fmt->index can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

Smatch warning:
drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mcam-core.c:1323 
mcam_vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_cap() warn: potential spectre issue 'mcam_formats'

Fix this by sanitizing fmt->index before using it to index
mcam_formats.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpen...@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gust...@embeddedor.com>
---
 drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mcam-core.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mcam-core.c 
b/drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mcam-core.c
index 80670ee..0a54dba 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mcam-core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mcam-core.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
 
 #include "mcam-core.h"
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #ifdef MCAM_MODE_VMALLOC
 /*
  * Internal DMA buffer management.  Since the controller cannot do S/G I/O,
@@ -1318,6 +1320,7 @@ static int mcam_vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_cap(struct file *filp,
 {
        if (fmt->index >= N_MCAM_FMTS)
                return -EINVAL;
+       fmt->index = array_index_nospec(fmt->index, N_MCAM_FMTS);
        strlcpy(fmt->description, mcam_formats[fmt->index].desc,
                        sizeof(fmt->description));
        fmt->pixelformat = mcam_formats[fmt->index].pixelformat;
-- 
2.7.4

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