-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/08/12 06:19, fr...@journalistsecurity.net wrote: > How many people on this list have spent time asking > non-technologists and other users who have tried, but have since > given up even trying to use tools like PGP? Or have examined how > new users interact with such tools? I have a great deal of respect > for this community. But to be honest it seems to me that neither > the technologists nor the donors have spent much time asking such > questions.
Hi Frank, I'd just like to make an anecdotal point here. A few months ago I spent an interesting afternoon talking to some activists in the UK about what communication tools they use for what tasks. None of them regularly used PGP, Tor, or disk encryption software, but the reasons they gave had nothing to do with usability. They were aware of the tools and knew how to use them, but they didn't believe that doing so provided any practical security benefits. They believed that encryption software probably contained backdoors and could be defeated by keyloggers. They'd seen evidence trails from computers and phones produced in court, and rather than relying on technology to solve technology's problems, some of them preferred to avoid electronic communication altogether for secret work. It's tempting to say they were right and leave it at that. Keep your secrets away from your gadgets and your gadgets away from your secrets. But that wasn't what they were actually doing. They all carried phones, even though they knew they were being tracked and possibly bugged. They all had email accounts, and some of them used mailing lists and forums for planning, even though they knew that if a keylogger could get their encryption passwords it could get everything else they typed. Why the apparent inconsistency? One possible interpretation is that they were assessing encryption tools with a typical information security mindset: if there's any weak point, the adversary will exploit it, so the strong points are irrelevant. But they were assessing other techniques with a more balanced mindset: weigh up the risks and potential benefits, compare the available alternatives, and choose the best (or the least bad). That's only speculation on my part, of course. But if it's right, it raises a difficult question: how do we maintain rigorous standards of critique within the information security community, without giving potential users of our tools the counterproductive impression that nothing works and you might as well give up? Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQIqBNAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMRLEH/04+ESJyNH9S6NYEwno1BvKe J8kMLCmR6OpolJ15nu3K7GkE4wQnhTmZVIrHApjWGz+8TACGiIQg7rOBl19r4MvA o/7tANsoUEgLRAO2hHQzA5tg+ZRtS+9oDe6LBVE3arHTCt9dYMW711ToOkgQwdoD ekNWbC4Ba2aKm3t8JmSUF+goDiadF+nSP0HByvNhKHCjzP/2SLBxDOQqeOMF/kpK Zej+0BZPCUGLaN6XaqoWw7DxgYfa9uUgx3E2ljwYnZZqcXr41kJp2uHQTZlExyxN TfiI+2P4bQfJtkK7KcOZtp/QWCAz3whmqV6F5y3tjfcHiEywzByInnKFr3tT5D0= =mHhw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
