Where angels fear to tread, dave rushes in. Question 1) seems, to me, to be nonsensical; or hopelessly anthropocentric; or, unanswerable in any generalized or abstract form.
Paraphrasing question 2) — what set of observables (behaviors) must be present before We/I can assert, "*t***hat *thing is an agent.*" Assuming such a set exists: a) it tells me nothing about the "internals" of the thing; and b) it tells me little about anything except how We (assuming some consistency among all human beings) go about naming / categorizing things. I would also bet money that any such set is culturally grounded and that it is unlikely that any "universal" set exists. Certainly no "universal" set shared by humans and our elusive alien neighbors. If we were to examine the inhabitants of any set of things that came about via question 2), why would we expect any commonality among the "conditions" (state?? characteristics?? patterns of same???) internal to each member? Granted, there might be subsets of the set (e.g. all instances of a human being, or a dog, or, for some, an AI) where we would expect and find some kind of, at least, statistical commonality. I say statistical because there are always outliers and exceptions. Another issue, implied by the way question 1) is phrased, concerns the possibility of knowing the train of events, steps in an evolutionary process, engaging the "internals" of an entity as it proceeds from non-agent to proto-agent to agent. How can this be anything other than idiosyncratic? As to explanation vs. description: given any "description," the number of "explanations" is infinite—or, at least co-extensive to the number of "explainers." No matter what Pierce might hope, consensus is unlikely. davew On Mon, Jul 17, 2023, at 12:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > Hi, Russ, > > I have a non-scientist friend to whom I sometimes show my posts here for > guidance. I showed him some recent posts and he wrote back, "Wow, Nick! You > are really swinging for the fences, here!" He and I know that one who swings > for the fences, rarely hits the ball, let alone the fences. > > So please can we precede in little tiny steps. > > You raise the question, _ **what makes an agent?**. > > This expression is ambiguous in just the way I was trying to highlight in my > response: > > It could mean, **(1) What are the conditions that bring an agent into being?** > > Or it could mean, **(2) What are the conditions that require us to identify > something an agent?.** > > The first (I think) is the explanatory question; the second, the descriptive > question. Wittgenstein was said to have said that something cannot be its > own explanation, and I believed him. Whatever else might be said about the > relation between explanations and descriptions is that descriptions are > states of affairs taken for granted by explanations. If you ask me why the > chicken crossed the road, my answering your quest commits me to the premise > that the chicken did indeed cross the road. > > A definition is **explanatory* *when it describes a process which explains > something else and which, itself, is in need of explanation. > > So: Can I come back to you with a question? Which of the two meanings did > you intend. And if you were looking to define agents in terms of the > internal mechanism that makes agency possible, what precisely is the state of > affairs, behavior, what-have-you, that such agents are called upon to > explain.! > > For me agency is design in behavior, and an agent is an individual whose > behavior is designed. All of this has to be worked out before your > explanatory question becomes relevant, What is the neural mechanism by which > such designs come about? > > nick > > > > On Sun, Jul 16, 2023 at 3:18 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Nick, >> >> I just asked Eric for examples. Your examples confuse me because I don't see >> how you relate them to agenthood. Are you really suggesting that you think >> of waves and puddles as agents? My suggestion was that you need some sort of >> internal decision-making mechanism to qualify as an agent. >> >> I don't know anything about the carotid sinus. >> >> Your thermostat example strikes me as similar to my flashlight example. I >> might put as: a thermostat senses the temperature and twiddles the controls >> of the heating/AC units in response. >> >> I'm not sure where you are going by labeling my discussion explanatory. I >> wasn't thinking that I was explaining anything, other, perhaps, than my >> intuition of what makes an agent. >> __ >> __-- Russ >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:06 PM Nicholas Thompson <thompnicks...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >>> Some examples I like to think about: >>> >>> Waves arrange pebbles on a beach from small to large >>> >>> A puddle maintains its temperature at 32 degrees as long as it has ice in >>> it. >>> >>> The carotid sinus maintains the acidity of the blood by causing us to >>> breath more oxygen when it gets to acid. (I hope I have that right. >>> >>> An old-fashioned thermostat maintains the temperature of a house by >>> maintaining the level of a vial of mercury attached to a bi-metallic coil. >>> >>> Russ, the objection would have with your definition is that it is >>> explanatory. An explanatory definition identifies a phenomenon with its >>> causes, bypassing the phenomenon that raises the need for an explanation >>> in the first place? What is the relation between agents and their >>> surroundings that makes them seem agentish? Having answered that question, >>> your explanation now comes into play. >>> >>> The thing about the above examples that makes them all seem agenty is that >>> they keep bringing the system back to the same place. The thing about them >>> that makes them seem less agenty is that they have only one means to do so. >>> Give that thermostat a solar panel, and a heat pump, and an oil furnace and >>> have it switch from one to the other as circumstances vary, now the >>> thermostat becomes much more agenty. >>> >>> Does that make any sense? I think the nastiest problems here are (1) >>> keeping the levels of organization straight and (2) teasing out the >>> individual that is the agent. >>> >>> Nick >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 7:29 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using >>>> as an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during >>>> the day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from >>>> a flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it >>>> really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying >>>> on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have >>>> on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional whereas the garden >>>> light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They are both tripped >>>> by outside forces. >>>> >>>> BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*! >>>> __ >>>> __-- Russ >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your >>>>> flashlight example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto >>>>> tomahto) because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and >>>>> effector to the flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets >>>>> dark and off when it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe >>>>> we merely kicked the can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about >>>>> decoupling and hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such >>>>> thing as a (pure) agent just like there is no such thing as free will. >>>>> But for practical purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call >>>>> it a day. >>>>> >>>>> On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote: >>>>> > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between >>>>> > things that are agents and things that aren't. >>>>> > >>>>> > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would >>>>> > also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The >>>>> > most obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess. >>>>> > >>>>> > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do >>>>> > anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and >>>>> > destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of >>>>> > destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have >>>>> > multiple meanings. A writer's agent represents the writer in >>>>> > negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning. >>>>> > >>>>> > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, >>>>> > and it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also >>>>> > have some internal logic that determines how it interacts with the >>>>> > world. This final condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill. >>>>> > >>>>> > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an >>>>> > agent even though it satisfies my definition. Does this suggest that >>>>> > an agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its >>>>> > interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal >>>>> > level of complexity might be. >>>>> > >>>>> > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of >>>>> > agents I looked at the article on Agency >>>>> > <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the >>>>> > /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a >>>>> > parody of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences >>>>> > from the article overview. >>>>> > >>>>> > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to >>>>> > act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this >>>>> > capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard >>>>> > conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action >>>>> > in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of >>>>> > action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. >>>>> > >>>>> > _ >>>>> > _ >>>>> > That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same >>>>> > time, it seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have >>>>> > intentions and mental models. (To be fair, the article does consider >>>>> > the possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But >>>>> > those discussions seem relatively tangential.) >>>>> > >>>>> > Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of >>>>> > worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far. >>>>> > >>>>> > __-- Russ Abbott >>>>> > Professor Emeritus, Computer Science >>>>> > California State University, Los Angeles >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com >>>>> > <mailto:wimber...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in <http://job.in> the Philosophy >>>>> > Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook: >>>>> > >>>>> > I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited >>>>> > defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at >>>>> > all. His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher >>>>> > who spins theories without paying attention to scientific practice and >>>>> > contributes nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that >>>>> > scientists themselves are constantly raising obviously philosophical >>>>> > questions and are often ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What >>>>> > is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right >>>>> > way to think about reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think >>>>> > about science? What is the nature of consciousness? Can you explain >>>>> > consciousness in terms of neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What >>>>> > does it even mean to be real? Or is realism a red herring; should we be >>>>> > pragmatists instead? Scientists raise all kinds of philosophical >>>>> > questions and have ill-informed opinions about them. But *philosophers* >>>>> > try to answer >>>>> > them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At >>>>> > least the smart ones do. >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ >>>>> >>>>> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>>> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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