I signed onto this mailing list as an interested person in security - not to see everyone moan. We will all have differences in opinion and we should all respect that. This goes for everyone and I feel I speak for a lot of people here, everyone needs to grow up, and shut up.
Email scanned and verified safe. On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:43, Mario Vilas <mvi...@gmail.com> wrote: > Sockpuppet much? > > > On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 2:35 PM, M Kirschbaum <pr...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote: > Gynvael Coldwind, > > What Alfred has reiterated is that this is a security vulnerability > irrelevantly of whether it qualifies for credit. > > It is an unusual one, but still a security vulnerability. Anyone who says > otherwise is blind, has little or no experience in hands on security, or > either has a different agenda. > > The obvious here is that Google dismissed it as a non-security issue which I > find rather sad and somewhat ridiculous. > > Even if we asked Andrew Tanenbaum about ,I suspect his answers wouldn't be > much different. > > Rgds, > > > On Saturday, 15 March 2014, 12:45, Gynvael Coldwind <gynv...@coldwind.pl> > wrote: > Hey, > > I think the discussion digressed a little from the topic. Let's try to steer > it back on it. > > What would make this a security vulnerability is one of the three standard > outcomes: > > - information leak - i.e. leaking sensitive information that you normally do > not have access to > - remote code execution - in this case it would be: > -- XSS - i.e. executing attacker provided JS/etc code in another user's > browser, in the context *of a sensitive, non-sandboxed* domain (e.g. > youtube.com) > -- server-side code execution - i.e. executing attacker provided code on the > youtube servers > - denial of service - I think we all agree this bug doesn't increase the > chance of a DoS; since you upload files that fail to be processed (so the > CPU-consuming re-encoding is never run) I would argue that this decreases the > chance of DoS if anything > > Which leaves us with the aforementioned RCE. > > I think we all agree that if Mr. Lemonias presents a PoC that uses the > functionality he discovered to, either: > (A) display a standard XSS alert(document.domain) in a sensitive domain (i.e. > *.youtube.com or *.google.com, etc) for a different (test) user > OR > (B) execute code to fetch the standard /etc/passwd file from the youtube > server and send it to him, > then we will be convinced that this is vulnerability and will be satisfied by > the presented proof. > > I think that further discussion without this proof is not leading anywhere. > > > One more note - in the discussion I noticed some arguments were tried to be > justified or backed by saying "I am this this and that, and have this many > years of experience", e.g. (the first one I could find): > > "have worked for Lumension as a security consultant for more than a decade." > > Please note, that neither experience, nor job title, proves exploitability of > a *potential* bug. Working exploits do. > > > That's it from me. I'm looking forward to seeing the RCE exploits (be it > client or server side). > > Kind regards, > Gynvael Coldwind > > > > > > -- > “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy > of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military > becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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