Re: Re: marxistphilosophy] Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
(andie nachgeborenen)
> >CB: One thinks of Marx's comments about the need for
>
> abstraction to
> make up
>
> >for inability to directly observe in certain aspects
>
> of science.
>
> Empiricists, hard-boiled phenomenalists, Berkleyean
> idealists, etc., don't object to the use of sbatrction
> in science. They wouldn't do science any differently
> (more the most part). (Mach, fore example, was a very
> distinguished scientist.) It's just the interpretation
> they put on those abstractions. After decades oif
> arguing this in philoshophy I amn wondering why the
> debate matters.
>
>
> Mach was
> stuck
> in the rut of phenomenalism. Dodging the materialist
> position, Mach
> attempted to redefine matter as permanent
> possibilities of sensation.
>
> He says he doiesn't do this. He is quite explicit that
> his "elements" are not sensastions and could bt
> physical. Carnap and later Nelson Goodman took the
> same line. Part of what mach was about as a proto
> logical positivist (and this is crystalline in Carnap,
> who was an LP), is that taking old metaphysical
> positions is pointless because they can't be sdoved by
> anything with an empirical consequence. So why not
> take Mach at his word that he is not a phenomenalist?
>
> Lenin
> defines
>
> >materlialism as belief in objective reality outside
>
> of our thoughts,
> not
>
> >belief in absolute space and time.
>
> I usedto to that. Now Ia gree with Rorty that the
> "materialist" position so defined is meaningless,
> unintelligible, and pointless. Some things are real
> and independent of our minds -- spacetime, atoms. Some
> things are real and not independent of our minds --
> classes. Some things are realand independent of our
> minds and not material -- numberrs. God, if she
> exists. Some things are real but not independent of
> our minds -- our minds, for one. The issue is really
> to be decided entirely on a case by case basis. What
> does it add to the list of all the things we think are
> real because we have scientific or other reasons to
> think they are real, whether or not they are
> indeoendent of our minds or are material, to say,a nd
> the World Is Real And Independent Of Out Minds? What
> is at stake in this claim or its denial?
>
> In fact, the
> point
>
> >to be made here is that Einstein's arriving at a
>
> materialist ( your
>
> >"realist") position based on, as you say, the
>
> dictation of science,
>
> Not the samething. Can be realistic about nonmaterial
> things.
>
> is
>
> >pretty powerful independent corroboration of the
>
> Engels-Lenin
> philosophy of
>
> >science positions. Without starting out thinking as
>
> Engels and Lenin,
> the
>
> >great thinker and scientist ,Einstein ,arrives at the
>
> same conclusions
> as
>
> >Engels and Lenin,
>
> He must be right then.
>
> >CB: What scientific theory does Lenin dismiss on
>
> philosophical grounds
> in
>
> >M&EC ? None. He criticizes empirio-criticism, a
>
> philosophical theory.
>
> Have to look this but, been years, but i am sure there
> is more than one.
>
>
> He
>
> >doesn't criticize any physical theories, Mach's or
>
> others, in M&EC. He
> only
>
> >says the new physical theories of that period are not
>
> a basis for
> ditching
>
> >materialism ( your realism), as Mach does.
>
> I believe you are correct here.
>
> >Justin: As for
> >
> > > Einstein's "realims" it was case by case. Einstein
> > > took no position on "materialism," the idea that
> > > everything in the world is in some sense material.
> >
> >Charles: Lenin's definition of materialism in M&EC is
>
> belief in the
>
> >existence of objective reality. Einstein believes in
>
> the objective
> reality
>
> >of atoms, which he specifically disputed with Mach,
>
> who coincidently
> was the
>
> >main target of Lenin's book on the general issue that
>
> the atoms issue
> is a
>
> >specific example of.
> >
> >Einstein made some statements that evince belief in
>
> God. That would be
>
> >non-materialism.
>
> Depends on what you mean by GHod. I think he somewhere
> said he acceptedthe God of Spinoza, "Deus sive
> natura," "God or nature." Now whether that is
> materialist depends on what you think nature includes.
>
> >Lenin terms Mach a Kantian , i.e. dualist, shamefaced
>
> materialist,
> agnostic.
>
> Mack acknowledges the influence of Kant. I don't think
> there is anything "shamefaced" ot "agnostic" about
> Kant's views on (to be precise) the realisity of the
> exteernal world. Kant is an "empirical realist" -- he
> thinks that there are planets and chairs, etc. They
> are not collections of Berkleyian ideas. He has an
> express refitation of Berkeley. AT the same time is
> is a "transcendental idealist." What this means is
> unclera, but one thing it does NOt mean is that he is
> agnostic about whether there are things outside our
> minds. Kant's basic thoufght is that there are things
> in themselves, i.e., outside our minds. Space and time
> are not amongthese, thesea re forms of intuition
> contributed by our minds. Kant does not think we can
> know anything about things in themselves because to
> know something about something is to have organized
> perceptions or theoretical ideas of it, what he calls
> intutions that are spatially and temporally structured
> and then conceptually organized. We also contribute,
> he thinks, concepts of such causality is the most
> important. So things as they are in themselves are
> outside space and time and have no causal relations.
> Nonetheless they exist (so there is no agnosticism)
> and "affect" us in a noncausal way, whatever that is,
> producing intuitions. This is hard has hell and it
> took me five courses on the Critique of Pure Reason to
> be able to write that paragraph, so don't expect to
> digest it too quickly.
>
> Anyway, Mach is not a Kantian in this sense. He isn
> not a transcendental idealist. He is probably not an
> empirical realist -- I don;t think Kant has any
> problem with the empirical reality of theoretical
> unobservable entities. He's something else, Mach is.
> It's less that he is agnostic about "the reality of
> theexternal world: than he thinks it doesn't matter.
> About specific cases he wants particular claims tied
> to empiricval results.
>
> >Einstein may have been more dualist, just not on
>
> atoms.
> Einstein was a Spinozist, and thus his "God" was a
> vague
> impersonal concept
>
> Don't know about Einstein's theology, but Spinoza
> never had a vague thought in hsi life. His God is
> impersonal, though.
>
> jks
I want to add to the last few points. Belief in an omniscient and /or
omnipotent interpreter is compatible with cruder forms of materialism.
There are certain ancient Indian versions too. Einstein's usage of 'God' in
some contexts is more due to social conditioning of speech. This happens with
some others living in places reeking of the opium. Einstein's God is neither
omniscient nor omnipotent, but it is at least a god which he believes is
omniscient or omnipotent to most other vague people in his locale.
A. Mani
Member, Cal. Math. Soc
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