Washington Post. 15 January 2002. U.S. Eyes Shift in Colombia Policy. Excerpts.
The Bush administration is considering expanding U.S. assistance to Colombia to give more aid to that country's counterinsurgency war against leftist guerrillas, according to administration officials. Proposals under high-level discussion include increased intelligence sharing on guerrilla activities around the country and training of an additional battalion of Colombian troops to serve as a rapid-reaction force protecting vital infrastructure, including pipelines used by U.S. oil companies [N.B.], against guerrilla attack. The U.S. military has trained three such battalions in the past two years, but they have been restricted to counternarcotics activities, as has virtually all U.S. military assistance in Colombia. U.S.-provided military equipment, including helicopters, is also limited under law to counternarcotics use, although the Colombian government is pressing for those restrictions to be lifted. Officials stressed that none of the proposals include the possibility of direct American combat involvement in Colombia. But expansion of U.S. assistance and training beyond the fight against production and export of illegal drugs would represent a quantum leap in a highly sensitive area of U.S. policy. High-level consideration of the proposals, one official said, is a direct result of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. "Before then, there would have been no debate, or only a very limited debate, about whether to even think about extending beyond counternarcotics aid," the official said. "At least now, these are debatable propositions." The momentum begun with September's attacks moved into high gear last weekend, after Colombian President Andres Pastrana unexpectedly suspended three-year-old peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country's largest guerrilla group. Pastrana ordered FARC troops to evacuate the Switzerland-sized zone he granted the rebel group in 1998 to encourage negotiations. His announcement sent Colombian army troops to mass near the zone in preparations for reoccupying it and driving out the FARC if a deadline set at 9:30 last night passed without substantive rebel concessions. Right-wing paramilitary troops fighting their own war against the guerrillas, in frequent alliance with the army, were also prepared to move, and there were widespread fears of impending civilian massacres. For its part, the FARC was expected to launch attacks throughout the country. Pastrana's ultimatum sent senior U.S. officials into urgent weekend discussions over what one called "authorizations and resources" -- what the United States was equipped and allowed to do under law and congressional restrictions in aiding the Colombian military. Officials were in the middle of an interagency meeting on the subject late yesterday afternoon when news arrived that the 9:30 p.m. deadline had been suspended, at least temporarily, following last-ditch mediation by a group of international diplomats working with the United Nations in Colombia. Whether peace talks get back on track or not, however, Colombia's multi-front war will continue, and "it is fair to say we are looking for other ways to help" the government prevail, said another administration official, who, like all those contacted, declined to be identified. The Pastrana government, which will leave office following elections this summer, has argued with increasing urgency that the United States must have a more comprehensive military program in Colombia. When the Bush administration, which made few changes in the bipartisan Colombia policy inherited from its predecessor, launched a policy review several months ago, a number of officials, led by senior civilians in the Defense Department, argued that the line drawn between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency was an artificial one that lessened the effectiveness of U.S. aid. [N.B.] Under the proposals being discussed, that intelligence cooperation would be reactivated and expanded to include information on guerrilla activities outside the bounds of counterdrug actions. A battalion of as many as 1,000 Colombian troops would be trained as a rapid-reaction force to protect infrastructure, and consideration would be given to providing additional equipment to the Colombian army for that purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Barry Stoller http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ProletarianNews