--- Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Friday 25 May 2007 21:06, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > --- Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > ...
> > > Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do
> > > anything to enforce the argv[0] convention,
> >
> > Sounds like an opportunity for improvement then.
>
> Jeez, what argv[0] convention are you both talking about?
>From the exec(3) man page:
"The first argument, by convention, should point to the
file name associated with the file being executed."
since the man page calls it a convention, so do I.
> argv[0] is not guaranteed to have any association with the
> name of the executable. Feel free to have any discussion
> about argv[0] you want, but *please* keep it away from
> AppArmor, which really has nothing to do with it.
As I pointed out, if you wanted to trust the argv[0] value
(which I understand AppArmor makes no claims about) and you
wanted to use the argv[0] value to determine application
behavior (which several people claim is a Bad Idea) you could
use Name Based Access Control to provide different access
to the common binary. As I pointed out before, that's a lot
of "if's".
> It would be nice if you could stop calling argv[0] checks ``name-based access
>
> control'': from the point of view of the kernel no access control is
> involved, and even application-level argv[0] based access control makes no
> sense whatsoever.
Fair enough, I don't believe that an argv[0] check ought to
be used as a security mechanism. I am not convinced that everyone
would agree with us.
Casey Schaufler
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
