"Roughly speaking, the idea of these attacks is to move an SED from one machine to another without cutting power, i.e., by replugging the data cable only."
Ouch. ..on Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 06:23:41PM +0100, André Rebentisch wrote: > > fyi, André > > -------- Original-Nachricht -------- > Betreff: [Crypto Stick News] Vulnerabilities of Self-Encrypted SSDs > Datum: Mon, 14 Jan 2013 17:14:51 +0100 > Von: n...@crypto-stick.com > Antwort an: webmas...@crypto-stick.com, n...@crypto-stick.com > An: n...@crypto-stick.com > > > > Researchers found vulnerabilities of self-encrypted SSDs. From the abstract: > "Self-encrypting drives (SEDs), such as Intel's SSD 320 and 520 series, are > widely believed to be a fast and secure alternative to software-based > solutions like TrueCrypt and BitLocker. [...] In this sense, hardware-based > full disk encryption (FDE) is as insecure as software-based FDE. We also show > that (2) there exists a new class of attacks that is specific to > hardware-based FDE [Full Disk Encryption]. Roughly speaking, the idea of > these attacks is to move an SED from one machine to another without cutting > power, i.e., by replugging the data cable only. [...] Some machines are > arguably more vulnerable when using SEDs." Watch the videos... [1] > > This article: http://www.crypto-stick.com/node/74 > > [1] https://www1.cs.fau.de/sed > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Julian Oliver http://julianoliver.com http://criticalengineering.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
