I speak with people regularly at Microsoft, including their CPO. It is my understanding that Microsoft's chief privacy officer doesn't have the power to do what you ask for. Scott Charney, the VP of Trustworthy Computing, will be much more central to any internal debates over this issue than Brendon Lynch. Ultimately though, I think you probably want to address this to Brad Smith, Microsoft's General Counsel.
On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <na...@nadim.cc> wrote: > Okay everyone, > the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration > of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your > signature there (or add it!) > > http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ > > We'll be publishing next week. > > > NK > > > On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <grego...@rsf.org> wrote: > >> We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but >> Reporters >> Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it. >> >> Best, >> >> >> Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : >> >> Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of >> reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you >> said into consideration. >> >> >> NK >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian <ch...@soghoian.net >> > wrote: >> >>> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government >>> surveillance section: >>> >>> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may >>> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered >>> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, >>> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of >>> National Security Letters. >>> >>> >>> You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people >>> signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to >>> real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, >>> and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't >>> specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, >>> >>> Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance >>> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require >>> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I >>> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law >>> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, >>> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without >>> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US >>> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 >>> >>> Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as 50 >>> U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of >>> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of >>> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a >>> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains >>> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not >>> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be >>> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney >>> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass >>> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint >>> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by >>> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for >>> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is >>> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United >>> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify >>> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized >>> probable cause determinations or supervise the program. >>> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) >>> >>> >>> While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign >>> on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <na...@nadim.cc>wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, >>>> >>>> I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to >>>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as >>>> signatories: >>>> >>>> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ >>>> >>>> The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. >>>> >>>> Thank you, >>>> NK >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> >> -- >> Grégoire Pouget, >> New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias >> Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières >> @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr >> GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >
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