STRATFOR.COM Weekly Global Intelligence Update 3 April 2000 Rogue States and the New Reality Summary We are in a transitional phase in global geopolitics. The previous period was dominated by a single superpower whose primary concern was global economic integration and the management of isolated, regional powers it called rogue states. The new epoch will be one in which there continues to be a single superpower, capable of projecting forces globally. However, arrayed against it will be a cluster of great powers, incapable of global power projection, but able to match American power on a regional basis. In the transition, rogue states will play a critical role. The great powers will use the rogue states as levers in negotiations with the superpower. As negotiations fail, the rogue powers will serve as strategic assets, helping great powers act as if they were global superpowers. Analysis During the 1990s, U.S. foreign policy focused on the threat posed by what was dubbed "rogue states." These states, including at various times, Iraq, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Libya and Cuba, represented three classes of threat. Internally, they followed policies disapproved of by the United States, and they threatened U.S. allies and general stability. Strategically, some of these nations had the potential for developing weapons of mass destruction that in some cases could have threatened the United States directly. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the intense engagement of China in economic relations with the West, the United States found it relatively easy to isolate these rogue states. Indeed, during the events that bracketed the 1990s - Iraq and Kosovo - the United States could form massive coalitions to wage war against them. The rogue states were isolated in the international system and could expect a re-supply of weapons only on a covert and therefore limited basis from a variety of unreliable sources. They were isolated in international trade and often traded under rules dictated by the United States. The United States' policy was to isolate the rogue states, maintain heavy pressure on them and ultimately create a situation in which the rogue regime would fall, to be replaced by a regime more in tune with U.S. global policy. U.S. national security policy was obsessed with the threat posed by these minor regional powers. Quite apart from the military effort exerted to contain these regimes, U.S. defense doctrine took seriously the idea that major conflicts with what were called "peer" countries would be unlikely in the future and that the most serious military operations would be waged against "outlaw" nations. Limited military operations coupled with economic and psychological warfare were expected to constitute the center of gravity for U.S. defense policy into the 21st century. Given the operational and doctrinal obsession with rogue nations, it is fascinating to note that in not a single case was this policy actually successful, with the possible exception of Haiti. In not a single case, from Iraq to Yugoslavia, did operations of varied levels of intensity succeed in bringing down a rogue regime. From both ends of the decade, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic continue to rule. So do Kim Jong Il and Fidel Castro. They were contained, but they were not destroyed. The ability to contain these nations had less to do with the effectiveness of U.S. operations and doctrines and more to do with the absence of a great power to serve as the center of gravity for an anti-U.S. coalition. No great power found it in its interest to challenge U.S. policy toward these countries by directly and openly providing them with military, political and economic assistance. More importantly, the survival of these regimes was not of sufficient interest to any great power to trigger a serious response against the United States. For example, had the United States chosen to attack Yugoslavia in 1970, the probability of a Soviet response would have been high. But the response might not have come in Yugoslavia. It might have come in some area of vital U.S. interest where the correlation of forces favored the Soviets. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, for example, one of the Soviets' options was to accept a U.S. attack on Cuba, but to overrun Berlin. The fear of direct Soviet intervention, or some indirect response, contained U.S. foreign policy. The reciprocal consideration contained Soviet foreign policy. There were no rogue nations during these years. Virtually any nation could find a great power patron. The presence of great power patronage limited the risk-taking of other great powers. The Soviet Union, China and the United States calculated all actions against lesser nations in terms of the potential responses by another great power. This did not preclude military action. It, however, raised the stakes dramatically and tended to contain the military actions taken. During the Korean War, for example, the United States did not bomb China or the Soviet Union. Nor did the North Koreans or Chinese attempt to attack U.S. air bases in Japan. The Cold War, precisely because there were very few rogue nations, limited unilateral military adventures in a variety of ways. The U.S. focus on rogue powers is predicated on the absence of great powers prepared to challenge U.S. power and prepared to convert rogue nations into client states. It is no longer clear that this is the case. Both China and Russia have an interest in challenging the unipolar world, replacing it with what they refer to as a multipolar world. Tensions between the United States and China have risen dramatically. While Putin is launching a predictable diplomatic offensive, we do not expect it to be successful. The gap between Russian needs and Western intentions is so vast that very little can bridge it. Indeed, this is precisely the point where rogue nations turn into clients. China and Russia are not interested in massive confrontations with the United States and the West. They are interested in extracting substantial concessions and in reorienting U.S. and Western policies in directions that are more favorable to them. Their problem is that they have limited traction with the United States. They can neither offer benefits of sufficient value to change U.S. policy, nor do they pose threats of a sufficient magnitude to change views. One of the most serious problems faced by Russia and China is the inherent inertia of U.S. foreign policy. Given U.S. power and relative invulnerability, the United States operates with huge margins of error. Unlike smaller, more vulnerable nations, the steering mechanism on U.S. foreign policy is extraordinarily imprecise. The United States continued to treat the Soviet Union as its primary adversary long after it had ceased to be a functional state. So too, the United States continues to take rogue nations as its primary challenge when, in fact, newer and much different challenges have emerged. The lag time in U.S. policy making is, oddly, more of a challenge to the rest of the world than it is to the United States, precisely because of the relative margins of error available. The problem being faced by both Russia and China is that although their policies have clearly shifted, and they now regard themselves in a much more complex and confrontational relationship with the United States, the U.S. government has not yet evolved in its thinking, publicly or privately. Individual officials may well understand the shift in realities, but the mechanism of U.S. foreign policy, both its public rhetoric and general operations, simply have not evolved. The U.S. is now facing a great power competition with near peers. But the rhetoric and operations of the government remain focused on rogue states. U.S. troops are committed against the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and North Korea. Cuba remains an obsession. The U.S. just launched an opening to Libya that seems to be bearing fruit, while a loosening of policy has taken place with Iran. U.S. policy continues to orbit around the rogue powers as if they were of equal concern with that of China and Russia. China and Russia's primary concerns are first, to get the undivided attention of the United States, and second, to be taken seriously. In order for the United States to take a country seriously, it must perceive a threat. It is the perception rather than the reality, particularly during transitional periods of U.S. foreign policy, which is critical. The United States has, reasonably, not been concerned with the threat posed by Russia or China. That is one of the reasons why Putin has focused attention on nuclear weapons again. It is one reason, among several, why China has chosen to threaten Taiwan. Each wants to pose a threat to the United States equal to, or greater than, the perceived threat posed by rogue powers. There is an obvious move open to the Russians and Chinese. Given the built-in time lag of U.S. policy making, it is clearly in Russia and China's interest to take advantage of the American obsession with rogue states by turning them, at least informally, into clients. This would definitely benefit rogue states, since it would end their formal isolation from the world. It would also aid them internally, since great power backing would help legitimize their regimes. The advantage to a Milosevic, Saddam or Castro of closer political ties, as well as military and economic assistance, is clear. Moreover, the relative amount of assistance required to make a difference is small enough that even Russia, in its reduced economic circumstances, could have a substantial impact. China, on the other hand, could make a tremendous difference even now. Such a move would benefit the potential clients. But the real beneficiary would be the great powers needing to influence the United States. A Russia providing military assistance to Havana or Belgrade would be taken much more seriously, and dealt with much more cautiously, than would a Russia without this leverage. The same is true with Chinese assistance to North Korea or Iraq. The reason is more psychological than strategic. The United States is geared up to deal with Yugoslavia and Iraq. The foreign policy bureaucracy has been deployed against these countries for years. The defense apparatus has been deployed as well. Anything that effects U.S.-Iraqi relations immediately registers in Washington. Dramatic shifts in Russian outlook simply do not. Moscow and Beijing are highly sophisticated in the ways of Washington. They fully understand that getting the attention of policy makers, particularly in an election year, is difficult. Getting them to deal with new phenomena, like an unanticipated change in the world order, is almost impossible. However, by linking themselves to ongoing, institutionalized concerns in Washington, they can force the system to take them seriously, because they affect existing, recognized problems. This is very much the tail wagging the dog in that the major issue, great power relations, is driven by secondary issues, like rogue powers. But given the dynamics of Washington, this is the short- term strategy. By turning Iraq into a client, Washington would have to face the fact that the patron state, Russia, China, or both, directly affects what Washington cares about. It forces Washington to exercise caution. Washington will eventually recognize that the key to dealing with rogue nations is often to be found in Moscow or Beijing. If the United States decides to make concessions to Moscow and Beijing, that is fine. If the United States is unable or unwilling to do so, then Moscow and Beijing have strategic relationships that will prove invaluable during the coming years of confrontation. In either case, merging the great power confrontation with the rogue power confrontation benefits both the great and rogue powers. We do not expect this to look like the Cold War, where virtually all nations defined themselves according to their relationship - or lack of relationship - with the major powers. This is a far more selective situation involving fewer nations, both because of more limited resources on the part of the challenger powers and because of the unwillingness of most secondary and tertiary powers to challenge the United States. We should still, however, expect intensifying relations between Moscow, Beijing and capitals like Baghdad, Belgrade, Havana and Pyongyang. All of America's bad boys are in play. It is interesting to note that a prior arrangement between Russia and China is not necessary for this play to take place. Each can move alone. As important, the relationship need not be formal. A covert relationship made very public, but unofficial, will do quite as well and provides Moscow and Beijing with room to maneuver if that is needed. We already see some of this process under way between China and North Korea, for example. We see Castro positioning himself for such a relationship with either Russia or China. For several years, Belgrade has been hoping for Russian patronage. Overall, the groundwork is laid and some of these relationships are taking shape. It seems to us, however, that it is in Russia and China's interest to begin intensifying their relationships with rogue states, particularly if each expects to reach a long-term accommodation with the United States. Since neither Russia nor China is governed by fools, it follows that this should become a serious issue as the U.S. presidential campaign heats up. (c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/ _______ Macdonald Stainsby ----- Check out the Tao ten point program: http://new.tao.ca "The only truly humanitarian war would be one against underdevelopment, hunger and disease." - Fidel Castro
