Valmiki Faleiro valmi...@gmail.com Portugal's dictator, Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, was told years before that it was impossible to defend Goa militarily. By 12 December 1961, it was clear to him that he was grossly overwhelmed by a combination of Indian land, sea and air forces. The author of the Indian Navy's official account of the 1961 Ops said the way the Portuguese went about preparing to meet the challenge was "as if they were firm believers in euthanasia."
Initially, Salazar ordered resistance "until all ammunition and provisions are exhausted". "[It was] a ridiculous expectation given the asymmetry of forces and the ragtag army at his disposal for the defence of Goa" (Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam, India's Wars, 2016, Page 188 -- the Air Mshl was referring to Salazar’s governor-general in Goa, but the quote is equally applicable to Salazar himself, the man calling the shots). Salazar changed the order in a radio message on 14 December 1961 and instead ordered his Governor-General in Goa not to surrender. "It is horrible to think that this may mean total sacrifice.... I do not foresee the possibility of truce or of Portuguese prisoners ... because I feel that our soldiers and sailors can be either victorious or dead" said Salazar in the order (Colonel Carlos Alexandre Morais, A Queda da Índia Portuguesa, Second Edition 1995, Page 117). In other words, Salazar wanted a hopeless fight to the last man and the last round. The devious intent behind this changed stance was to scandalise the world to 'pacifist' India's brutal massacre of a tiny Portuguese force in Goa. Salazar was willing to have each and every of his 3,300 ill-trained and ill-equipped defenders dead, so that this would create a worldwide political backlash against India. Even that, Salazar decided, was not enough. He was not a man of half measures. Three days later, he rounded the Portuguese response. In an ominous secret radio message on 17 December 1961, Salazar further ordered the complete destruction of all traces of Portuguese civilisation in Goa, such that nothing shall fall into the hands of India... major towns, centuries-old heritage buildings, and ancient churches -- in other words, a scorched earth policy (just as he had done in São João Batista de Ajudá, Dahomey/Benin, Africa, five months before). Freedom fighter and Goa’s first elected Legislative Assembly Speaker from 1963, Pandurang P Shirodkar quoted, "Não deixe pedra sobre pedra" (Shirodkar, My Life In Exile, 2012, Page 252). Don't leave stone on stone, destroy everything. "There shall be neither victors nor vanquished, only heroes and martyrs," said Salazar. In other words, all would die, the attackers, the defenders and most of all, the innocent residents unwittingly caught in-between. Only Goa's ashes would remain. (The Geneva Conventions banned scorched earth policy only in 1977.) "This fellow is mad," Major General Vassalo Silva said on reading the orders. Vassalo e Silva was a military officer true to traditions. When going for the symbolic Bastão (staff) ceremony to the Bom Jesus Basilica in January 1959, a dog suddenly charged out and went under wheels of his lead outrider, flinging him 10 metres away at Sao Pedro. The governor stopped the motorcade, got out to enquire about the fallen outrider, João Aranha, a young motorcycle stuntman, who rose and was ready to proceed. Vassalo e Silva insisted that Aranha be forthwith taken to the Ribandar hospital, where he spent 15 days under the care of Dr. Belarmino Lobo. The governor had someone regularly visit the hospital and report Aranha's progress to him. [This author’s senior respected neighbour and friend, Dr. Francisco Colaço, Goa's pioneer echo-cardiologist -- and a passionate writer and musician hobbyist -- gifted the book, Enquanto se esperam as naus do reino… authored by João Aranha (Esfera do Caos, Lisbon, 2008, ISBN: 978-989-8025-62-3). Aranha was a cavalry captain who arrived in Goa by the ship, Niassa on 7 May 1957 and after working in South Goa, was at the Panjim Police HQ at the time. Other than interesting accounts of several places in South Goa, Aranha describes the motorcade incident at Pages 81-82 of the book. He was a POW in Goa until repatriated in May, 1962.] Vassalo e Silva was a Brigadier-General when he was appointed the Goa Governor-General on 4 December 1958. He was promoted to a Major General in 1960. Like the first governor, Afonso de Albuquerque in 1510, the last governor Vassalo e Silva had kind of fallen in love with Goa. Not once during his three years in Goa had Vassalo e Silva visited Portugal -- something that was not regarded kindly by the regime in Lisbon. He displayed a manifest sense of caring toward Goa. As a military engineer, he conceived and executed projects designed to improve lives of the local populace. Vassalo e Silva conceived Goa's most vital bridge linking north and south Goa across the Zuari at Cortalim-Agasaim. Execution of the steel bridge may have commenced in 1961 but for a dispute with the contractor, says former Chief Engineer PWD, Anil Parulekar from Gogol, Margao, who saw the tender papers in Portuguese. (It took the Indian administration close to a quarter of a century to build a RCC bridge with a 1,200 metre span and 14 metre clearance using newly developed technology.) The last Portuguese Governor, then 61, travelled in civvies in a jeep and mixed with people freely, to the consternation of his security detail. According to freedom fighter Dr. Suresh Kanekar, he was "possibly the all-time most popular governor-general of Goa" (Kanekar, Goa's Liberation and Thereafter, Goa,1556, 2011, Page 115). [An aside: According to a long-retired Goan-origin Wing Commander of the IAF, Maj Gen Vassalo e Silva had a beautiful blue-eyed daughter aptly named Maria do Ceu -- literally, Mary of the Heavens. His son had a girl child by a Goan wife, but left them behind in Bombay. "The wife's brother was my [the Goan fighter pilot’s] college mate at St. Xavier’s College, Bombay, back in the early 1950s."] It must have been the most painful decision in the life of Major General Vassalo e Silva -- to obey Lisbon's orders and destroy his men and Goa (Lisbon had sent him cyanide), or defy the orders and save his men and Goa -- a Hobson's choice, between the devil and the deep sea. As a loyal soldier, he chose to obey orders. Following the Lisbon despatch of 17 December 1961, the governor ordered mining of the huge petrol storage bunkers at Mormugao, major towns, centuries-old heritage civil buildings, ancient churches, and ready them all for demolition. (On 14 December 1961, the Ministry for Overseas Affairs ordered the relics of St. Francis Xavier to be transferred to Lisbon, but there was neither time nor the means to implement it.) Mormugao was a mid-latitude location. Petrol bunkers exploding there would perhaps suffice to destroy north, central and south Goa. Explosives were duly placed. The governor's order to detonate was awaited. Word of the impending destruction spread like wild fire. It is said (one does not know the veracity) that India intercepted Lisbon's ominous radio message of 17 December 1961 and forthwith decided to ignore Washington's entreaties and launch Op Vijay that very night. We know that the leftist Defence Minister Krishna Menon itched to go for Goa militarily to bolster his prospects in the February 1962 general elections, but the liberal Prime Minister, Nehru, consistently towed a softer line. In the face of Salazar’s persistent stubbornness, Nehru under 'great strain' and political pressure finally decided in August 1961 to use force. The USA made last-minute efforts to prevent war, due to which D-Day of the invasion was twice postponed, first to 14 December 1961 and then to 16 December 1961. In any case, leaflets in Konkani, Marathi, Portuguese and English dropped by IAF aircraft the following morning (on 18 December 1961) read (in part), "The Portuguese will do everything to leave Goa in ruins and the Goan people in misery. They do not care what happens to Goa, now [that] they must depart. They have nothing to lose by sowing destruction. Their Portugal is at a safe distance. They will try to destroy our bridges, our railways, our temples and churches, our schools and public buildings, our fine and God-given harbour... Goans cannot and must not allow this to happen." When the first rattle of Goan house windows occurred early morning of 18 December 1961 (from IAF bombings), Goans deserted towns and villages and fled to the hills and forests. A 14-year old polio-crippled boy in Banastari was carried in a pantlo (bamboo basket used for coconuts and paddy) by his father as a head load, rushing for the yonder hills. People did not know if it was a curtain raiser of Salazar's Scorched-Earth or the Indian Invasion, or both. Not that they cared. They just fled. PS: Inácio Piedade Silveira, younger brother of the 14-year old polio-crippled boy from Banastari, worked many years in this author's parental house at Margao. He was like an older brother to me. He was about ten, I was six. He was sent home by my ex-Indian Army doctor father during the buildup to the invasion. Inácio Piedade giggled whenever he narrated the 18 December 1961 pantlo story. I giggled too. I don't today. -- Excerpted from revised text of the book, Patriotism In Action: Goans in India’s Defence Services by Valmiki Faleiro, first published in 2010 by Goa,1556 (ISBN: 978-93-80739-06-9). Revised edition awaits publication. Photos [not included]: 1. Presidente do Conselho, Portugal's President of the Council of Ministers, Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar (courtesy: Visão História-Queda Índia Portuguesa, Volume 14, 2011, Page 33) 2. Governor-General/C-in-C Maj Gen Vassalo e Silva (courtesy: Sikh LI Regimental Centre and Col Harjeet Singh, Veteran, ex 2 Sikh LI) *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*- Join a discussion on Goa-related issues by posting your comments on this or other issues via email to goa...@goanet.org See archives at http://lists.goanet.org/pipermail/goanet-goanet.org/ *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-