Hi Marc,

On 05/22/2018 04:06 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the
discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation.

A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a
config option.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyng...@arm.com>
---
  arch/arm64/Kconfig               |  9 ++++++
  arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h |  3 +-
  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c   | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index eb2cf4938f6d..b2103b4df467 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -938,6 +938,15 @@ config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
If unsure, say Y. +config ARM64_SSBD
+       bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT
+       default y
+       help
+         This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores
+         by speculative loads.
+
+         If unsure, say Y.
+
  menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
        bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
        depends on COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
index bc51b72fafd4..5b2facf786ba 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@
  #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC                   27
  #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC                   28
  #define ARM64_HW_DBM                          29
+#define ARM64_SSBD                     30

NIT: Could you indent 30 the same way as the other number?

Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.gr...@arm.com>

Cheers,

--
Julien Grall
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