Consciousness? Sure. Free will? Not so much. Science still doesn’t really understand consciousness, but I do think humans are conscious. Free will, though? I don’t believe in it—it seems more like a trick our minds play on us.
On Thu, 6 Mar 2025 at 04:34, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com> wrote: > Will it have consciousness? > > > > *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly > *Sent:* Wednesday, March 5, 2025 6:23 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will? > > > > The real issue is consciousness. > > > > --- > Frank C. Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > 505 670-9918 > Santa Fe, NM > > > > On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, 7:20 PM Pieter Steenekamp <piet...@randcontrols.co.za> > wrote: > > First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note > to self: keep an eye on its development. > > Now, back to the question: Will it have free will? > > I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free > will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s > take on free will). > > However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based > and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t > prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess > some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon > or artificial biology. > > > Appendix, Grok's take on free will: > > Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will. > > Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg) > > > Key Points > > - Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we > can make choices independently of prior causes. > - Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, > while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined. > - Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, > but interpretations vary, fueling controversy. > - The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, > making it a deeply debated topic. > > Definition and Philosophical Debate > > Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully > determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into > two main camps: > > - Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism, > meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those > desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because > you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by > upbringing. > - Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined > by prior causes. They split into: > > > - Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false, > suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices. > - Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is > an illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes. > > Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism > is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which > claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not > external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s > argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise, > and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist > regardless of determinism. > > Scientific Insights > > Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain > activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making, > suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this > is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue > we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for > significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging > Libet’s paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, > as experimental procedures can influence results (Neuroscience News > <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). > > Implications and Conclusion > > The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people > responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus > exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, > even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist > view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion > continues. > ------------------------------ > > A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and > Societal Dimensions > > Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of > deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific > research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its > definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader > implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper > understanding. > > Historical and Philosophical Context > > The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has > evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often > defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior > events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing > otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, > leading to divergent philosophical positions. > > Key Philosophical Positions > > Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists, > each with nuanced subcategories: > > - Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with > determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to > one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior > causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is > considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing. > > > - Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free > will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and > second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have > free > will, regardless of determinism (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy > <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>). > - Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza > argue that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for > action, such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, > even > in a deterministic framework. > > > - Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist > with determinism, splitting into two camps: > > > - Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires > indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined, > possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect > to > decision-making, allowing genuine freedom. > - Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes > free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of > prior > causes, leaving no room for alternative choices. > > The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define > free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same > circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” > includes internal states, allowing for different choices if those states > differ. > > Major Arguments > > To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from > both sides, drawn from philosophical literature: > > *Position* > > *Main Arguments* > > *Key Details and Examples* > > *References/URLs* > > Against Free Will (Incompatibilism) > > - > > Consequence Argument > > : If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section > 4a). > > - Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐ > (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is > true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed). > > Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983) > > - > > Origination Argument > > : Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents > this (Section 4b). > > - Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism > means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused); > concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs. > self-origin). > > Kane (1998) > > For Free Will (Compatibilism) > > - > > Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments > > : Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or > reasons-responsive views (Section 5a). > > - Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire > mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and > Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk > decision. > > Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998) > > - > > Frankfurt’s Argument > > : Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section > 5b). > > - Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she > didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative > (Section 5b). > > Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003) > > - > > Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes > > : Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by > determinism (Section 5c). > > - Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism; > not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being > pushed); supports compatibilism. > > P. Strawson (1963) > > Pessimism > > - Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true > (Section 3c). > > - If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur > randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based > on chance. > > Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994) > > The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if > determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no > room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The > Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of > actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, > where actions are externally caused. > > Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent > is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but > doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative > possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this, > arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist > regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility. > > Scientific Investigations > > Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new > dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using > electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness > potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting > decisions might be determined before we’re aware (Neuroscience of Free > Will Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>). > This has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard > determinism. > > However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by > Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness > potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental > procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not > conclusively disprove free will (Neuroscience News > <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>). Additionally, > some argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them, > preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like > choosing a career over a trivial finger movement. > > Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices, > such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that > brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences, > potentially supporting free will in important contexts (The Johns Hopkins > News-Letter > <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>). > Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free > will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and environment, > with no room for independent choice (New Scientist > <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>). > > > Societal and Practical Implications > > The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal > identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible > for their actions, or should we see them as products of their > circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in > free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial > for social order (The Atlantic > <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>). > Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment, > and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical > frameworks. > > Quantum Mechanics and Beyond > > Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic > rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing > for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing > that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This > remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the > complexity. > > Conclusion > > The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments > like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and > compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle > ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively > disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in > meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that > free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for > maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate > will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our > agency in a potentially deterministic universe. > > Key Citations > > - Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy > <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/> > - Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American > > <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/> > - There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic > > <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/> > - Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will> > - A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm > Neuroscience News <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/> > - Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins > News-Letter > > <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will> > - Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New > Scientist > > <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/> > > > > > > > > On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com> wrote: > > https://corticallabs.com/research.html > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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