning (Sinn) is defined exactly as the unity of the
difference between actuality and potentiality. Maybe there an answer can be
found.
Besides, Luhmann's Sinn can also be translated as information since it regards
redundancy and selection. Luhmann self referred to Sinn (which I'd rather to
translate as sensemaking) as information processing.
Best regards
El nov 8, 2017 6:59 AM, "Joseph Brenner" <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> escribió:
Dear Colleagues,
This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar reasons, with
the last two notes, if nothing else to say that there can be one:
1. Regarding John C.'s view of the value of Pierce, there can be no common
ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the problem. His metaphysics
has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's intuitions, to which he gives less
value, have some value for me.
2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied. Nothing tells
us that information, or another complex natural process, evolves according to
the trajectories that he describes:
Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be
either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the
two.
Rather, like this discussion, such processes follow follow a 'mix' but is by
no means undisciplined, even if it is partly backwards and forwards at the same
time. Such scare words should not be used. Pace John, I think what underlies
both has been found in part, and it is the linked movement of systems from
actual to potential and vice versa.
What is missing from my picture, since no-one seems to point to it, are the
detailed values of the path from actuality to potentiality, which themselves
may go from maxima to minima, as discussed by Michel Godron. Michel has left us
. . .
Best regards,
Joseph
----- Original Message -----
From: Koichiro Matsuno
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 1:18 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism
On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote:
In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is
empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to
find what underlies both.
Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction, though
which may not yet have received due attention from the folks interested in the
issue of information.
One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin Crooks
(1999). The agenda is on the distinction between states and events in
thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness of thermodynamics allowing
for even the non-state or history-dependent variable such as heat. This
perspective is powerful enough to precipitate a dependable synthesis out of
integrating both the state and the process descriptions.
When a microscopic system of interest contacts a heat bath, its
development along an arbitrary trajectory of the state attributes of the system
necessarily accompanies the associated event of heat flow either to or from the
bath. If the trajectory is accompanied by the heat flow to the bath over any
finite time interval, it would be far more likely compared with the reversed
trajectory absorbing the same amount of heat flow from the bath. This has been
a main message from Crooks’ fluctuation theorem. One practical implication of
the theorem is that if the trajectory happens to constitute a loop, the likely
loop must be the one having the net positive heat flow to the bath. For the
reversed loop trajectory would have to come to accompany the same amount of
heat flow from the bath back into the inside of the system, and that would be
far less likely. Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and
biology must be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an
undisciplined mix of the two.
A lesson we could learn from this pedagogical example is that
thermodynamics is a naturalized tool for making macroscopic events out of the
state attributes on the microscopic level irrespectively of whether or not it
may have already been called informational. It is quite different from what
statistical mechanics has accomplished so far. Something called quantum
thermodynamics is gaining its momentum somewhere these days.
Koichiro Matsuno
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of John Collier
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2017 5:30 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism
Loet, I have no disagreement with this. at least in the detailed summary you
give. In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics
is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to
find what underlies both.
My mention of the Scholastics was to Pierce's version, not the common
interpretation due to a dep misunderstanding about what they were up to. I
recommend a serous study of Peirce on te issues of meaning and metaphysics. He
wa deeply indebted to their work iin logic.
Of course there may be no common ground, but the our project is hopeless.
Other things you have said on this group lead me to think it is not a dead end
of confused notions. In that case we are wasting our time.
John
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