I tried to forward this the other day but it didn't make it for some reason. Brian McAndrews -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >X-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 09:30:06 -0400 >To: (Recipient list suppressed) >From: Michel Chossudovsky <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: KLA financed by Organised Crime >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Precedence: bulk > > > > >KOSOVO "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" FINANCED BY ORGANISED CRIME > > by > > Michel Chossudovsky > >Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and author of The >Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Third >World Network, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997. > >C Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, 1999. All rights reserved. >Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial internet sites, >provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To >publish this text in printed and/or other forms contact the author at >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > >Heralded by the global media as a humanitarian peace-keeping mission, >NATO's ruthless bombing of Belgrade and Pristina goes far beyond the >breach of international law. While Slobodan Milosevic is demonised, >portrayed as a remorseless dictator, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is >upheld as a self-respecting nationalist movement struggling for the rights >of ethnic Albanians. The truth of the matter is that the KLA is sustained >by organised crime with the tacit approval of the United States and its >allies. > >Following a pattern set during the War in Bosnia, public opinion has been >carefully misled. The multibillion dollar Balkans narcotics trade has >played a crucial role in "financing the conflict" in Kosovo in accordance >with Western economic, strategic and military objectives. Amply documented >by European police files, acknowledged by numerous studies, the links of >the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to criminal syndicates in Albania, Turkey >and the European Union have been known to Western governments and >intelligence agencies since the mid-1990s. > >"...The financing of the Kosovo guerilla war poses critical questions and >it sorely test claims of an "ethical" foreign policy. Should the West back >a guerilla army that appears to partly financed by organised crime." 1 > >While KLA leaders were shaking hands with US Secretary of State Madeleine >Albright at Rambouillet, Europol (the European Police Organization based >in the Hague) was "preparing a report for European interior and justice >ministers on a connection between the KLA and Albanian drug gangs."2 In >the meantime, the rebel army has been skilfully heralded by the global >media (in the months preceding the NATO bombings) as broadly >representative of the interests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. > >With KLA leader Hashim Thaci (a 29 year "freedom fighter") appointed as >chief negotiator at Rambouillet, the KLA has become the de facto helmsman >of the peace process on behalf of the ethnic Albanian majority and this >despite its links to the drug trade. The West was relying on its KLA >puppets to rubber-stamp an agreement which would have transformed Kosovo >into an occupied territory under Western Administration. > >Ironically Robert Gelbard, America's special envoy to Bosnia, had >described the KLA last year as "terrorists". Christopher Hill, America's >chief negotiator and architect of the Rambouillet agreement "has also been >a strong critic of the KLA for its alleged dealings in drugs."3 Moreover, >barely a few two months before Rambouillet, the US State Department had >acknowledged (based on reports from the US Observer Mission) the role of >the KLA in terrorising and uprooting ethnic Albanians: > >"...the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who comes to the police, ... KLA >representatives had threatened to kill villagers and burn their homes if >they did not join the KLA [a process which has continued since the NATO >bombings]... [T]he KLA harassment has reached such intensity that >residents of six villages in the Stimlje region are "ready to flee." 4 > >While backing a "freedom movement" with links to the drug trade, the West >seems also intent in bypassing the civilian Kosovo Democratic League and >its leader Ibrahim Rugova who has called for an end to the bombings and >expressed his desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Yugoslav >authorities.5 It is worth recalling that a few days before his March 31st >Press Conference, Rugova had been reported by the KLA (alongside three >other leaders including Fehmi Agani) to have been killed by the Serbs. > >Covert Financing of "Freedom Fighters" > >Remember Oliver North and the Contras? The pattern in Kosovo is similar to >other CIA covert operations in Central America, Haiti and Afghanistan >where "freedom fighters" were financed through the laundering of drug >money. Since the onslaught of the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies >have developed a complex relationship to the illegal narcotics trade. In >case after case, drug money laundered in the international banking system >has financed covert operations. > >According to author Alfred McCoy, the pattern of covert financing was >established in the Indochina war. In the 1960s, the Meo army in Laos was >funded by the narcotics trade as part of Washington's military strategy >against the combined forces of the neutralist government of Prince >Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.6 > >The pattern of drug politics set in Indochina has since been replicated in >Central America and the Caribbean. "The rising curve of cocaine imports to >the US", wrote journalist John Dinges "followed almost exactly the flow of >US arms and military advisers to Central America".7 > >The military in Guatemala and Haiti, to which the CIA provided covert >support, were known to be involved in the trade of narcotics into Southern >Florida. And as revealed in the Iran-Contra and Bank of Commerce and >Credit International (BCCI) scandals, there was strong evidence that >covert operations were funded through the laundering of drug money. "Dirty >money" recycled through the banking system--often through an anonymous >shell company-- became "covert money," used to finance various rebel >groups and guerilla movements including the Nicaraguan Contras and the >Afghan Mujahadeen. According to a 1991 Time Magazine report: > >"Because the US wanted to supply the mujehadeen rebels in Afghanistan with >stinger missiles and other military hardware it needed the full >cooperation of Pakistan. By the mid-1980s, the CIA operation in Islamabad >was one of the largest US intelligence stations in the World. `If BCCI is >such an embarrassment to the US that forthright investigations are not >being pursued it has a lot to do with the blind eye the US turned to the >heroin trafficking in Pakistan', said a US intelligence officer.8 > >America and Germany join Hands > >Since the early 1990s, Bonn and Washington have joined hands in >establishing their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans. Their >intelligence agencies have also collaborated. According to intelligence >analyst John Whitley, covert support to the Kosovo rebel army was >established as a joint endeavour between the CIA and Germany's Bundes >Nachrichten Dienst (BND) (which previously played a key role in installing >a right wing nationalist government under Franjo Tudjman in Croatia).9 >The task to create and finance the KLA was initially given to Germany: >"They used German uniforms, East German weapons and were financed, in >part, with drug money".10 According to Whitley, the CIA was, subsequently >instrumental in training and equipping the KLA in Albania.11 > >The covert activities of Germany's BND were consistent with Bonn's intent >to expand its "Lebensraum" into the Balkans. Prior to the onset of the >civil war in Bosnia, Germany and its Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich >Genscher had actively supported secession; it had "forced the pace of >international diplomacy" and pressured its Western allies to recognize >Slovenia and Croatia. According to the Geopolitical Drug Watch, both >Germany and the US favoured (although not officially) the formation of a >"Greater Albania" encompassing Albania, Kosovo and parts of Macedonia.12 >According to Sean Gervasi, Germany was seeking a free hand among its >allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of Mitteleuropa."13 > >Islamic Fundamentalism in Support of the KLA > >Bonn and Washington's "hidden agenda" consisted in triggering nationalist >liberation movements in Bosnia and Kosovo with the ultimate purpose of >destabilising Yugoslavia. The latter objective was also carried out "by >turning a blind eye" to the influx of mercenaries and financial support >from Islamic fundamentalist organisations.14 > >Mercenaries financed by Saudi Arabia and Koweit had been fighting in >Bosnia.15 And the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen >mercenaries from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting >alongside the KLA in Kosovo. German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were >reported to be training the KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics.16 > >According to a Deutsche Press-Agentur report, financial support from >Islamic countries to the KLA had been channelled through the former >Albanian chief of the National Information Service (NIS), Bashkim >Gazidede.17 "Gazidede, reportedly a devout Moslem who fled Albania in >March of last year [1997], is presently [1998] being investigated for his >contacts with Islamic terrorist organizations."18 > >The supply route for arming KLA "freedom fighters" are the rugged >mountainous borders of Albania with Kosovo and Macedonia. Albania is also >a key point of transit of the Balkans drug route which supplies Western >Europe with grade four heroin. 75% of the heroin entering Western Europe >is from Turkey. And a large part of drug shipments originating in Turkey >transits through the Balkans. According to the US Drug Enforcement >Administration (DEA), "it is estimated that 4-6 metric tons of heroin >leave each month from Turkey having [through the Balkans] as destination >Western Europe."19 A recent intelligence report by Germany's Federal >Criminal Agency suggests that: "Ethnic Albanians are now the most >prominent group in the distribution of heroin in Western consumer >countries."20 > >The Laundering of Dirty Money > >In order to thrive, the criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans >narcotics trade need friends in high places. Smuggling rings with alleged >links to the Turkish State are said to control the trafficking of heroin >through the Balkans "cooperating closely with other groups with which they >have political or religious ties" including criminal groups in Albanian >and Kosovo.21 In this new global financial environment, powerful >undercover political lobbies connected to organized crime cultivate links >to prominent political figures and officials of the military and >intelligence establishment. > >The narcotics trade nonetheless uses respectable banks to launder large >amounts of dirty money. While comfortably removed from the smuggling >operations per se, powerful banking interests in Turkey but mainly those >in financial centres in Western Europe discretely collect fat commissions >in a multibillion dollar money laundering operation. These interests have >high stakes in ensuring a safe passage of drug shipments into Western >European markets. > >The Albanian Connection > >Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and Macedonia started at the >beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power, headed by >President Sali Berisha. An expansive underground economy and cross border >trade had unfolded. A triangular trade in oil, arms and narcotics had >developed largely as a result of the embargo imposed by the international >community on Serbia and Montenegro and the blockade enforced by Greece >against Macedonia. > >Industry and agriculture in Kosovo were spearheaded into bankruptcy >following the IMF's lethal "economic medicine" imposed on Belgrade in >1990. The embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians and Serbs >were driven into abysmal poverty. Economic collapse created an >environment which fostered the progress of illicit trade. In Kosovo, the >rate of unemployment increased to a staggering 70 percent (according to >Western sources). > >Poverty and economic collapse served to exacerbate simmering ethnic >tensions. Thousands of unemployed youths "barely out of their Teens" from >an impoverished population, were drafted into the ranks of the KLA...22 > >In neighbouring Albania, the free market reforms adopted since 1992 had >created conditions which favoured the criminalisation of State >institutions. Drug money was also laundered in the Albanian pyramids >(ponzi schemes) which mushroomed during the government of former President >Sali Berisha (1992-1997).23 These shady investment funds were an integral >part of the economic reforms inflicted by Western creditors on Albania. > >Drug barons in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (with links to the Italian >mafia) had become the new economic elites, often associated with Western >business interests. In turn the financial proceeds of the trade in drugs >and arms were recycled towards other illicit activities (and vice versa) >including a vast prostitution racket between Albania and Italy. Albanian >criminal groups operating in Milan, "have become so powerful running >prostitution rackets that they have even taken over the Calabrians in >strength and influence."24 > >The application of "strong economic medicine" under the guidance of the >Washington based Bretton Woods institutions had contributed to wrecking >Albania's banking system and precipitating the collapse of the Albanian >economy. The resulting chaos enabled American and European transnationals >to carefully position themselves. Several Western oil companies including >Occidental, Shell and British Petroleum had their eyes rivetted on >Albania's abundant and unexplored oil-deposits. Western investors were >also gawking Albania's extensive reserves of chrome, copper, gold, nickel >and platinum... The Adenauer Foundation had been lobbying in the >background on behalf of German mining interests. 25 > >Berisha's Minister of Defence Safet Zoulali (alleged to have been involved >in the illegal oil and narcotics trade) was the architect of the agreement >with Germany's Preussag (handing over control over Albania's chrome mines) >against the competing bid of the US led consortium of Macalloy Inc. in >association with Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZ).26 > >Large amounts of narco-dollars had also been recycled into the >privatisation programmes leading to the acquisition of State assets by the >mafias. In Albania, the privatisation programme had led virtually >overnight to the development of a property owning class firmly committed >to the "free market". In Northern Albania, this class was associated with >the Guegue "families" linked to the Democratic Party. > >Controlled by the Democratic Party under the presidency of Sali Berisha >(1992-97), Albania's largest financial "pyramid" VEFA Holdings had been >set up by the Guegue "families" of Northern Albania with the support of >Western banking interests. VEFA was under investigation in Italy in 1997 >for its ties to the Mafia which allegedly used VEFA to launder large >amounts of dirty money.27 > >According to one press report (based on intelligence sources), senior >members of the Albanian government during the Presidency of Sali Berisha >including cabinet members and members of the secret police SHIK were >alleged to be involved in drugs trafficking and illegal arms trading into >Kosovo: > > (...) The allegations are very serious. Drugs, arms, contraband >cigarettes all are believed to have been handled by a company run >openly by Albania's ruling Democratic Party, Shqiponja (...). In the >course of 1996 Defence Minister, Safet Zhulali [was alleged] to >had used his office to facilitate the transport of arms, oil and > contraband cigarettes. (...) Drugs barons from Kosovo (...) >operate in Albania with impunity, and much of the transportation of >heroin and other drugs across Albania, from Macedonia and Greece >en route to Italy, is believed to be organised by Shik, the state >security police (...). Intelligence agents are convinced the chain of >command in the rackets goes all the way to the top and have had no >hesitation in naming ministers in their reports.28 > >The trade in narcotics and weapons was allowed to prosper despite the >presence since 1993 of a large contingent of American troops at the >Albanian-Macedonian border with a mandate to enforce the embargo. The West >had turned a blind eye. The revenues from oil and narcotics were used to >finance the purchase of arms (often in terms of direct barter): >"Deliveries of oil to Macedonia (skirting the Greek embargo [in 1993-4] >can be used to cover heroin, as do deliveries of kalachnikov rifles to >Albanian `brothers' in Kosovo".29 > >The Northern tribal clans or "fares" had also developed links with Italy's >crime syndicates.30 In turn, the latter played a key role in smuggling >arms across the Adriatic into the Albanian ports of Dures and Valona. At >the outset in 1992, the weapons channelled into Kosovo were largely small >arms including Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, RPK and PPK machine-guns, 12.7 >calibre heavy machine-guns, etc. > >The proceeds of the narcotics trade has enabled the KLA to rapidly develop >a force of some 30,000 men. More recently, the KLA has acquired more >sophisticated weaponry including anti-aircraft and antiarmor rockets. >According to Belgrade, some of the funds have come directly from the CIA >"funnelled through a so-called "Government of Kosovo" based in Geneva, >Switzerland. Its Washington office employs the public-relations firm of >Ruder Finn--notorious for its slanders of the Belgrade government".31 > >The KLA has also acquired electronic surveillance equipment which enables >it to receive NATO satellite information concerning the movement of the >Yugoslav Army. The KLA training camp in Albania is said to "concentrate on >heavy weapons training - rocket propelled grenades, medium caliber >cannons, tanks and transporter use, as well as on communications, and >command and control". (According to Yugoslav government sources.32 > >These extensive deliveries of weapons to the Kosovo rebel army were >consistent with Western geopolitical objectives. Not surprisingly, there >has been a "deafening silence" of the international media regarding the >Kosovo arms-drugs trade. In the words of a 1994 Report of the Geopolitical >Drug Watch: "the trafficking [of drugs and arms] is basically being judged >on its geostrategic implications (...) In Kosovo, drugs and weapons >trafficking is fuelling geopolitical hopes and fears"...33 > >The fate of Kosovo had already been carefully laid out prior to the >signing of the 1995 Dayton agreement. NATO had entered an unwholesome >"marriage of convenience" with the mafia. "Freedom fighters" were put in >place, the narcotics trade enabled Washington and Bonn to "finance the >Kosovo conflict" with the ultimate objective of destabilising the Belgrade >government and fully recolonising the Balkans. The destruction of an >entire country is the outcome. Western governments which participated in >the NATO operation bear a heavy burden of responsibility in the deaths of >civilians, the impoverishment of both the ethnic Albanian and Serbian >populations and the plight of those who were brutally uprooted from towns >and villages in Kosovo as a result of the bombings. > > > >NOTES > >1. Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels >The Times, London, Monday, March 24, 1999. > >2. Ibid. > >3. Philip Smucker and Tim Butcher, "Shifting stance over KLA has betrayed' >Albanians", Daily Telegraph, London, 6 April 1999 > >4. KDOM Daily Report, released by the Bureau of European and Canadian >Affairs, Office of South Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of >State, Washington, DC, December 21, 1998; Compiled by EUR/SCE >(202-647-4850) from daily reports of the U.S. element of the Kosovo >Diplomatic Observer Mission, December 21, 1998. > >5. "Rugova, sous protection serbe appelle a l'arret des raides", Le >Devoir, Montreal, 1 April 1999. > >6. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia Harper >and Row, New York, 1972. > >7. See John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of >Manuel Noriega, Times Books, New York, 1991. > >8. "The Dirtiest Bank of All," Time, July 29, 1991, p. 22. > >9. Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999; see also Michel Collon, Poker >Menteur, editions EPO, Brussels, 1997. > >10. Quoted in Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999). > >11. Ibid. > >12. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4 > >13. Sean Gervasi, "Germany, US and the Yugoslav Crisis", Covert Action >Quarterly, No. 43, Winter 1992-93). > >14. See Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1993. > >15. For further details see Michel Collon, Poker Menteur, editions EPO, >Brussels, 1997, p. 288. > >16. Truth in Media, Kosovo in Crisis, Phoenix, 2 April 1999. > >17. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 13, 1998. > >18. Ibid. > >19. Daily News, Ankara, 5 March 1997. > >20. Quoted in Boyes and Wright, op cit. > >21. ANA, Athens, 28 January 1997, see also Turkish Daily News, 29 January >1997. > >22. Brian Murphy, KLA Volunteers Lack Experience, The Associated Press, 5 >April 1999. > >23. See Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3, see also Barry James, >In Balkans, Arms for Drugs, The International Herald Tribune Paris, June >6, 1994. > >24. The Guardian, 25 March 1997. > >25. For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, La crisi albanese, >Edizioni Gruppo Abele, Torino, 1998. > >26. Ibid. > >27. Andrew Gumbel, The Gangster Regime We Fund, The Independent, February >14, 1997, p. 15. > >28. Ibid. > >29. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3. > >30. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 66, p. 4. > >31. Quoted in Workers' World, May 7, 1998. > >32. See Government of Yugoslavia at >http://www.gov.yu/terrorism/terroristcamps.html. > >33. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4. > > > > > > Michel Chossudovsky > > Department of Economics, > University of Ottawa, > Ottawa, K1N6N5 > > Voice box: 1-613-562-5800, ext. 1415 > Fax: 1-514-425-6224 > E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > >Recent articles by Chossudovsky : > >on Yugoslavia: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/022.html >on the Brazilian financial crisis: >http://wwwdb.ix.de/tp/english/special/eco/6373/1.html > >on global poverty and the financial crisis: > >http://www.transnational.org/features/chossu_worldbank.html >http://www.transnational.org/features/g7solution.html >http://www.twnside.org.sg/souths/twn/title/scam-cn.htm >http://www.interlog.com/~cjazz/chossd.htm >http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/eco/ >http://heise.xlink.de/tp/english/special/eco/6099/1.html#anchor1 > > ************************************************** * Brian McAndrews, Practicum Coordinator * * Faculty of Education, Queen's University * * Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 * * FAX:(613) 533-6307 Phone (613) 533-6000x74937* * e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] * * "Education is not the filling of a pail, * * but the lighting of a fire. * * W.B.Yeats * * * **************************************************
