----- Original Message ----- From: Charles F. Moreira <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, June 26, 2000 5:20 PM Subject: MLL: Fw: Yugolavia - Milosevic Comrades, This is an interesting analysis by Stratfor Inc which shows continued NATO imperialist intentions and cunning manouvres in Yugoslavia. Fraternally Charles ----- Original Message ----- From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, June 26, 2000 10:22 PM Subject: Yugolavia - Milosevic > Stratfor.com's Global Intelligence Update - 26 June 2000 > > Toppling Milosevic: The Carrot Instead of the Stick > > Summary > > Governments in both the United States and Europe have suddenly signaled > shifts in their stances towards Yugoslavia. Washington has suggested that > rifts can be mended if Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic departs and the > European Union has said that trade might resume as long as the Belgrade > government doesn't get the revenues. A year after the war for Kosovo ended, > the West is searching for ways to recast its strategy in the Balkans, even if > means finding compromise with a leader it only recently reviled. > > Analysis > > It has now been a year since the war in Kosovo ended and two important trial > balloons were floated last week, designed to create some room for > maneuver. The Clinton administration has floated a plausibly deniable idea > for giving Milosevic de facto amnesty if he leaves Yugoslavia, and the > European Union announced it would create a "White List" of Yugoslav companies > allowed to trade with the EU as exceptions to the general embargo. > > Having failed to overthrow Milosevic with the help of the opposition, the > West is now trying to generate a palace coup, providing Milosevic with > incentives to leave and other members of the regime with incentives to push > him out. Giving Milosevic a kind of amnesty is not a very palatable strategy, > but changing geopolitical realities are forcing the United States to search > for an exit strategy from Kosovo in particular, and the Balkans in general. > > Overthrowing Milosevic was built into the rationale for last year's war. The > United States and its NATO allies claimed that the war had to be waged for > moral reasons. The United States and NATO charged that Yugoslavia was engaged > in deliberate and horrendous crimes in Kosovo, described as the worst in > Europe since Hitler. Therefore, the war had two goals: to expel Yugoslav > forces from Kosovo, putting a halt to the atrocities and destroying the > Milosevic regime by bringing those responsible for these crimes to > justice. It was assumed, without much analysis, that defeat in Kosovo would > inevitably topple the Milosevic government. > > As in Iraq, nothing of the sort has happened. There were never more than two > ways to topple Milosevic and neither depended on hauling war criminals to the > Hague. One realistic option was the scenario Germany had pursued in World War > II, invading via Hungary, allowing NATO to occupy Serbia, drive to Belgrade > and dig the Yugoslav leader out. NATO had neither the forces in place nor the > stomach for a full-scale war. Again, as with Iraq, it was easy to draw arrows > on a map. It was much more difficult to deploy, supply and execute. The > second realistic option was pursuing a political campaign of destabilizing > the regime by supporting its opponents. This was certainly attempted and it > also failed. > > The failure to dislodge Milosevic has been rooted in several causes. Perhaps > the most important was that the war was genuinely popular in Serbia. There > was a consensus that Kosovo was an integral and critical part of Serbia. More > important, Serbs believed that they were being deliberately victimized by > NATO. They believed-and still believe-that the claims of mass murder were > deliberate fabrications by the Albanians and the West to justify the > war. Every day Serbs saw themselves as innocent victims of massive > international aggression, generating both defiance and pride. > > After the war, Milosevic was not personally all that popular; he was regarded > by many as a bungler. However, whatever doubts the Serbs may have had, they > had much graver doubts about his opposition. Milosevic may have been a > bungler, but he was certainly a patriot. His opponents were seen as, at best, > taking advantage of Serbia's plight to enhance their position. At worst, > they were seen as agents of NATO, seeking to finish what the bombers had > begun. Thus, NATO's post-war strategy was doomed by its very nature. > > What has unfolded since has been a year of gridlock. In Kosovo, the > occupation has become increasingly difficult. NATO forces are caught between > the ambitions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and a growing willingness > among Serbs to take risks. NATO troops are, in a way, hostage to the > political intentions of bitter enemies. > > But the gridlock in the Balkans has encountered the dynamics of a > dramatically evolving global set of geopolitics. Partly because of the war in > Kosovo, relations between the United States and Russia, as well as China, > deteriorated. Most important, the United States faced a potential military > challenge by China over Taiwan. As tension in the Taiwan Strait rose and > fell, it has become increasingly apparent to U.S. policy makers that the > current global disposition of U.S. forces makes little sense; occupying > Kosovo, Bosnia, and patrolling the Persian Gulf makes a rapid and decisive > intervention in the strait difficult. As well, the new government in Russia > is in part a reaction to Russia's treatment at the hands of the West. With > President Vladimir Putin skillfully splitting Europe from the U.S. over the > issue of missile defenses, it would be helpful to reach a settlement in the > Balkans. > > The United States clearly needs to withdraw from the Balkans. But finding a > way out means negotiating with Belgrade; the problem is negotiating as long > as Milosevic is in power. It is the same problem that exists with Saddam > Hussein. If your opponent is an immoral monster, what do you do when you > can't destroy him? You can't ignore him and you can't negotiate with him. It > was in this context that the Clinton administration floated an idea in the > New York Times earlier this week. > > The idea was simple: the Clinton administration would be willing to forgo a > war crimes trial for Milosevic if he stepped down and left the country. To > sweeten the deal, the administration would allow Milosevic to keep his > fortune. It was floated in such a way that the administration could > immediately deny it. The article had three intended audiences. The first, of > course, was Milosevic. The second was the human rights apparatus, ranging > from the Hague tribunal to Amnesty International. The administration wanted > to test, with plausible deniability built in, how nasty the response would be > from that quarter and whether it could be managed. The response from this > quarter appears manageable. > > The third audience, and by far the most important, is the set of powerful > figures inside of the Milosevic regime. What they see is that United States > is no longer committed to the destruction of the regime. It is interesting to > note that at about the same time that the administration floated its trial > balloon, the European Union announced the creation of a "White List" of > Yugoslav firms that would be allowed to trade with the EU, as long as > revenues don't go to the government in Belgrade. This is a critical > signal: the union now prepared to make distinctions between good Yugoslav > businesses and bad ones -- good members of the Yugoslav elite and bad. > > All in all, this is an attractive offer to the Yugoslav government, basically > saying that if it is rid of Milosevic, the regime can be purified and > readmitted to Europe. A deal along these lines may not, however, be > particularly attractive to Milosevic. The example of Pinochet rests before > him. How can he be sure that some country or other won't extradite him and > put him on trial while he is passing through London some day? Milosevic may > not buy it. > > But the United States is trying to create an opportunity that Milosevic can't > resist. Other members of the regime can see an opportunity to save > themselves and end the country's isolation. It also plays well to the Serb > public who have no great love of Milosevic but resist the West dictating > their internal politics. A move against Milosevic from within would now > essentially be a palace coup, perhaps originating in the army. It is also > reasonable to believe that more intimate discussions between intermediaries > and Serbian elites will be aimed at getting Milosevic to buy into the deal > on a personal level. > > Where that leaves Kosovo is anyone's guess. It is impossible to imagine a > quick return to Serbian sovereignty -- and it is impossible to imagine any > Serb politician prepared to formally abandon claims to a Serbian > province. There is also the question of the KLA. Who will control the former > rebels? We expect a reconstituted peacekeeping force, heavily European but > including Russians in a leading role. That would allow the U.S. to draw down > its presence, while placating Moscow. Such a bargain would also remove Kosovo > as a potential presidential campaign issue in the United States. > > Of course Milosevic is fully aware of the importance of his quiet > departure. Knowing that, he will extract everything he can and perhaps seek > more than Washington can give him. Washington and NATO will want to do > everything informally, maintaining the myth that they are not dealing with > Milosevic; in the wake of the Pinochet affair, Milosevic would be a fool to > settle for that. The deal may founder as a result unless his friends in > Belgrade decide to push Milosevic out. Launching that sort of thinking in > Belgrade was what last week's maneuvers were all about. > > (c) 2000 WNI, Inc. > _______________________________________________ > SUBSCRIBE to the free, daily Global Intelligence Update. 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