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Ben Wattenberg of the conservative American Enterprise Institute weighs
in on the implications of the declining global population with remarks
affirming the neoconservative philosophy that America must do more with its superpowers. Wattenberg is representative of the neoconservative and Project for the
New American Century philosophy seemingly entrenched in the power rooms of Washington
DC where many promote popular justifications for the emerging Pax
Americana. The conclusions about the environmental impacts are worth discussing,
and I’d like to think that new technology and future inventions will indeed
make this forecast more positive than it seems today. However, I’m not in agreement that more developed countries
take care of their pollution better than underdeveloped ones. That’s a generalized statement begging
to be challenged in today’s world.
However, if the US joins other industrialized nations like its northern
neighbor and Old Europe in adopting the Precautionary Principle in commercial
and environmental law, then we might have a positive outcome, regardless of
future technologies and sustainable resources. On the immigration issue, I remember a previous thread discussing how
cheaper air travel, cell phones and satellite TV are keeping immigrants linked,
bonded and in some cases, still financially in business in their home country
while working in abroad. The new
immigrants are not the old immigrants.
If America’s population
growth is going to be mostly fueled by immigration in the coming century the
challenge will be that they become Americans, adopt the ideals and isms, not
become day workers in a new global economy, if this version of Pax Americana is
to succeed. - KWC It
Will Be a Smaller World After All
By Ben J. Wattenberg in the NYT, 030803 WASHINGTON - Remember the number 1.85. It is the lodestar of a
new demography that will lead us to a different world. It should change the way
we think about economics, geopolitics, the environment, culture — and about
ourselves. To make their calculations orderly, demographers have typically
worked on the assumption that the "total fertility rate" — the number
of children born per woman — would eventually average out to 2.1. Why 2.1? At that rate the population stabilizes over time: a couple
has two children, the parents eventually die, and their children
"replace" them. (The 0.1 accounts for children who die before
reaching the age of reproduction.) Now, in a new report, United Nations demographers have bowed
to reality and changed this standard 2.1 assumption. For the last five years they have been examining one of the
most momentous trends in world history: the startling decline in fertility
rates over the last several decades.
In the United Nations' most recent population report, the fertility rate
is assumed to be 1.85, not 2.1.
This will lead, later in this century, to global population decline. In a world brought up on the idea of a "population
explosion," this is a radical notion. The world's population is still
growing — it will take some time for it to actually start shrinking — but the
next crisis is depopulation. The
implications of lower fertility rates are far-reaching. One of the most profound is their
potential to reduce economic inequality around the world and alter the balance
of power among nations. The United Nations divides the world into two groups, less
developed countries and more developed countries. The most surprising news comes from the poorer
countries. In the late 1960's,
these countries had an average fertility rate of 6.0 children per woman. Today
it is 2.9 — and still falling. Huge and continuing declines have been seen in
countries like Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and (of great
importance to the United States) Mexico. The more developed countries, in contrast, have seen their
fertility rates fall from low to unsustainable. Every developed nation is now
below replacement level. In the early 1960's, Europe's fertility rate was
2.6. Today the rate is 1.4, and
has been sinking for half a century.
In Japan the rate is 1.3. These
changes give poorer countries a demographic dividend. For several decades the bulk of their population will be of
working age, with relatively few dependents, old or young. This should lead to
higher per capita incomes and production levels. Nations with low fertility rates, meanwhile,
will face major fiscal and political problems. In a pay-as-you-go pension system, for example, there will
be fewer workers to finance the pensions of retirees; people will either have
to pay more in taxes or work longer. Among the more developed countries, the United States is the
outlier nation, with the highest fertility rate — just under 2.1. Moreover, the
United States takes in more immigrants than the rest of the world combined.
Accordingly, in the next 50 years.
America will
grow by 100 million people. Europe will lose more than 100 million people. When populations stabilize and then actually shrink, the
economic dislocations can be severe. Will there be far less demand for housing
and office space? Paradoxically, a very low fertility rate can also yield labor
shortages, pushing wages higher. Of course, such shortages in countries with
low fertility rates could be alleviated by immigration from countries with
higher fertility rates — a migration from poor countries to rich ones. But
Europeans are actively trying to reduce immigration, especially since 9/11.
Wisely, America has mostly resisted calls for restrictions on immigrants. The environmental future, however, looks better. Past
research on global warming was based on a long-term United Nations projection,
issued in the early 1990's, of 11.6 billion people in 2200, far more people
than we're ever likely to see. The new projections show the global population
rising from just over six billion now to just under nine billion in 2050,
followed by a decline, moving downward in a geometric progression. With
fewer people than expected, pollution should decrease from expected levels, as
should consumption of oil.
Clean water and clean air should be more plentiful. We know that many of these
people will be richer — driving more cars, consuming more resources. We also
know that wealthy countries tend to be better at cleaning up their pollution
than poor nations. With fewer people, open spaces should also be more abundant. Still, it is the geopolitical implications of this change that may well be the most
important. There is not a one-to-one relationship between population and
power. But numbers matter. Big nations, or big groups of nations acting
in concert, can become major powers.
China and India
each have populations of more than a billion; their power and influence will
almost surely increase in the decades to come. Europe will shrink and age,
absolutely and relatively. Should the world face a "clash of civilizations," America may
find itself with weaker allies. It may then be forced to play a greater role in defending and promoting the liberal,
pluralist beliefs and values of Western civilization. We may have to do more, not because we want to, but because
we have to. Ben J. Wattenberg, a senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, is author of "The Birth Dearth." http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/08/opinion/08WATT.html |
