On Mon, 2025-03-17 at 13:03 +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > On Mon, Mar 17, 2025 at 09:27:16AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote: > > On Thu, 2024-04-04 at 12:32 +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 10:40:34AM +1300, Huang, Kai wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 3/04/2024 4:42 am, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 06:48:21PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 11:21:32PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote: > > > > > > > On 3/25/2024 6:38 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > > > > > > > TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear > > > > > > > > it leads > > > > > > > > to #VE. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to > > > > > > > guard > > > > > > > against X86_FEATURE_MCE as well? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then > > > > > > > CR4.MCE might > > > > > > > not be fixed1. > > > > > > > > > > > > Good point. > > > > > > > > > > > > I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy > > > > > > enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is > > > > > > allowed. > > > > > > > > > > > > It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. > > > > > > We > > > > > > don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably > > > > > > future-proof > > > > > > the code at this point. > > > > > > > > > > > > But let me think more. > > > > > > > > > > I think I will go with the variant below. > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S > > > > > b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S > > > > > index 56cab1bb25f5..8e2037d78a1f 100644 > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S > > > > > @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ > > > > > */ > > > > > #include <linux/linkage.h> > > > > > +#include <linux/stringify.h> > > > > > +#include <asm/alternative.h> > > > > > #include <asm/page_types.h> > > > > > #include <asm/kexec.h> > > > > > #include <asm/processor-flags.h> > > > > > @@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) > > > > > * Set cr4 to a known state: > > > > > * - physical address extension enabled > > > > > * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before > > > > > + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled > > > > > before. > > > > > + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending > > > > > on setup. > > > > > > > > Nit: Perhaps we can just call out: > > > > > > > > Clearing MCE is not allowed if it _was_ enabled before. > > > > > > > > Which is always true I suppose. > > > > > > It is true now. Future TDX will allow to clear CR4.MCE and we don't want > > > to flip it back on in this case. > > > > And yet v12 of the patch which became commit de60613173df does > > precisely that. > > > > It uses the original contents of CR4 which are stored in %r13 (instead > > of building a completely new set of bits for CR4 as before). So it > > would never have *cleared* the CR4.MCE bit now anyway... what it does > > is explicitly *set* the bit even if it wasn't set before? > > > > This is what got committed, and I think we can just drop the > > ALTERNATIVE line completely because it's redundant in the case that > > CR4.MCE was already set, and *wrong* in the case that it wasn't already > > set? > > But we AND R13 against $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57). We will lose MCE if > drop the ALTERNATIVE.
Ah, yes. > And we don't want MCE to be enabled during kexec for !TDX_GUEST: > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Actually now I've added proper exception handling in relocate_kernel perhaps we could rethink that. But that's for the future. > I think we should patch AND instruction to include X86_CR4_MCE on > TDX_GUEST: > ... > - andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d > - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), > X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST > + ALTERNATIVE __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d), \ > + __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57 | > X86_CR4_MCE), %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST Yeah... although the reason I'm looking at this is because I want to kill the ALTERNATIVE so that I can move the relocate_kernel() function into a data section: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241218212326.44qff3i5n6cxuu5d@jpoimboe/ So I think I'll do it like this instead: diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h index 5081d0b9e290..bd9fc22a6be2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ extern gate_desc kexec_debug_idt[]; extern unsigned char kexec_debug_exc_vectors[]; extern uint16_t kexec_debug_8250_port; extern unsigned long kexec_debug_8250_mmio32; +extern uint32_t kexec_preserve_cr4_bits; #endif /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c index 7abc7aa0261b..016862d2b544 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -353,6 +353,22 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image) kexec_va_control_page = (unsigned long)control_page; kexec_pa_table_page = (unsigned long)__pa(image->arch.pgd); + /* + * The relocate_kernel assembly code sets CR4 to a subset of the bits + * which were set during kernel runtime, including only: + * - physical address extension (which is always set in kernel) + * - 5-level paging (if it's enabled) + * - Machine check exception on TDX guests + * + * Clearing MCE may not be allowed in TDX guests, but it *should* be + * cleared in the general case. Because of the conditional nature of + * that, pass the set of bits in from the kernel for relocate_kernel + * to do a simple 'andl' with them. + */ + kexec_preserve_cr4_bits = X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) + kexec_preserve_cr4_bits |= X86_CR4_MCE; + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) kexec_pa_swap_page = page_to_pfn(image->swap_page) << PAGE_SHIFT; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index 4f8b7d318025..576b7bbdd55e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SYM_DATA(kexec_pa_swap_page, .quad 0) SYM_DATA_LOCAL(pa_backup_pages_map, .quad 0) SYM_DATA(kexec_debug_8250_mmio32, .quad 0) SYM_DATA(kexec_debug_8250_port, .word 0) +SYM_DATA(kexec_preserve_cr4_bits, .long 0) .balign 16 SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(kexec_debug_gdt) @@ -183,17 +184,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) movq %rax, %cr0 /* - * Set cr4 to a known state: - * - physical address extension enabled - * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before - * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. - * Clearing MCE might not be allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup. + * Set CR4 to a known state, using the bitmask which was set in + * machine_kexec_prepare(). * * Use R13 that contains the original CR4 value, read in relocate_kernel(). - * PAE is always set in the original CR4. */ - andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST + andl kexec_preserve_cr4_bits(%rip), %r13d movq %r13, %cr4 /* Flush the TLB (needed?) */
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