I really do have difficulty communicating. It doesn't help when overloaded terms/concepts like
"organism" and "right-left brain" cannot be easily avoided. However, some
responses to Marcus and Glen:
1-Sure you can create a network of processors connected to a larger network of robots and
claim that you are dealing with trillions of inputs but that totally misses the point.
Robots only recognize a predetermined and homogeneous set of inputs while a human entity
must deal vast heterogeneity. and has evolved (deep into the evolutionary tree) means to
"make sense" of those inputs. I cannot see how those means could be reduced to
algorithms and replicated in in an artificial system.
2-I am not using right-left brain as a *metaphor*. A huge body of empirical
evidence makes it clear that certain abilities, certain functions, are
associated with electrical activity in one lobe or the other; and how damage to
a lobe can eliminate specific kinds of abilities, including cognitive functions
like language and reasoning. That body of evidence clearly shows that
mathematical, algorithmic, linguistic, logical, ..., are primarily (not
exclusively) associated with the left-lobe. My understanding predates but has
become greatly influenced by the work of Ian McGilchrist (nearly three thousand
pages in three books), whom I have mentioned before.
3-My comment about left-brain lies and hallucinations is based on McGilchrist's
work.
4-I use the word 'organism" merely, and arbitrarily, as a convenient epidermis bounded
subsystem, ala the "embodied mind" literature.
5-Glen: you are correct as to our prior agreement. I see some kind of Venn
diagram, three overlapping circles with some kind of, as yet undefined, Grand
Unified Logic in the center common area.
davew
On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, at 10:57 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Dave writes:
>
> < BTW the human left-brain shares an interesting trait with LLMs. It
> lies and hallucinates, and frequently. >
>
> Glen writes:
>
> < What LLMs have shown us is that a mixture of 0 shot (akin to
> abduction), N-shot (akin to a mixture of induction and deduction), and
> reasoning/show-your-work (deduction) are sufficient to mimic human
> thought (or maybe merely human language). >
>
> Delusion seems more like a right-brain thing to me. Deception,
> premeditation, those are reasoning activities.
> Trump is in the middle, more of an N-shot, but also calcified 0-shot
> from a lifetime of accumulated, unedited, implicit bias. Some
> rehearsal to test how the generative model plays.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>>
On Behalf Of glen
> Sent: Thursday, March 6, 2025 8:43 AM
> To: friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?
>
> Yes. I feel like the left- right-brain metaphor is even more insidious
> than the brain as computer metaphor. I think I once got Dave's
> agreement that induction, deduction, and abduction were not disjoint
> forms of inference. Maybe I'm misremembering. But if that's the case,
> then it seems overly simplistic to suggest that a map between the left
> brain and a computer is a strong analogy but the map between the right
> brain and a computer is a weak analogy.
>
> What LLMs have shown us is that a mixture of 0 shot (akin to
> abduction), N-shot (akin to a mixture of induction and deduction), and
> reasoning/show-your-work (deduction) are sufficient to mimic human
> thought (or maybe merely human language).
>
> And it's also a mistake to map LLM <-> computer. LLMs are not
> computers. They're not really even run on computers, at least not
> without being WAY more particular about what you mean by "computer".
> The instantiated LLM (instantiated on a network of [C|G]PUs, with all
> sorts of little "glial" components as well) is not merely
> constitutively complicated, but also has provenance or heritage. The
> instantiated LLM didn't spring into existence like Athena. They've been
> scaffolded over space and time, relying on frozen stages of ontogeny.
>
> Where the analogy fails is in the (somewhat false conception of)
> organism and our fixation on it.
>
> On 3/6/25 8:09 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
>> A large AI system like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_(supercomputer)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_(supercomputer)>
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_(supercomputer)
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_(supercomputer)>> has more transistors than the human
brain has synapses, and mostly AI systems are doing tensor operations, not working with symbols.
>>
>> Much of it could an analog system, or biological system like the CL1, if either of those could provide
competitive performance (someday). Even well developed analog systems like https://mythic.ai/
<https://mythic.ai/> <https://mythic.ai/ <https://mythic.ai/>> or
https://research.ibm.com/projects/analog-ai <https://research.ibm.com/projects/analog-ai>
<https://research.ibm.com/projects/analog-ai <https://research.ibm.com/projects/analog-ai>> aren’t really at
the level of TPUs or GPUs.
>>
>> Connected to a robot or a network of robots like self-driving taxis would
provide a constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs.
>>
>> *From:*Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>>
*On Behalf Of *Prof David West
>> *Sent:* Thursday, March 6, 2025 8:04 AM
>> *To:* friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?
>>
>> Pieter,
>>
>> I mostly agree with you about free will. if it exists at all, it is at a
relatively trivial level, like choosing Twizzlers over Red Vines when I buy licorice.
>>
>> However, I would strongly disagree with your statement, /"I see no reason to
believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be
replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology."/
>>
>> The fallacy that the brain is *just* another physical symbol system and the
mind is an epiphenomenon of the operation of that system is exactly that—a
simplistic, reductionist, Fallacy—a Cartesian fantasy.
>>
>> The human organism—*as a whole*—evolved to make sense of the simultaneous and
constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs. The entire organism is involved in
"preprocessing" (aggregating, synthesizing, filtering, etc.) those inputs and the
operation of the brain is totally dependent on that substrate.
>>
>> Within the brain itself there is specialization, with a subset of the
substrate processed by right or left lobes. *NOTE: the whole brain is always involved
in any cognitive activity.*
>>
>> The left-brain's contribution to cognition is relatively small. Unfortunately, it is
both easy to describe and looks a lot like how scientists, college professors, and programmers
believe they "think."
>>
>> I will concede that anything the left-brain can do a computer can do. But
that is almost infinitely remote from what a human mind-organism can do.
>>
>> BTW the human left-brain shares an interesting trait with LLMs. It lies and
hallucinates, and frequently.
>>
>> davew
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, at 8:18 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:
>>
>> First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field.
Note to self: keep an eye on its development.
>>
>> Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?
>>
>> I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free
will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take on free
will).
>>
>> However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based
and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t prove it,
I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely
special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology.
>>
>> Appendix, Grok's take on free will:
>>
>> Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will.
>>
>> Grok's reply: (https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg
<https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg>
<https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg
<https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg>>)
>>
>>
>> Key Points
>>
>> * Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we
can make choices independently of prior causes.
>> * Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism,
while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.
>> * Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions,
but interpretations vary, fueling controversy.
>> * The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus,
making it a deeply debated topic.
>>
>> Definition and Philosophical Debate
>>
>> Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully
determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into two main
camps:
>>
>> * Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism,
meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those desires
are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because you love sweets
is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by upbringing.
>> * Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined
by prior causes. They split into:
>>
>> o Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is
false, suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices.
>> o Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is
an illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.
>>
>> Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if
determinism is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which
claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not external
causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s argument, showing moral
responsibility without the ability to do otherwise, and Strawson’s reactive
attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist regardless of determinism.
>>
>> Scientific Insights
>>
>> Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain activity
(readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making, suggesting decisions might be
determined before we’re aware. However, this is debated: some see it as evidence against free
will, while others argue we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for
significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s paradigm, suggests
these findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental procedures can influence results
(Neuroscience News <https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>>).
>>
>> Implications and Conclusion
>>
>> The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people
responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus exists,
it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, even if its reality
is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist view for practical purposes,
but the controversy ensures the discussion continues.
>>
>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific,
and Societal Dimensions
>>
>> Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently
of deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific
research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its definitions,
historical debates, scientific findings, and broader implications, offering a
detailed survey for those seeking a deeper understanding.
>>
>> Historical and Philosophical Context
>>
>> The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has
evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often defined as the
capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior events or external
influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing otherwise in identical
circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading to divergent philosophical
positions.
>>
>> Key Philosophical Positions
>>
>> Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and
incompatibilists, each with nuanced subcategories:
>>
>> * Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with
determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to one’s own
desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior causes. For instance,
choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is considered free, even if your
preference was shaped by upbringing.
>>
>> o Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free will
involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and second-order desires (what we
want to want). If these align, we have free will, regardless of determinism (Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/
<https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>>).
>> o Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza
argue that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, such
as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a deterministic
framework.
>>
>> * Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist
with determinism, splitting into two camps:
>>
>> o Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires
indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined, possibly due to
quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to decision-making, allowing
genuine freedom.
>> o Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and
concludes free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior
causes, leaving no room for alternative choices.
>>
>> The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often
define free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same
circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” includes internal
states, allowing for different choices if those states differ.
>>
>> Major Arguments
>>
>> To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments
from both sides, drawn from philosophical literature:
>>
>> *Position*
>>
>>
>>
>> *Main Arguments*
>>
>>
>>
>> *Key Details and Examples*
>>
>>
>>
>> *References/URLs*
>>
>> Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Consequence Argument
>>
>> : If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section
4a).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐
(necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g.,
Lincoln's assassination fixed).
>>
>>
>>
>> Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Origination Argument
>>
>> : Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism
prevents this (Section 4b).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2
(determinism means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused);
concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs. self-origin).
>>
>>
>>
>> Kane (1998)
>>
>> For Free Will (Compatibilism)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments
>>
>> : Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or
reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order
desire mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and
Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision.
>>
>>
>>
>> Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Frankfurt’s Argument
>>
>> : Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise
(Section 5b).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she
didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative (Section
5b).
>>
>>
>>
>> Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>>
>> Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes
>>
>> : Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by
determinism (Section 5c).
>>
>>
>>
>> - Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite
determinism; not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being
pushed); supports compatibilism.
>>
>>
>>
>> P. Strawson (1963)
>>
>> Pessimism
>>
>>
>>
>> - Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true
(Section 3c).
>>
>>
>>
>> - If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur
randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based on chance.
>>
>>
>>
>> Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)
>>
>> The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that
if determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no room
for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The Origination Argument
adds that free will requires being the source of actions, which determinism
undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, where actions are externally caused.
>>
>> Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an
agent is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but doesn’t
intervene, showing responsibility without alternative possibilities. Peter Strawson’s
reactive attitudes further support this, arguing that our natural responses like
resentment or gratitude persist regardless of determinism, maintaining moral
responsibility.
>>
>> Scientific Investigations
>>
>> Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new dimension to the
debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain
activity (readiness potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting
decisions might be determined before we’re aware (Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>>). This has been interpreted
as evidence against free will, supporting hard determinism.
>>
>> However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by Dmitry
Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness potential may not correlate
directly with decisions and that experimental procedures can influence results, suggesting
Libet’s findings may not conclusively disprove free will (Neuroscience News
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>>). Additionally, some argue that
even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them, preserving a form of free will,
especially for significant decisions like choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.
>>
>> Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices, such as deciding
which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that brain activity patterns differ for decisions with
real consequences, potentially supporting free will in important contexts (The Johns Hopkins News-Letter
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>>).
Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free will doesn’t exist, viewing
actions as the sum of biology and environment, with no room for independent choice (New Scientist
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>>).
>>
>> Societal and Practical Implications
>>
>> The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal identity. If
free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible for their actions, or should we see
them as products of their circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief
in free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for social order
(The Atlantic
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>>).
Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment, and personal
responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical frameworks.
>>
>> Quantum Mechanics and Beyond
>>
>> Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are
probabilistic rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will,
allowing for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing
that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This remains a
speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the complexity.
>>
>> Conclusion
>>
>> The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical
arguments like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and
compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle ground.
Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively disprove free will, with
recent research suggesting room for freedom in meaningful decisions. Given its
societal importance, it seems likely that free will, even if partially illusory, is a
valuable concept for maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the
debate will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our agency
in a potentially deterministic universe.
>>
>> Key Citations
>>
>> * Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/
<https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>>
>> * Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/>>
>> * There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/>>
>> * Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will>>
>> * A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience News
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/
<https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/>>
>> * Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins News-Letter
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will
<https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will>>
>> * Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New Scientist
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/>>
>>
>> On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com
<mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com> <mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com
<mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com>>> wrote:
>>
>> https://corticallabs.com/research.html <https://corticallabs.com/research.html>
<https://corticallabs.com/research.html <https://corticallabs.com/research.html>>
>>
> --
