>FWD > >FAULT-LINES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (CONFLICTS TO COME?) >Interview with Harlan Cleveland by Monte Leach > >An interview with former US Assistant Secretary of State Harlan >Cleveland about what types of conflicts are most likely to occur >in the years ahead, and what can be done to prevent them. > >Harlan Cleveland, a political scientist and public executive, is >president of the World Academy of Art and Science. A former US >Assistant Secretary of State, US Ambassador to NATO, and >university president, he has written a dozen books on executive >leadership and international affairs. > >Share International: You recently wrote a paper with futurist >Mark Luyckx at the request of the European Commission which >included some unexpected conclusions about the role of religion >in the future. What were some of your conclusions? > >Harlan Cleveland: If it's true that in the 21st century religion >will play an increasingly important role in world affairs >that's what André Malraux, author, and France's Minister of >Culture from 1960-1969, said just before he died in 1976, what >kinds of conflicts are most likely to occur in the years ahead? > >We think the fault-line is going to lie inside each of the great >religions, essentially between what are called, in various ways, >fundamentalists people who take their tradition to be very >important, and if other people don't share that tradition, then >they're infidels, outside the system and "transmoderns", those >who believe that ancient traditions and current spiritual inquiry >lead to a greater tolerance of everybody else's search for God. > >In fact, about one-quarter of the adult population in the United >States are in the category that I call "unorganized >spirituality". They feel a relationship with a higher power >God, Allah, or whatever it's called in their language and >traditions but don't feel a need for the mullah, rabbi or >priest as the intermediary, which has been the basis for all the >organized religions. People in this unorganized spirituality >component of our population are more and more thinking about how >to arrange the search for God in a way that doesn't require >trampling on everybody else's search. One rule is, nobody gets to >say: "Okay I've found the truth, the search can be called off >now". It's a way of thinking about how we can live in a peaceful >way in a very pluralistic world. > > > >SI: To say that one of the fault-lines of the future will be >inside the religious traditions is a surprising conclusion. When >you look at some of the conflicts occurring around the world, you >see conflict between the secular and religious or between the >religions. I'm thinking of Algeria, the Sudan, Israel, Northern >Ireland. > >HC: The point was brought home rather dramatically to me during a >trip to Sri Lanka. I met an American Buddhist monk, a real >contemplative person. And then I came back to Colombo, the >capital, to get the newspaper, and I read about some people >calling themselves Buddhists who just spread poisonous sarin gas >in the Tokyo subway. They're both calling themselves Buddhists. >And the young man who murdered Rabin in Israel. Compare him to >the people at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, for >example. Then compare the militant Christian right wing of the >Republican Party in the US with most of the other Christians in >the United States, who don't really appreciate the Reverend Pat >Robertson being their spokesman. > >The transmodern group is still a minority but a rapidly-growing >one. What I'm calling the new fault-line, the fault-line for the >21st century, is that the fundamentalists and transmoderns are >both against modernism, for very different reasons and in >different ways. But they're also at loggerheads. It's important >to think of the future that way rather than just assume that the >clashes are going to be between Christianity and Islam, for >example. > > >SI: Just to clarify, when you're saying somebody is premodern, >you refer to that as a fundamentalist viewpoint. The modern >viewpoint would be more secular, based on scientific principles. > >HC: Yes, supported by the pedestal of Reason, which has in this >century been eroded by the experience that scientific discovery >and technological innovation can lead not only to miracles and >constructive change but also to unprecedented dirt, damage, and >disease. > >The transmoderns are beginning to try to pour some non-rational >spirituality into the mix. And you see this happening in the >scientific community. The chaos theorists are saying that they >can't get their thinking from here to there by rational means, >and yet they know that's where they need to go. Transmodern >thinking is also increasingly questioning administrative pyramids >and hierarchical ways of thinking about management. We >increasingly have 'nobody-in-charge' systems, such as the >Internet and the international monetary system. And part of our >problem is to find ways of managing nobody-in-charge systems. > >An important part of the transmodern trend is the change in the >attitudes toward, and status of, women around the world. In the >Iranian election, the Iranian Government didn't have any idea >that allowing women to vote would upset the whole apple cart. > > > >SI: What can we do to try to resolve that premodern-transmodern >conflict that you see happening? > >HC: First, we are going to have to try not to draw political >lines around groups that think alike, in the way that has >been unsuccessfully done in Bosnia, for example. Developing a >culture of wide tolerance becomes a very important security >consideration, not just because it's nice and warm and fuzzy, but >because it really prevents conflict. > > > >Dialogue among the nations: > >SI: You have spoken and written about opening a dialogue between >the Western nations and the developing nations. Why do you see >that as being important? And what would the dialogue be based >upon? > >HC: It is a way of understanding each other in a mode that >doesn't require them to think of us as different or non-human or >infidels, nor require us to think of them as the second-class >citizens of the world who don't really matter because we >Europeans and Americans are the big shots around here. > > > >SI: You have written in your report that we might begin this >dialogue with something like the following philosophy: "We are >products of a secular, industrial society, but we realize we can >no longer discuss political futures without also discussing >questions of meaning, spirituality, and cultural identity. We are >therefore asking you to join us in a serious effort to project >mutually-advantageous futures for our societies. In order to do >this, we will all have to set aside our superiority complexes, >our intolerances whether based on scientific rationalism or >spiritual tradition, and our dreams of having our views prevail >worldwide." How would this approach be helpful as the basis for >global dialogue? > >HC: It is a way of thinking about how Europeans and Americans >ought to be talking to the Arab Middle East, Indonesians, >Indians, Chinese and others who are outside their regions. If in >a European foreign policy they could approach the world with that >attitude, it would be a striking change. Because actually what a >lot of the fundamentalists, at least the thinkers, are >complaining about doesn't have a religious basis. They're really >complaining about modernity, the effects of industrialization. We >can tone down that conversation a lot with this kind of approach. >But it requires some deep swallowing to admit that we've got a >superiority complex and that we'd better knock it off. > > > >SI: What specific topics would you be talking about? > >HC: For the Europeans, I think, in particular it applies to their >immigration policies, because they've been tightening up >recently. The Germans have been sending the Turks home. The >French, as a matter of political doctrine, used to regard Algeria >as a department, as if it were a state within the country. They >have a lot of Algerians in Paris who are French citizens, and now >they're trying to figure out some way to declare them >off-limits, which makes them the enemy. > > > >Fairness revolution: > >SI: How do you see the transmodern element and the premodern >element getting along? How will either of them accept the modern >culture they've rejected for various reasons? > >HC: That's the important thing in itself the fact that they're >both tending to reject more and more overtly and rationally the >modern worldview, which has been essentially a product of the >industrial age. The information revolution is making for all >sorts of opportunities for compatibility between those two >opponents of modernity. One of the things the information >revolution can do for the world is make it a much fairer world, >because once people get educated they're able to use the world's >dominant resource, information. But the world's dominant resource >is not like other resources. It's not scarce, you don't run out >of it, it expands as it's used. It doesn't give rise to exchange >transactions; it gives rise to sharing transactions. > > > >SI: When I think of the information revolution, I can't see the >mullahs in Iran taking part on their laptop computers. > >HC: I think they're going to find that they have to, in order to >keep up with the rest of the world, or even with the children of >their own constituents. People who think they're in charge will >always try to control a phenomenon like the Internet, but it's >essentially uncontrollable. And that's the good news about it. > > > >SI: In addition to the information revolution, could you talk >about other important trends that you see occurring in the coming >time? > >HC: In the next century we're going to have to solve the problem >of two-thirds of the world being so much poorer than the other >third that they get "antsy" and even revolutionary about it. The >means of solving that problem are becoming available, as a >byproduct of the information revolution. > >In South Korea, for example, primarily by getting the entire >population educated, they've come from being a very poor, >underdeveloped country to being the newest member of the OECD >(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), the >club of rich countries. And this was the result of applying >information to a whole society in a big way. The generals who >were in charge when the Korean War broke out in 1950 figured >they had a technological war to fight, and they'd better get >their people educated so the country could participate well in >this technological war. So the generals decreed universal >education. > >Then the war tapered off, and the generals who were still in >charge said: "We'd better knock off this universal education >stuff, it's getting too expensive." But every parent in South >Korea had gotten clearly in their mind that "all my kids are >going to go to college". There was just no way they could turn it >off. And this happened just as what we now call the information >revolution was beginning to break out. So they built a very >strong economy, which consists of bringing stuff in and adding >value to it and shipping it out again. > >If that can be done there, it can be done anywhere, and it has >been done in parts of a lot of countries, and in entire >countries like Singapore. > >What I call "the global fairness revolution" is going to be the >big story of the 21st century. We'll find other ways to be >inequitable, I suppose, but I think the economic bases for >poverty are going to disappear over the next few decades. So many >people's leaders don't let the people participate, don't want >them to be educated, but it's going to be harder and harder for >them to control. > > > >SI: Many countries are experiencing economic upheaval South >Korea is one, all of Asia really, Brazil, Russia. Do you see this >economic upheaval being a catalyst for a global fairness >revolution? > >HC: It's not really an economic crisis. It's really a financial >crisis. The lack of money is making a lot of people go >bankrupt, or feel poor. But it's the result of some very stupid >financial thinking. > >Money is really a symbolic resource. If, for example, you own a >lot of Proctor and Gamble stock and the stock price suddenly goes >down, you don't have that wealth any more; it has disappeared. Or >you thought you were wealthy, but the exchange rate changed >between your currency and somebody else's currency. But it >doesn't affect how much wheat there is in the world. > >The shortage is no longer of resources. The main shortage is of >human imagination and our capacity to organize ourselves to >handle the problems we face. It's not an absence of things. It's >an absence of curiosity and imagination. > >I have an upbeat attitude about the future. But it's often hard >for us to do what obviously needs to be done until all the other >alternatives have been exhausted. > >(For more information, contact: World Academy of Art and Science, >130 Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of >Minnesota, 301 19th Ave South, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA; Tel: >612-624-5592; Fax: 612-625-3513) > >Monte Leach, based in San Francisco, USA, is a freelance radio >journalist and the US editor of Share International. > >This article was made available through the generosity of the >Share International Media Service, PO Box 971, North Hollywood, >CA 91603, United States of America >(http://www.simedia.org/main.html) > >END FORWARD > >**In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is >distributed without charge or profit to those who have expressed a prior >interest in receiving this type of information for non-profit research and >educational purposes only.** > >HOMELESS PEOPLE'S NETWORK <http://aspin.asu.edu/hpn> >5,000+ POSTS by or via homeless & ex-homeless people >Nothing About Us Without Us - Democratize Public Policy > >
