Well, that certainly cleared things up! ;-} ;-{
On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 11:33 AM, Nicholas Thompson < nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Dear Doug and "List", > > I hope it is clear to everybody by now that "Nick" is a philosophical > example. He was borrowed for this purpose because the best discussions are > reflexive ... i.e, they become examples of themselves. Doug and Nick (the > real one, this time) fell into a paradox. He is arguing that I falsify my > own mind when I say that I dont understand expressions like "I feel > nauseous". I am arguing that he doesnt know what he is saying when he uses > them. Notice the paradox: if "Nick" is right, then Russ is right; if > "Russ" is right, then Nick is right. You are correct to demand that we call > a truce on this discussion for long enough to clarify why anybody should > give a damn. > > Part of the purported importance has just become clear in Russ's most > recent message. He feels that ethical behavior necessitates our respecting > the sanctity of the inner life of others. To respect the inner life of > others one must first embrace one's own, and so my statement that I dont > "have" an inner life begins to feel like an attack on the most central of > moral principles. As one of my graduate students used to [cheerfully] say, > "but Nick, if you don't have an inner life, it's ok to kill you, right?" > > Now, my wisest response to this line of argument would be to go all > technocratic and to deny that I have any ethical dog in this fight at > all. One can, after all, be a moral naturalist and assert that reasoning > and argument only come into play when people are trying to violate their > ethical impulses and that, on the whole, people are designed by nature so > that they dont kill each other. Just as I dont think it makes any > difference whether you believe in evolution or creation whether you are a > good person, I dont think it makes any difference to being a good person > whether you believe others have an inner life or not. Thus, I escape the > argument by asserting that it has no MORAL consequences. I reassure Russ > that my absense of an inner life does not make me dangerous, and, once he > takes that reassurance seriously, he doesnt have to kill me. Peace is > re-established. > > But we behaviorists are fierce (if covert) moralists. Just read Skinner's > Walden II. We deplore the metaphysics of the inner life because we think of > it as a way of thinking that encourages people to act badly while claiming > good intentions. Now it will become clear to you why I have tolerated the > conversation about my "honesty", or, more accurately "Nick's" honesty : > because I am holding a similar judgment behind my back like a mailed fist. > *The function of the inner life view (in evolutionary history) has been to > promote dishonesty! * > > Animal behaviorists from time to time have tried to serve as expert > witnesses in the societal debate concerning who you can kill (or enslave, or > whatever). I regard my colleagues participation in this argument as akin to > that of the psychologists who consulted in the CIA torture techniques. One > of my best collegial friends -- bless his heart -- wrote an essay entitled > "Does octopus suffer ?" and came to the conclusion that well, perhaps, yes, > but nothing LESS than octopus could possibly feel pain. Therefore you can > dissect a cockroach with impunity, right? Well, anybody who has stuck a > needle in a cockroach knows they dont like it. So, any attempt to draw a > line between creatures that suffer and those that dont strikes me as > casuistry of the worst sort. And people who object to clubbing a cow over > the head but who will happily eat a salmon that has suffocated in the hold > of a boat under a pile of his own kind seems to me to be ... well, kidding > himself. > > In short, I Russ thinks people would be better if they believed in the > inner life; I think people would be better people if they didnt. > > This is probably where the argument should stop, because I dont see any way > to resolve it. I am overjoyed if The People have come to understand that > The Inner Life is a way to think, not the way things are. Russ will have to > speak for himself, but I guess he will be more or less satisfied if we > understand that The Inner Life is fundamental to what we are as humans. We > will just have to hold those contradictory thoughts in our minds and move on > to issues we can resolve. > > Two places where I would like to see this discussion go from here are as > follows: > > (1) What about "self-awareness" in computers? Now, that discussion got off > to a strange start because I expected the experts on the list to treat as > trivial the proposition that computers ... in some loose sense at least ... > collect information about themselves. That assertion seemed to be already > controversial, and I would really like to understand why. Modern > automobiles gather all sorts of information about themselves. What exactly > is going on when they do this. I see this as a detailed, matter-of-fact, > discussion of self-reference in control systems. > > (2) What about "emergence"? Discussions concerning emergence always stray > into discussions about consciousness because, for many, the origin's of > consciousness in the brain is the only truly interesting example of > emergence. But I think the most interesting examples of emergence are the > most prosaic ones. I would like to see us get back to the emergent > properties of ... triangles. I would like to see us build an error-free > language for talking about simple forms of emergence ... triangles, gliders, > etc. -- so that we can have some confidence and discipline the next time we > get together to talk complexity babble face to face. > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University (nthomp...@clarku.edu) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > *To: *John Kennison <jkenni...@clarku.edu> *Cc: *The Friday Morning > Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com>; > nickthomp...@earthlink.net; e...@psu.edu > *Sent:* 6/19/2009 8:58:14 AM > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior > > As I wrote to Nick directly, I think Nick is gracious and kind and a man of > great integrity. > > But this doesn't make sense to me: "We don't have to believe in inner minds > to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as if deeply hurt." What > could it possibly mean to say that a person is deeply hurt if there is no > such thing as first person experience? And if there is no such thing as > being deeply hurt in a first person way, what could it possibly mean to say > that someone is behaving as if deeply hurt? > > This suggests that it is very dangerous to claim that there is no first > person experience and that observable behavior is all there is. It would > encourage "treating people as objects" because that's exactly the position > it takes. An attitude of this sort would seem to discard millennia of > progress in our understanding and acceptance of what ethical human-to-human > interaction consists of. > > -- Russ > > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 7:40 AM, John Kennison <jkenni...@clarku.edu>wrote: > >> >> >> Nick and I are on opposite sides of the consciousness debate. I think >> there is an inner mind and that I experience it. Nick rejects statements not >> made from the third person perspective. Perhaps the debate suffers from a >> feeling that if we take Nick's third person view, we are not allowed to use >> metaphorical statements that suggest an inner mind. But clearly we can say >> "The computer had an illusion" or a "breakdown" etc. to describe behavior. >> (e.g. The behavior was as we imagined it would be if the computer had a >> inner mind which suffered a breakdown.) Moreover, not only can these >> metaphorical statements about behavior be defined rigorously, but we can >> formulate and test rules about how they are related. We don't have to >> believe in inner minds to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as >> if deeply hurt. That is why we should not casually make such accusations nor >> assume they will be without negative consequences even if there is no inner >> mind. >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of >> Russ Abbott [russ.abb...@gmail.com] >> Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2009 11:07 PM >> To: nickthomp...@earthlink.net >> Cc: friam@redfish.com; e...@psu.edu >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior >> >> Nick wrote: >> >> To call a man "dishonest" (my word, I admit, but you have embraced it) is >> very harsh in my world, and seems (to me) to require a level of certainty >> about another person's motives that I just don't know how you could come by >> from your limited experience with me. ... >> >> You are insisting on the correctness of your view of my mind based on >> inferences from my behavior. >> >> Yes, I'm doing exactly that, judging you on the basis of your behavior -- >> in this conversation. (The past 40 years aren't relevant to that.) Your >> position in this discussion seems to be that your behavior is all there is. >> So why are you objecting that I'm doing it? >> >> Furthermore, your objection seems to be that I don't know what your >> "motives" are. I'm not sure what you mean by motives in this case. I'm not >> assuming any particular motive. In fact I'm confused about what your motives >> might be and why you are acting so dishonestly. Yet you are acting >> dishonestly. >> >> To review: a good example of your dishonest behavior was your answer to my >> question about nausea. Your provided a very nice first person description of >> what it means to feel nauseous. >> >> If you say that you are "feeling nauseous" i will understand that your >> world seems like it is churning around but that your visual cues do not >> confirm (i.e., you are dizzy) and that your stomach feels the way it does >> when on previous occasions you have thrown up. >> >> Note your use of the first person words seems and feels. But then you >> refused to answer whether that description would ever apply to a robot. >> Instead you offered a 3rd person description of what it looks like to feel >> nauseous and said that of course a robot could fit that description. I call >> that dishonest. You know what a first person description means because you >> used it yourself. But then you refused to answer the question whether such a >> first person description could apply to a robot. Furthermore, you refused to >> acknowledge that this is what you were doing. I see that as dishonest. But I >> don't know what your motives for acting this way might be. >> >> Besides, why are you so concerned about my characterizing your behavior as >> dishonest? Why is that a very harsh term? It's simply a description of your >> behavior. >> >> Are you upset because you are taking my use of the term dishonest to apply >> more broadly than to your behavior? In the second passage of yours quoted >> above, you talked about my view of your mind. Are you unhappy that I seem to >> be implying that your mind is dishonest? I thought your position was that >> there is no mind for me to have a view of. I thought your position was that >> behavior was all that mattered. It should not matter to you what "my view of >> your mind" is if it doesn't mean anything to talk about minds. >> >> >> -- Russ >> > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > -- Doug Roberts drobe...@rti.org d...@parrot-farm.net 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell
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