26. Balance of Power By Valmiki Faleiro valmi...@gmail.com
As seen, India mobilised a relatively large military force -- land, sea and air -- to physically oust a minuscule and ill-armed Portuguese military presence from Goa, Daman and Diu. Let us take a peek at how imbalanced the comparative strength of the two sides actually was, in Goa alone. In terms of ground forces mobilised by India, the disproportion or numerical superiority was about 10:1 (30,000 Indian troops versus the Portuguese garrison of 3,300), as estimated in most diplomatic reports. Some exaggerated reports put the figure at 45,000 infantry. One patently false report declared the ratio was 30:1, stating that three 'Divisions' were used when in fact two brigades were used and the third was held in reserve (three brigades equal one division). In terms of naval power, India deployed 16 warships -- a carrier group comprising of one aircraft carrier with one cruiser, one destroyer and three antisubmarine, torpedo and antiaircraft frigates as escort ships patrolling the Arabian Sea some 80-50 miles off Goa, one cruiser and one destroyer for the assault in Anjediva, three frigates for the assault at Mormugao, four minesweepers and one support vessel -- against a lone and ageing Portuguese destroyer and a small patrol boat. In terms of air power, there was no basis for comparison. India deployed a huge force of fighters, bombers, reconnaissance, air observation, communications, transports and helicopters in Pune and Belgaum plus Naval Aviation's air combat Sea Hawk and recce/anti-submarine Alizé aircraft aboard the INS Vikrant against a non-existent enemy air force. Portugal had zero aircraft in Goa (not to be confused with Japan's feared 'Zero' aircraft -- the Mitsubishi A6M combat aircraft called Reisen or the Zero fighter -- that caused havoc in the earlier stages of World War II). In terms of equipment, the disproportion varied from department to department. There was no artillery worth the name in Goa. Some ageing 6x105mm Portuguese howitzers faced a towed field artillery regiment and a heavy mortar mountain battery with air observation support (though towed artillery was meaningless on Goa's then narrow roads). The Portuguese in Goa had no modern infantry weapons, save a few mortars, LMGs and MMGs (light and medium automatics or machine guns). Perhaps the only area where there was some semblance of parity was in infantry rifles: while Portuguese troops used German Mausers of 1904 vintage and Lee-Enfield and Kropatschek rifles of 1917 vintage, Indian troops used Lee-Enfield rifles of 1917 vintage (instead of the recommended modern Belgian FN4 rifles because India's defence minister Krishna Menon, as seen, did not want NATO arms in India). [One Peter Paul Mauser rifle from an abandoned Portuguese arms and ammunition heap at the Cuelim-Cansaulim hilltop, wrapped in a mat and tied to the crossbar of a bicycle, resurfaced at remote São Brás-Cumbarjua. Elders in the family duly broke and disposed the firearm, to the chagrin of the enthusiastic lad who had pedalled with the weapon all the way from Cansaulim. Of no use to the Indian Army, the Portuguese rifles were handed over to the Goa Police, who stored them at their Altinho-Panjim armoury... from where the weapons began wriggling their way into the hands of Telugu naxalites, until terror police of the then unified State of Andhra Pradesh busted the racket in 1991.] India had all it took in excess, while the Portuguese were hopelessly ill-equipped. India's AMX tanks and Stuart armoured vehicles were pitted against a handful of Portuguese 1942-vintage armoured reconnaissance vehicles that were no longer armoured at the bottom... their worn-out bottom iron plates had been replaced with wooden planks of bacalhau (dried cod) crates. It typified the pathetic state of the Forças Armadas do Estado da Índia (armed forces of the Portuguese State of India). The Portuguese magazine Visão História wryly commented that the Portuguese equipment, only for the reason of being deployed in Goa, was not in a museum (Volume 14, 2011, Page 42). In the estimation of Goa-born Portuguese Colonel Carlos Alexandre de Morais in A Queda da Índia Portuguesa -- Crónica da Invasão e do Cativeiro (The Fall of Portuguese India -- Chronicle of the Invasion and Captivity, Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2nd edition 1995, ISBN: 9789723311341) the Indian side was "using combat vehicles of the latest model, artillery, air-transported troops, amphibious units, technical support, modern aviation, etc." while all that the Portuguese side had was "around 3,500 men ill-equipped with arms and ammunition, without armoured cars or anti-tank weapons, no air support, and practically without any artillery". Major General Dinesh Merchant, AVSM (a Pai Raikar from Panjim/Savoi Verem, Madras Regiment, veteran) grew up in Panjim in the colonial era. Once, while in transit in Nairobi late night when returning from a UN Mission in Somalia in 1994, he pined for fish curry rice. The hotel staff awakened the Goan chef. Both General and the chef nostalgically conversed in Konkani. The chef, apologetic about the lack of ingredients, prepared a modified dried-fish curry to satiate the soldier's yearning. Of the 1961 mobilisation, the Major General who lived sometime in Margao after retirement and is now in Belgaum, said in retrospect, "It was like using a sledgehammer to kill a fly." Indeed. To say that it was merely a case of inequality of the contending forces would be an understatement. The strength of the contenders was hardly comparable. The Indian side had far, far more than necessary. The Portuguese side had next to nothing. The reader will ask the obvious question: Why then did India mobilise such a large war machine? Let us look at the answer next week. -- Excerpted from revised text of the book, Patriotism In Action: Goans in India’s Defence Services by Valmiki Faleiro, first published in 2010 by Goa,1556 (ISBN: 978-93-80739-06-9). Revised edition awaits publication. *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*- Join a discussion on Goa-related issues by posting your comments on this or other issues via email to goa...@goanet.org See archives at http://lists.goanet.org/pipermail/goanet-goanet.org/ *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-