" 4. For us and for itself "

^^^^
CB: I use "thing-for-us" and "thing-in-itself"

 


_

When I first received this book, I perused the various commentaries by its 
various contributors other than Lukacs, without reading Lukacs' own 
text.  Now I've done just the opposite, reading Lukacs sans the 
commentaries (pp. 45-150).

Many of you will recall the trajectory I've been following, revisiting the 
premises of critical theory in relation to the problems of the philosophy 
of the natural sciences.  I think I most recently reported on the 
Marcuse-Popper debate.  I have yet to write up my review of Steven Vogel's 
AGAINST NATURE, which pinpoints the cardinal weaknesses of the tradition 
from Lukacs to Habermas but whose conclusions are taken in the wrong
direction.

The last book I read before this was DIALECTICAL CONTRADICTIONS, an 
excellent compilation of essays from the Stalinist camp, much more 
philosophically sophisticated than the usual diamat agitprop.  It treats of 
the issues surrounding dialectics and logic fairly well, showing up the 
strengths of those who follow the natural-scientific tendency within 
Marxism.  But of course these are the same people who oppose critical 
theory and the anti-Stalinist wing of Marxism--both Soviet philosophers 
like Narski and their western followers.

Revisiting Lukacs at this point means rehashing issues which are old-hat, 
but nonetheless it is useful to look for missing links in intellectual 
history when in an evaluative woulda-coulda-shoulda phase.  Recovering 
Lukacs' lost manuscript doesn't solve the problem, but is nonetheless 
illustrative of what coulda happened but didn't.  Vogel wrote before this 
Lukacs ms appeared; it would be interesting to see what he would have made 
of it.

I've written about the need for an integration of knowledge which has yet 
to come.  All of the above serve as indicators that it hasn't come.  Lukacs 
lost mss shows the extent to which Lukacs pursued the issues in a hostile 
environment, how far he could go and where he broke off.  He was screwed by 
his fellow Bolsheviks. He could not effect the integration of knowledge 
within the context of the Third International, let alone within the 
universe of knowledge.  But it's still of interest to see that he was 
philosophically the most advanced within the Bolshevist tendency.

Lukacs takes on these essential tasks in his mss:

(1) demolishes the 'Kantian' arguments of his accusers: the 'Menshevik' 
Deborin and the 'tailist' Rudas;

(2) argues that his book History and Class Consciousness (HCC) is a 
philosophical defense of Bolshevism;

(3) demonstrates that only the dialectical perspective can surmount the 
subject-object dualism implicit in the philosophy of his attackers;

(4) takes on Engels' remarks about Kant, the dialectics of nature, and the 
role of the scientific experimenter within the total social process.

The structure of the ms is as follows:

I. Problems of Class Consciousness
   1. Subjectivism
   2. Imputation
   3. The peasantry as class
II. Dialectic of Nature
   1. Exchange of matter with nature
   2. Simple and higher categories of the dialectic
   3. Once again: exchange of matter with nature
   4. For us and for itself

Lukacs argues that Deborin and Rudas are caught within a dualism of subject 
and object, and therefore are incapable of addressing the nature of class 
consciousness, revolutionary praxis (as opposed to fatalism and 
spontaneity), and the Bolshevik party as the vehicle for the mediation of 
the objective and subjective dimensions of class struggle.  (See esp. pp. 
56, 63, 65, 67, 72, 75, 76, 79.)  Lukacs argues at length for his 
conception of 'imputed class consciousness', i.e. from the viewpoint of 
totality of the working class situation and its interests rather than from 
the standpoint of immediacy.  Mediation in contradistinction to immediacy 
becomes a central conceptual concept for Lukacs.

Lukacs makes a pretty good case against Deborin and Rudas.  Perhaps later 
on I'll point out specific details.  Of note is the natural-scientific 
perspective of Lukacs' opponents, the notion of 'laws of history', and 
subjectivity and consciousness across the great divide.  There's also an 
arcane treatment of their implicit Kantianism and the duality of form and 
content (76).  Lukacs convincingly argues how his viewpoint alone 
philosophically captures the essence of praxis (which must of necessity 
become embodied in a Communist party).

My memory of Soviet philosophy in the 1920s is not very good, so I can't 
contrast the arguments presented then with the party line of the New Turn 
of 1931 which sent Deborin packing as well as his rivals, and establishing 
the dominance of murderous Stalinists like Yudin and Rosenthal.  Stalinism 
was and could not remain content with a 'contemplative' natural-scientific 
perspective; the activist element had to be activated as well.  This was 
accomplished in the Stalinist double-cross of 1931.  But my memory is too 
vague to compare any possible differences between the standard 
Marxist-Leninist line of 1924 and that of the 1930s.  And then there is the 
comparison between Lukacs' conception of praxis in the '20s with the 
Stalinist line of the '30s.  (Cf. also Sidney Hook's use of Lukacs in his 
1933 work and the hot water he got into with the CPUSA, though his 
'heresies' look rather tame today.)

The other question relates to Lukacs as philosopher of Bolshevism (rather 
than as godfather of 'Western Marxism').  One can argue for the vanguard 
party as an ideal concept.  Even today Trotskyists argue that there is no 
reason a vanguard party could not function in a democratic 
manner.  However, bringing this abstract notion into contact with empirical 
realities messifies the whole business.  The issues are now obvious: (1) 
since the objective mass basis for this type of party seems to have 
disappeared in advanced industrial societies, what is the appropriate form 
of mass organization for today; (2) membership in an opposition party is 
more or less voluntary, and hence there remains freedom of association; 
whether a party captures the unique historical role it seeks for itself is 
still an open question; (3) the situation changes completely when a party 
captures state power; (4) the party as the mediator of class struggle 
becomes problematic when the party is corrupted.  Lukacs could not have 
foreseen all the problems that became obvious later, yet he was unaware 
that Bolshevism had already become irreversibly corrupted at the time of 
his writing, and that very corruption was manifest in the attacks upon 
him.  So at that very moment his theoretical justification of the vanguard 
party, which makes sense as an abstraction, was already out of phase with 
the empirical realities of how such a party really functioned in the 
context in which Lukacs lived and acted.  And so the forward thrust of 
Lukacs' brilliant theoretical argument is brought to a screeching halt.

(to be continued)

>To: marxistphilosophy at yahoogroups.com
<http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis> 
>From: Ralph Dumain <rdumain at igc.org
<http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis> >
>Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2004 02:36:37 -0400
>Subject: [marxistphilosophy] Tailism and the Dialectic
>
>
>Today (I'm pretending it's still Thursday) I received my copy of _Tailism
>and the Dialectic: A Defence of History and Class Consciousness_ by Georg
>Lukacs.  Just from reading the front and back matter by John Rees, Laszlo
>Illes, and Slavoj Zizek, I'm convinced of the indispensability of this
>book.  The amazing thing is that no one knew this manuscript even existed
>until the secret archives of the Soviet Union were opened for public
>inspection.  And this manuscript appears to be the missing link that
>explains everything that Lukacs was on about and his relationship to the
>forces that crushed his independence.  Apparently, this work forces us to
>rethink certain assumptions about Lukacs including his supposed hostility
>to the natural science and the dialectics of nature.  This work shows
>Lukacs responding to the accusations of Deborin and Rudas and stressing the
>special role of the subject/object relation as it affects the study of
>human affairs in a way not applicable to inanimate nature.  It seems, at
>first glance, that Lukacs is not questioning a unified conception of
>scientificity as well as man and nature so much as the dynamic of the
>subject/object relation in social theory and political practice.  If you
>compare this to the administrative-bureaucratic mentality of most of the
>Bolsheviks--leaders like Zinoviev and philosophers like Deborin and
>Rudas--the historic tragedy of the whole situation becomes clear.
>
>
>
>---------------------------------------------
>"This e-mail kills fascists."
>
>                    -- Woody Guthrie



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